Friday, August 27, 2010

Op-Ed: Yemen on the Brink

Yemeni girls in hijabs.
(Photo by Vassilis Glafkos
http://www.flickr.com/photos/bilwander/1420421540 )
By Antonia Dimou

Reproduced by World Press August 24, 2010

Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula seriously continues to threaten Yemen's stability, regional security and Western interests. Western security concerns focused on the impoverished Arab country, which is a neighbour of top oil exporter Saudi Arabia, after al Qaeda's Yemen-based regional wing claimed responsibility for a failed suicide bombing of a U.S.-bound plane in December 2009. Since then, al Qaeda's Yemen arm has intensified its attacks against state infrastructure in various Yemeni provinces. The attack in the southern Shabwa province on July 25 was among five raids on state targets since June, which have been attributed to the resurgent militant group.

That is why Yemen's pressing short-term and long-term problems need to be addressed immediately and comprehensively. The root causes of terrorism, appropriate methods of de-radicalizing or countering religious radicalism, and the potential for Yemen's troubles to infect its neighbors demand proper policy responses. It is evident, however, that security and economic development are mutually dependent, and meaningful political reform is necessary to sustain both.

In fact, there is an urgent need for a process of dialogue to address the critical issue of national reconciliation as well as broader political reforms. Yemen's government needs to adopt more constructive and inclusive attitudes, and decentralization of political power could alleviate many of the local grievances spawning confrontation. Personal status and business disputes are being increasingly resolved under tribal law, and not state law, and thus the restoration of the rule of law and of a strong, independent judiciary is urgent.

An outside facilitator is needed to provide a neutral forum for discussion and promote accountability. Regional and international support is absolutely critical to achieving success, and Oman or Qatar could possibly be suitable interlocutors. The dialogue process should be broad, including the ruling party, the Joint Meeting Parties, the Southern Movement, the Houthis and other relevant actors.

At the same time, Yemen's oil reserves are being depleted. Approximately 70 percent of the government's revenue comes from oil, making economic diversity an urgent and critical issue if Yemen is to avoid devastating consequences, while immediate attention needs to be paid to Yemen's emerging water and energy crises. Both crises, if not managed well, have the potential to threaten Yemen's national security.

With this reality on the ground, the framework established at the London Summit of 2010 by the representatives of countries and international organizations has become a meaningful basis to address Yemen's problems. The summit reiterated commitment to support Yemen in fighting extremism, corruption, poverty, maritime piracy and African displacement, as Yemen currently hosts more than 2 million refugees from the Horn of Africa, in addition to a large number of internally displaced persons.

A follow-up meeting of donor countries in Riyadh in February was a major extension of the London Conference. The Riyadh Donor Conference was designed to gather donors to find transparent ways to disburse aid and establish mechanisms that will monitor the reform of economic institutions and practices, the improvement of the investment climate and the rapid replacement of dwindling water and energy resources.

Nine agreements were signed by the Saudi Fund for Development on the sidelines of the Donors Conference for financing several projects in Yemen at a cost of $642 million. Saudi Arabia also agreed to extend funding for the implementation of six projects, in partial fulfillment of its pledge initially made at the first London Donors Conference of 2006 to offer $1 billion to Yemen. Additionally, the World Bank revealed that it would offer Yemen an amount of $480 million to finance development projects as part of the strategy of country assistance to Yemen for the years 2010-2013.

Both the London and the Riyadh Donors conferences aimed to address issues like the tackling of unemployment, water and energy, the role of the IMF, international aid delivery and the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yemen's high unemployment rate is critical for its stability. Given the dearth of job opportunities inside the country, the greatest obstacle towards building up Yemen's economy lies in the unwillingness of its neighbors to allow Yemenis to work in their countries. Neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and other GCC states could gradually open their labor markets to Yemeni citizens.

Yemen's lack of water is also critical as San'a may well be the first capital to lack sufficient water for its population. This water crisis could lead to massive population shifts in the region as well as serious health implications and internal instability with unpredictable security ramifications. The construction of desalination plants in key population centers along the coast and intensive aid to the government of Yemen for a national effort to manage and conserve water are important.

Additionally, neighboring countries could support Yemen in the power sector, for example, connecting Yemen to the regional power grid and assisting construction of Yemen's power infrastructure, while the further development of the Aden Free Zone as an industrial zone that would have a separate administrative authority and appropriate regulations is critical. A special status permitting duty and quota-free shipments to the European Union, the United States and other countries would stimulate investment. This zone could also host projects such as desalination and power production plants, both of which would have an evident impact on the daily lives of the Yemeni people.

It is also important to note the vital role the IMF can play in the implementation of critically needed financial and budget reforms, both of which are fundamental to progress toward a sustainable economy and thus improving the security status. The IMF could assist the Yemeni government in tax reform, which could recover billions of dollars lost through tax evasion, energy subsidies such as reducing subsidies on diesel fuel, and water reform such as increased tariffs for high water usage.

Additionally, international development aid needs to maximize coverage to a wide variety of actors and regions without favoring the government at the expense of opposition groups that have legitimate grievances. Aid should flow through the central government and local institutions. The Social Fund for Development provides a model for aid distribution. In all cases, the flow of aid must be carefully monitored in light of Yemen's pervasive corruption. Approved international government agencies and NGOs could manage foreign aid with transparency and accountability.

Last but not least, the GCC can play a significant role in addressing Yemen's problems, especially in the economic realm. But the GCC as an organization and its individual states are unwilling to open their doors to Yemeni expatriate laborers. They still mistrust the Yemeni government for backing Saddam's 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and they suspect that the Yemenis will bring with them the infections of Islamic extremism. Given that some GCC countries remain reluctant to give Yemen full membership in the Council, perhaps the GCC might consider granting Yemen "associate status" that would allow freer movement of labor and capital between Yemen and GCC countries. Such a designation would be a vote of confidence and encouragement, and could serve as a basis for reinvigorating the process of economic reform in Yemen.

As it is evident, there is no panacea or silver bullet solution for Yemen. Prerequisite for Yemen's success is the development of a comprehensive plan to address chronic poverty, reform economic institutions and practices, improve the investment climate, introduce national dialogue, restore order and the rule of law, and establish security. Failure to act on these issues will undermine any effort to deal with the threat from al Qaeda or Yemen's internal misery and thus will prolong regional turmoil and violence.


* Antonia Dimou is an associate at the Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan and head of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit at the Centre for Security and Defence Analyses based in Athens
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Thursday, August 19, 2010

Jordan: A Success Story of the IMF

Photo from: Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF

By Antonia Dimou, Associate at the Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan, and Head of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit at the Centre for Security and Defence Analyses based in Athens

Jordan is an example of how the IMF can foster strong, stable economies that are productive members of the global economy. Jordan is a small country in the Middle East with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other natural resources but whose economy is based on three characteristics; Remittances from Jordanian labour in neighbouring countries, elspecially in the Gulf states, which are an important source of national income equivalent to 15-20 percent of the GDP; Jordanian exports primarily destined in the region which in turn supplies the bulk of Jordan’s energy requirements; and, Receipt of substantial aid from countries in the region. Thus, a regional economic boom in the 1970s facilitated substantial transfers to Jordan which contributed to rapid growth. Conversely, falling oil prices and associated recessions in the oil exporting countries of the region adversely affected Jordan in the second half of the 1980s.

Specifically, in the late 1980s, inflows of both official transfers and remittances fell, with substantial adverse consequences on budgetary revenues. Initially, the authorities resorted to external borrowing to fill the revenue gap, leading to a sharp increase in external debt. In 1989, Jordan had a 30-35% unemployment rate and was struggling with its inability to pay its loans. Structural weaknesses in Jordan’s public finances and balance of payments were soon exposed, leading the authorities to request the country’s first arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989 to facilitate orderly external financial relations and reverse a sharp decline in economic growth.

Economic reforms were initiated as part of an agreement between Jordan and the IMF. The key objectives of the economic reforms in the kingdom focused on the reduction of public debts, reduction of the budget deficits, controlling of inflation, tax reforms, credit policy reforms, investment incentives, privatisation and easier trade policies. Nevertheless, a highly growing population and the unstable political situation in the region have been major impediments to immediately reaping the benefits of IMF-introduced economic reforms.

The first and second Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003 respectively had severe disruptive effects on the Jordanian economy. Jordan’s opposition to the 1991 Gulf war led to the termination of aid from regional countries and the expulsion of Jordanian workforce. The “returnees” boosted the population by about 10 percent. After the 1991 war, Iraq provided Jordan with almost all of its oil needs, part of it free and the rest at discounted prices. Since 2003 however, regional oil producing countries have provided oil grants to facilitate Jordan’s recovery from the negative economic consequences of the second war on Iraq.

In this regional context and in view of its grave economic situation, Jordan agreed to a series of five-year reforms sponsored by the IMF. During the period of 1993 to 1999, the IMF extended to Jordan three fund facility loans. As a result, the government undertook massive reforms with priority on foreign investment and easier trade policies. By 2000, Jordan was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a year later signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Jordan was also able to bring down its overall debt payment and restructure it at a manageable level.

The ultimate objectives in all of Jordan’s IMF-supported programs were the improved living standards and the expanded employment opportunities. Intermediate objectives have taken the form of specific macroeconomic goals such as higher real GDP growth, low inflation, and the strengthening of external and fiscal positions. Over time, the macroeconomic objectives of the programs, as presented in IMF reports, have become more explicitly linked to the Jordanian government’s social policy objectives. For example, the program supported by the 1996 Extended Fund Facility (EFF) allowed for an increase in real per capita consumption, in order to partially reverse sharp declines in preceding years and, together with expanding employment opportunities, the program was made “politically acceptable” and “socially sustainable”. Similarly, the 1999 EFF-supported program sought to strike a balance between the need for progress toward fiscal sustainability, and “avoidance of undue recessionary effects from rapid contraction”. The main elements of growth strategies in the programs focused on a combination of measures to boost domestic saving and investment, and wide-ranging structural reforms covering the government budget, financial sector, external sector (including trade liberalization), regulatory framework, and public enterprises and privatization.

After almost 15 continuous years under IMF arrangements, the Jordanian authorities have indicated that a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) which expired in July 2004 marked the country’s “exit” from reliance on IMF loans. The IMF acknowledged that steadfast implementation of reforms had strengthened the economy’s foundation and that Jordan was ready to “graduate” from IMF-supported programs. Still, the Jordanian government and all relevant authorities decided to maintain close relations with the IMF in the context of the so-called “post-program monitoring” and technical assistance.

Nowadays, Jordan stands as a country subject of an evaluation that assesses how effectively IMF assistance helped it tackle major macroeconomic challenges, including the effects of shocks related to political and economic developments in the Middle East since the late 1980s and most importantly during the recent global economic crisis.

According to Dominique Strauss-Khan Managing Director of the IMF, “The Jordanian economy has proved resilient to the global economic downturn, thanks to sound economic management and prudent supervision of the kingdom's financial sector”. At the conclusion of his recent visit in Jordan on April 2010, the IMF director acknowledged that looking beyond the immediate task of managing the impact of the global financial crisis, the Jordanian government’s plans as outlined in its National Agenda head to the right direction towards the implementation of political, economic, and social reforms designed to facilitate the further transformation of the kingdom into a highly-competitive, knowledge-based economy".

As noted, towards the end of 2008, the world witnessed a financial crisis, but Jordan has been minimally affected by that crisis. The Central Bank of Jordan has ensured the stability of the banking system while maintaining monetary stability, which indicated that the economy would not face major problems. In fact, the setting of 12% as a percentage for capital adequacy has preserved the banks from any financial problems and led to a zero percent probability of bankruptcy. The world standard for capital adequacy does not exceed 8%; however, Jordan used a conservative banking system in order to save its banks in 2008. Right after the world financial crisis, banks were requested to disclose all their toxic papers which amounted to 40 million dollars; an amount not considered as a major loss taking into account the profits of over a billion dollars for these banks in 2008.

Jordan has continued its progress in enhancing the investment climate and developing its privatization programs. The Jordanian strategy in attracting foreign and domestic investment achieved portions of its goals and it was based on the Investment Promotion Law approved in 2006 for investment regulatory simplification. According to statistics, investments benefiting from the Investment Promotion Law increased in 2008 to reach JD 2.268 million compared to JD 2.221 million in 2007. In addition, JD 310.7 million of investments in special development zones are included to the total investments for 2008.

In response to the recession, Jordan is executing several major infrastructure projects to be financed by public-private partnerships (PPPs) to stimulate the economy. One of these is a nuclear power plant project, the first such scheme to be built on a PPP basis. Since the start of 2010, Jordan’s fortunes have turned a corner. Remittance levels have stabilised and tourist arrivals have picked up. GDP growth is forecast to be 4.1 per cent this year, rising to 4.5 per cent in 2011.

Additional plans, like grand tourism projects in Aqaba as well as two mega water projects are in line. The first is the Disi water project which will tap an aquifer near the Saudi border and pipe it to greater Amman where some 3 million out of the kingdom’s 6 million population lives. The second is the "Red to Dead" project, which entails pumping water from the Red Sea to the rapidly falling Dead Sea, and along the way siphoning water for desalination and also for the cooling of nuclear projects. These are massive, multibillion-dollar projects that require foreign investment and aid.

The IMF-sponsored success with which Jordan has been able to weather the negative impacts and repercussions of regional and world events, while continuing to achieve comparatively high economic growth rates is an issue worth of being evaluated. But as 2009 and past years showed, Jordan’s economy is closely tied to the economies of other countries in the region, and thus it is important to continue to reform and manage its economic policy so that the kingdom pursues its goal of long-term national economic prosperity.


* Reproduced by Middle East Observer, Issue #3, Vol. 1, May-August 2010



Saturday, August 14, 2010

Israel's Second Disengagement from Gaza

A Gaza weapons factory destroyed in the attacks last January.


Reproduced by Worldpress at http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3607.cfm, August 13, 2010


By Antonia Dimou, associate at the Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Jordan and head of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit at the Centre for Security and Defence Analyses based in Athens.


Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman proposed recently a plan that provides for a second Israeli disengagement from Gaza. The plan works to secure E.U. cooperation to rebuild the Gaza Strip and relinquish all Israeli responsibility for Gaza including the lifting of the naval blockade on it.


The plan came amid pressures from the United States and the European Union reinforced after Israel's recent raid on a Turkish-led Gaza-bound flotilla. The plan envisions to grant Israel international recognition that it has ended its occupation of Gaza. Concurrently, the plan effectively grants legitimacy to the de facto government of Hamas in Gaza, since the international community will have to work with the Islamic organization on Gaza, not Israel or the Palestinian Authority.


Israel also announced the intention to look into an international jurists study that will determine what conditions Israel will have to fulfil so that it is recognized internationally that it no longer occupies Gaza.

The Israeli plan has surfaced the Gaza legal debate that has dominated political discussions over the years. In 2005, under the terms of a unilateral disengagement plan, Israel dismantled all its 21 settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip for the first time since 1967, prompting suggestions that the territory was no longer under Israeli belligerent occupation but instead under Palestinian administrative control.


Under the terms of the disengagement plan, however, Israel has retained control over the external perimeter of the Gaza Strip, has retained a military presence along the border of Egypt and Gaza, known as the Philadelphi Route, and has maintained exclusive authority in Gaza airspace and exercised security activity in the sea off the Gaza coast. Moreover, Israel has exercised complete control over the movement of goods into Gaza. Israel continues to control most elements of the taxation system, such as VAT, and customs rates on goods destined for Gaza in accordance with the Paris Agreement of 1994 signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.


The Gaza Strip and the West Bank have been considered as a single territorial entity for administrative and peace-making purposes. A series of international agreements concluded between Israel and Palestinian representatives like the PLO in pursuit of a peaceful solution since 1967 have shaped international perspectives on the conflict. Following negotiations at Oslo in 1993, Chairman of the PLO Yassar Arafat and then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The terms of the agreement provided "the two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period."


Arguably, since Gaza and the West Bank are considered a single territorial unit and Israel still exerts control over the West Bank, it is legally profound that the Israeli authority is extended to Gaza regardless of military presence, and thus Gaza will continue to be considered occupied territory under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations. This is the case regardless of any Hamas-Fatah divide, any Hamas victory in future legislative elections and, most importantly, any kind of Israeli disengagement from Gaza alone.


Realistically, there are two major issues that need to be addressed before an Israeli disengagement takes place. The first is the possibility of a humanitarian disaster that may emerge as consequence of Israeli disengagement and that will be attributed directly to Israel. The second is related to steps that have to be taken so that total disengagement from Gaza does not turn into an intractable security problem, given the loss of Israeli control over the flow of weapons into the area.

Egypt's role is central in this regard. The Rafah crossing is the alternate land route for the transfer of goods into Gaza. The transfer of goods by sea is not a serious option since the loading capacity of Gaza's seaport and the existing marina is too small an area and not adequately operative at this stage. The supervision of the flow of goods to prevent possible smuggling of weapons thus falls in the hands of Egypt, which has an interest to prevent weapons smuggling via the Rafah crossing.


For many, this may be a starting point for Egypt to assume full responsibility for Gaza similar to the situation that existed prior to the Six Day War of 1967 where the Egyptian military not only controlled Gaza but was also exclusively responsible for its security. Even scenarios and assumptions of a confederation or a loose kind of federation between Egypt and Gaza are likely to resurface.


However, these assumptions are not as simple as they may suggest. Egypt is worried by the Hamas rule in Gaza and the possible spill-over effects that may cross its borders. In the eyes of the Egyptian government, Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main political challenge to its rule. This worry was recently met with the reveal of a Hezbollah network in Egypt that smuggled weapons into Gaza and allegedly intended to act against the government.


Egypt has legitimate concerns that pressure on Gaza will cause repercussions in Cairo. Because of this, Cairo exerted all its efforts and sponsored the Hamas-Fatah talks to reach an agreement on Palestinian reconciliation.


The split between Fatah and Hamas and Egyptian efforts to bring the two sides together have been critical. By 2009, Hamas was interested in a bilateral dialogue with Fatah, and by February they had a dialogue. Then the Goldstone report erupted and Hamas attacked Abbas for delaying the report. Hamas has expressed three key requirements for reconciliation: restructuring the Palestinian election commission, redesigning the role of the president and guarding the concept of resistance.


However,Hamas–Fatah talks under the aegis of Egypt have failed, and certain political circles in the region are convinced that in the current political climate any such talks will continue to fail, no matter the interlocutor.Right now as the reality on the ground unfolds, the Palestinians need to reorganize and face the four most major issues, namely negotiations, reconciliation, elections and institution building. Priority has to be given to reconciliation so that Palestinians appear with a united internal front and have one "saying."


What has become clear is that it is high time for Israeli and Palestinian leaders to recognize the enormity of the responsibility that they bear, not only for the future security, stability and prosperity of their people, but for the well-being of the entire region. Today, all sides should deal on a regular basis with the same important issues and come up with a meeting of peace partners. Only together they can create a future of inclusion and unity. Good will is not enough. Action is required for Israel and the Palestinians to make sure that the emerging Palestinian state does not become a failed state.


Friday, August 6, 2010

EDITORIAL: Sinking Traditional Relations: Rhetoric or Reality?

By Antonia Dimou, Editor of Middle East Observer, Head of Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit, Defense and Security Analysis Institute, Athens


The May 31st raid by Israeli commandos on a Turkish-led flotilla bound for Gaza with the aim to get around the Israeli blockade and deliver humanitarian aid as well as to pressure the international community to review its sanction’s policy has marked a turning point in the course of Turkey-Israel relations. Not least, the event is expected to have catalytic impact on the regional balance of power, as according to cetrain political circles, Turkey’s shooting into an Islamic orbit reshuffles the deck of political and diplomatic cards in the region and creates an opening for certain strategic rearrangements.

Only a decade ago, Turkey was considered Israel’s major Muslim ally in the region. The two countries commenced a multi-level relationship that included military and intelligence cooperation, exchange of technological and technical know-how in industry and agriculture, the securing of financial credits for Turkey, and academic cooperation. Relations began to deteriorate publicly in 2009 when Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan sparred with Israel’s President, Shimon Peres, at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

The flotilla event worsened Turkey-Israel relations to unprecedented levels and it is not believed to be coincidental. Rather it was a calculated move aimed to secure Turkey gains both domestically and regionally. Domestically, “Israel punching” is the most profitable political move in a country where anti-Israel sentiments are high. Regionally, Turkey’s revised foreign policy outlook is well known and comes from current Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu. In his view, Turkey’s location at the center of what he calls the Afro-Eurasian space enables it to rise to the status of a “center power” for the whole region. By eliminating conflicts with its neighbors at the level of zero problems, Turkey will be able to consolidate its regional leadership and play a key global role in the post-Cold war regional environment.


The flotilla event has actually made the world pay close attention to Turkey which through a combination of economic successes and Islamic leadership is trying to evolve to the level of the “center power” that bridges the Middle East with the West. Not least, the flotilla event has made the world pay close attention to the Israeli blockade on Gaza and underscored the necessity for all sides involved to walk on the path of Israeli-Palestinian coordination and dialogue in a way so that any emerging Palestinian state does not become a failed state.

In the current issue of the MEO our contributors represent each country that directly or indirectly was involved in the political and diplomatic handling of the crisis. They have articulated their views professionally on the impact and the lessons learnt from the Freedom Flotilla. The MEO is honored to have a Statement by HRH Prince El Hassan Bin Talal who served as Crown Prince of Jordan from 1965 till 1999 and whose initiatives have been catalytic to international decisions and resolutions. HRH very accurately underlines that the freedom flotilla has developed a new dimension to the Israeli siege on Gaza, and stresses that “the Near East, once known as the Cradle of Civilisation, has become a tinder box of war; but in losing sight of peace and humanitarian law, we are surrendering one-by-one to the crushing power of the opportunist 'hatred industry'”.

We could not agree more.


Middle East Observer, Issue #3, Vol. 1, June-August 2010


CONTENTS OF MIDDLE EAST OBSERVER, Issue #3, Vol. 1, June-August 2010


STATEMENT ΒΥ ΗRΗ Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of Jordan

INTERVIEWS:
General (Ret.) Dr. Efraim Sneh: "Turkey Taking Sides Ends Its Regional Role", Conducted by Antonia Dimou
Ambassador Marwan Abdelhamid: "Lift the Siege on Gaza as soon as Possible", Conducted by Antonia Dimou

ANALYSES:
"Turkey's Willing Road Accident with Old Friend Israel", by Bural Bekdil
"Lessons Learnt from the Freedom Flotilla: An Israeli View", by Smadar Perry
"Impact of the Freedom Flotilla: A Palestinian Perspective" by Rami Dajani
"The Battle if the Siege, Border Crossings and Reconciliation Starts Now", by Oraib Rantawi
"The Gaza Naval Incident and the Need for a New Greek Perspective", by Zacharias Michas
"Turkey and the Freedom Flotilla", by Sylvia Tiryaki
"Flotilla of World Hypocricy", by Boaz Ganor

NEWS DIGEST:
- UN Security Council Approves New Iran Sanctions
- Resolution 1929 (2010), Security Council, 6335th Meeting, New York, June 9, 2010 (Excerpts)
- Israel Presents Second Disengagement Plan from Gaza

NEWS COMMENT:
Israel's Second Disengagement from Gaza: A Magic Cure?

ECONOMIC MONITOR:
- Foreign Investment in Oman
- POWER-GEN Middle East Conference and Exhibition, Qatar, October 6-8, 2010
- Creation of a West Asian Forum: Asia-Gulf Business and Security

SPECIAL FEATURE:
"Jordan: A Success Story of the IMF", by Antonia Dimou


The featured interview of General (R.) Dr. Efraim Sneh, Chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue and twice deputy minister of Israel addresses the issue of legality of the Israeli action and the imminent effect of the flotilla event on Israel-Turkey relations.

The interview of Ambassador Marwan Abdelhamid, member of the Central Council of the PLO who previously served as Head of the Diplomatic Representation of Palestine to Greece tackles the issue of the impact of the Israeli blockade on Gaza and stresses that suspension of any external interference in Palestinian affairs is urgent.

The Turkish-led flotilla bound for Gaza was a planned move by Ankara aiming at multiple gains both at home and in the region. With parliamentary elections a year ahead and his government looking rattled for the first time since coming to power in 2002, the Turkish Prime Minister smartly calculated that he could successfully hunt votes with his love affair with Hamas and hate affair with Israel, as articulated Burak Bekdil.

Mrs Smadar Perry points out in her Op-Ed analysis that the military attack on the Mavi Marmara was a grave mistake, acknowledging that it is not a secret that deterioration of relations between Ankara and Jerusalem was kind of crawling gradually with the starting point in Davos that remains to be seen as a significant example of the new political approach in Turkey, according to which Israel is to lose its priority in favor of Ankara's new foreign policy of minimizing rifts and diversities with close neighbors in the Arab and Muslim world.

Rami Dajani indicates in his in-depth analysis that what is perhaps new in the recent flotilla event is the emergence of an energized momentum seeking enforcement of rights and international laws through non-violent means of resistance and activism which under certain circumstances, may succeed in bringing some measure of justice to the Palestinian people, and through that eventually peace and security for all states in the region.

For his part, Oraib Rantawi deals with the issues of the Israeli Siege of Gaza and the Palestinian Reconciliation, while interestingly supports that there is a very odd situation underway whereby most of the world believes that the siege on Gaza is "unsustainable", except the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Egyptian government.

Zacharias Michas indicates in his analysis that the Freedom flotilla event is expected to have catalytic impact on the regional geopolitical balance that Greece should exploit and maintains that the fluidity in the regional system of states now becomes apparent as Turkish aspirations collide with the existing regional order, forged by the US and Israel.

Mustafa El-Labbad elaborates that the flotilla incident sent unprecedented powerful shockwaves on regional and international power equations and discloses that Turkey has handled the crisis with consummate skill with the aim to tighten Israel's international isolation and to strip it of its conventional diplomatic strengths, with special emphasis on the support of international public opinion and Washington's unqualified backing.

Sylvia Tiryaki deals with the background as well as the aftermath of the Freedom Flotilla and concludes that only time can show whether Israeli blockade on Gaza is not only contrary to International Law but also strategically counterproductive for Israel.

Finally, Boaz Ganor points out in his op-ed analysis that the Turkish Prime Minister is pulling Turkey away from the secular path of Kemal Ataturk which has guided Turkey toward prosperity and pragmatism for so many years and argues that Erdogan is promoting an Islamic revolution in Turkey of the most dangerous variety, that is a non-violent cultural revolution.