THE ARAB SPRING:
A REGION IN TRANSITION**

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“Egypt will Honor its Peace Treaty with Israel”

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INTERVIEW WITH Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker

Conducted by Antonia Dimou

1. In your own opinion, what is the reason of the mass wave of protests and of the sectarian crisis which has suddenly emerged in Egypt, in an unprecedented manner?

It is a combination of factors. With regard to the mass wave of protests, groups of different professions and government employees asked for an increase in their salaries and privileges. These groups are taking advantage of the revolution to improve their lot. As to the sectarian crisis it was triggered, in my view, by an accusation to the Coptic Church that it has withheld a married Coptic lady who allegedly converted to Islam and without knowing her whereabouts. This case led to a number of attacks on Churches including an attack on 7^th May against another church for similar reasons. There is an accumulation of other allegations such as that certain positions in the government are exclusively reserved for Muslims.

2. The pace of change in Egypt has been extraordinary, and a step-by-step transition to democracy and renewed stability has great public and regional appeal. Is Egypt ready for democratic reforms this quickly or is it your sense that this will be a decades’ long process?

Egypt is ready for democratic reforms after more than 30 years of President Mubarak’s era. It will be a quick process, and to give you an example, elections for legislative bodies will be conducted in September followed by presidential elections in November. These elections would require a new constitution that has to be worked out in the meantime and be put to a referendum. So as you can see, we are in a rush.

Some are advocating for a slower pace that would allow also the formation of new political parties with membership open to the youth who triggered the whole revolution. It is feared that if elections were to be held by the end of the year, the old political parties on the scene and the former members of the National Democratic Party which has been dissolved as well as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Muslims will all have the upper hand in these elections. Therefore, there are voices addressed to the Higher Council of the Armed Forces to remain in power a little bit longer to allow the political national mosaic to take shape.

3. According to regional experts, the massive wave of protests in Egypt set off a chain reaction that has blown up the entire region, and has engulfed most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East, with spreading effects into countries like Libya and Syria. That said, how is what is happening in the neighbourhood being seen by the Egyptians at the moment and how is it affecting Egypt?

In my view and without interfering in the internal policies of other Arab nations, what is happening around us in the Arab world is welcomed by Egyptians who are proud to see that their revolution had an impact on other sister nations. I must also admit that Tunisia was ahead of us. It may have not been a factor in our revolution but it was an indicator that time had come for drastic change in the region. Egyptians are satisfied that other Arab nations are moving ahead as well. It gives Egyptians a great sense of comfort and accomplishment.

4. On Sunday 20, 2011, Egyptians voted 77 per cent in favour for a swift return to civilian rule. Specifically, more than 14 million Egyptians approved the constitutional amendments intended to guide Egypt through new presidential and parliamentary elections within six months. Will these changes go far enough in overhauling the Mubarak-era charter, or is there need for additional changes to be introduced so that the Mubarak-era is completely rewritten?

The vote was a prelude and an appetizer for more to come as I have already indicated. The amendments of the constitution present just the beginning for a whole review of the constitution and the making of a new one.

5. Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Nowadays, there are concerns whether the new president-to-be in Egypt will honour the peace treaty with Israel or whether it needs to be revised at best, or scrapped at worst. What is your opinion?

I must assert here that one of the very first statements issued by the Higher Council of the Armed Forces was to assure the world community that Egypt will honor all the treaties it is party of. Therefore, this statement should be read as that Egypt will honor its peace treaty with Israel. In case there is need for change or amendments, it goes without saying that they will have to be agreed upon a mutual basis.

6. Egypt has traditionally played a major and catalytic role between Israel and the Palestinians towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, after years of dispute, rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah recently signed an Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement in Cairo, which provides a timeframe for legislative and presidential elections and calls for the formation of an interim government. That said, how do you evaluate Egyptian mediation and what are the primary reasons behind the timing of the agreement along with the possibilities and challenges ahead on the regional and international levels?

The Egyptian mediation was critical in reaching the agreement between the Palestinian factions. Egypt was involved for years in negotiating a reconciliation agreement and I believe the revolution in Egypt has prompted the Palestinians to benefit from the new climate that has emerged as a result of this revolution. Palestinians, especially those living in Gaza, are encouraged by the reopening of the Rafah crossing which I believe has also contributed to this new atmosphere.

7. The Muslim Brotherhood, the popular Islamic movement long banned from politics by former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, recently announced that it has formed a political party that will put forward candidates in parliamentary elections scheduled for upcoming September, but it will refrain from participating in the presidential election, expected two months later. That said, is the chief political platform of the new party consistent with the agenda of democratization and reform and in what ways do you predict that the new party will become more actively involved in the emerging new state of politics and governance in Egypt?

Let me say at the outset that a significant dichotomy exists in the establishment of a party by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has existed for many years but not developed into an association according to Egyptian Law. Therefore, for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to form a new party it has to conform to national regulation. The new party will probably be active in Parliament. As promised, the party will run for 50% of the seats in Parliament and will be satisfied if it gets between 25% and 30% of the seats. It is not going to be the first time for the Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood was in parliament for the 2005-2010 term, as independent. This time it will be represented as a party, and it will have to perform according to the constitution now in the making.

* Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Sawiris Foundation for Social Development, Chairman of the Board of the Regional Information Technology Institute and Vice-Chair of the Board of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs. Dr. Mohamed Shaker held the position of Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Kingdom (1988-1997) and was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Court of St. James. He was Ambassador to Austria and member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna (1986-1988).

He also held a number of positions at the UN, including UN Deputy Permanent Representative (1984-1986), member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (1993 – 1998), Chair of the Advisory Board for 1995, and member of the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (2001-2002). He holds a degree in Law from Cairo University and a PhD in Political Science from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva.

** SOURCE: Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011

North Africa and Middle East Protests: Country by Country

(Photo from: http://compassrosebooks.blogspot.com/)

By Antonia L. Dimou

Reproduced by Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2 , March-June 2011

A wave of protests sweeping through parts of the Middle East and North Africa is largely organized by the youth with demands for economic and political reforms, and a higher standard of living. An overview of the revolutionary movement that spread into the wider region denotes that all first started in Tunisia.

In Tunisia, widespread protests in late 2010 sparked by the self-immolation of a street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that was allegedly inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides. His act became the symbol of remonstrance and catalyst for the Tunisian revolutionary flow which became the most dramatic social and political unrest of the last three decades. Street demonstrations were precipitated by high unemployment, high prices in basic goods, corruption lack of civil freedoms and poor living conditions and led to the oust of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali who ruled Tunisia since 1987. Tunisian demonstrations have been dubbed the Jasmine Revolution in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of "colour revolutions", a term that is widely used by the media to describe related movements that developed in several societies in the CIS (former USSR) and Balkan states during the early 2000s.

Next, inspired by the Tunisian revolutionary protests, was Algeria. Protests throughout Algeria from 28 December 2010 onwards sparked by sudden rises in staple food prices, and opposition parties, trade unions, and human rights organisations began to hold weekly demonstrations defying a governmental declaration of a state of emergency. Algerian protests have a common denominator with those in Tunisia, most prominently high unemployment, the lack of housing, widespread corruption, restrictions on freedom of speech and poor standard of living. Major riots broke out in several areas like the Bab El Oued neighbourhood of the capital Algiers and nearby suburbs, as well as the country’s second city, Oran, and other towns including Djelfa, Boumerdes, Annaba, and Tipaza. Within days the riots spread to twenty administrative areas, covering the north including the Kabylie region, several towns in the Sahara, like Ouargla and Bechar. Widespread unrest in Algeria could have implications for the world economy because it is a major oil and gas exporter, but many analysts say a Tunisian-style revolt is unlikely as the government can use its energy wealth to placate most grievances.

Next stop was Egypt, a country of eighty million and a natural leader of the Arab world, where the popular uprising began on 25 January 2011. But many of the grievances on the street are the same. The uprising was mainly a campaign of non-violent civil resistance, which featured a series of demonstrations, and labour strikes. Public demands focused on legal, economic and political issues including police brutality, the lack of free elections, unprecedented levels of corruption in public institutions, high rate of unemployment, food price inflation and low minimum wages. The most important however demand was the end of the Mubarak regime, the cease of the emergency law, and the restoration of civil liberties. The capital city of Cairo became a war zone with 840 deaths reported, and over 6,000 injuries. Protestors stared to gather in Cairo's Tahrir Square, even after a night-time curfew came into effect, and watch groups were organised by civilians to protect neighbourhoods. In an attempt to quell dissent, the 82-year-old Mubarak dissolved his government and named his intelligence chief and close confidant Omar Suleiman as his vice-president and former air force commander Ahmad Shafiq as Egypt's new prime minister, in an apparent step toward setting up a successor other than his son, Gamal.

This move did little to mollify pro-democracy groups, and on 11^th February the Vice President announced that Mubarak stepped down as president and turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. On 13 April, the prosecutor ordered the former president and both his sons to be detained for 15 days of questioning about allegations of corruption and abuse of power and later on the former Egyptian President was ordered to stand trial on charges of premeditated murder of peaceful protestors and, if convicted, could face the death penalty.

Jordan fell next in the series of regional protests with demonstrators disapproving the rising of prices and demanding the dismissal of the Jordanian government, with no direct challenge to the King. Around 3,500 opposition activists from Jordan's main Islamist opposition group, trade unions and leftist organisations gathered in the capital on 28^th January asking the government to control rising prices, inflation and unemployment. In an attempt to defuse tensions, on February 1, King Abdullah sacked the government and asked Marouf al-Bakhit, an ex-army general, to form a new cabinet, with the authority to take quick, concrete and practical steps to launch a genuine political reform process so that Jordan is placed on the path to strengthen democracy. On 15^th March, a 53-member committee with government officials and opposition leaders was composed to draft new election and new political parties’ laws with a set of a three-month timetable for agreement on political reforms. It is noteworthy that Jordan’s economy continues to struggle, weighed down by a record deficit of $2 billion this year, an inflation rate of around 6.1%, and rampant unemployment and poverty estimated at 12% and 25% respectively.

Syria has been influenced by concurrent protests in the region and dozens of communities across the country erupted in demonstrations against the rule of President Assad. It all began on 26th January 2011, when Hasan Ali Akleh from Al-Hasakah set himself on fire following the example of the Tunisian youth to protest against the Syrian government. On 28th January 2011, an evening demonstration was held in Ar-Raqqah, to protest the killing of two soldiers of Kurdish descent. On 15th March protests escalated simultaneously in major cities across the country and the number of protesters estimated in hundreds of thousands, suggesting that Syria’s fragmented population reached new levels of coherence and organization. the city of Daraa became the focal point for the uprising. On 20^th March, thousands took to the streets of Daraa that became the focal point of protests, with slogans against the country's 48-year emergency law, the release of all political prisoners, and an end to pervasive corruption. Security forces reportedly opened fire during protests and killed peaceful demonstrators, and increasingly, the crackdown against the protests became more violent. In the wake of the violent crackdown on anti-government dissent that has left some 900 people dead, the United States imposed sanctions on three top Syrian officials, Syria's intelligence agency and Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

The US sanctions freeze any assets the individuals have in US jurisdiction and bar Americans from doing business with them. According to a White House statement, the executive order signed by American President Obama “gives the US new tools to target individuals and entities determined to have engaged in human rights abuses in Syria, and also sends a message to the Syrian people that those responsible for the abuses must face consequences for their actions”. On a parallel track, the European Union imposed an arms embargo and sanctions against 13 Syrian officials deemed responsible for the regime's harsh crackdown on protesters. Specifically the EU Council adopted a regulation and a decision providing for an embargo on exports to Syria of arms and equipment that could be used for internal repression, as well as a visa ban and an assets freeze, holding off however sanctioning the Syrian President as the 27 member states were divided over the question.

Yemen has been the next stop of protests that occurred almost simultaneously with the Egyptian revolutionary events. In the early stages, protests in Yemen were against unemployment, corruption, and against the government's proposals to amend the country's constitution. Demands escalated with calls for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign and mass defections from the military, and the government. Succumbing to public demands, the Yemeni President announced that he would not run for re-election in 2013 and also that he would not pass power to his son, Ahmed Saleh, who heads the elite presidential guard. In response, protesters gathered in a series of cities demanding the departure of the Yemeni President with the central slogan that it was "time for change". Protestors’ demands were driven by the unprecedented high levels of poverty among a growing young population and frustration with the lack of political freedoms, and by fears that Yemen is becoming a leading al-Qaeda haven. President Saleh, last re-elected in 2006, became leader of North Yemen in 1978, and has ruled the Republic of Yemen since the north and south merged in 1990.

Saudi Arabia fell next in the series of regional protests whose size remained quite small since demonstrations are not part of the Saudi culture. Shia nationals presented the majority in protests that occurred in the city of Qatif and smaller towns in the Eastern Province, like al-Awamiyah and Hofuf, and demanded the release of prisoners, the withdrawal of Peninsula Shield Force from neighbouring Bahrain, equal representation in key offices, and reforms of political institutions. But calls for political reform gradually started coming from different sections of Saudi society, Shia and Sunni, conservative and liberal alike. It is this that alarms the authorities. On 23th February, Saudi King Abdullah, on his return after three months abroad for health treatment, announced a series of benefits for citizens amounting to 10.7 billion dollars, that include funding to offset high inflation, the loans’ writing off, increase of state employees’ salaries per cent, and the funnelling of funds for housing loans. Notably, no reference was made for political reforms and only some prisoners indicted in financial crimes were pardoned.

Oman inspired by the regional events fell in flow of protests with demands for salary increases and lower costs of living. Omani protests termed as the Green March climaxed on 18^th February, demanding an end to corruption, better distribution of oil revenue, and political reforms within the current governing system of Sultan Qaboos. Reportedly, protests were peaceful, well-organised and disciplined, while placards with protest slogans were translated into English, French and German for the international media. In response to protests, the Sultan On reshuffled his cabinet, the first time in 26^th February, and the second in 7^th March, announced benefits for the students of the Higher College of Technology, decided to set up an independent authority for consumer protection in the country, pledged to create 50,000 government jobs, provide a monthly benefit of $390 to the unemployed and ordered a committee to draft proposals for boosting the power of an elected council that advises him in state affairs. The Sultan also issued eight royal decrees including Royal Decree No 38/2011 that abolishes the Ministry of National Economy and states that a committee shall be formed by the Council of Ministers to manage the distribution of its prerogatives, allocations, assets and employees. Notably, the ministry had been targeted by protesters for being corrupt and inefficient.

Bahrain was the next stop of regional protests whose major aim was the introduction of political reforms and equality for the majority Shia population that complains of receiving poor treatment in employment, housing, and infrastructure, compared to Sunnis who have preferential status. Tens of thousands from the Shia opposition marched through the capital of Manama, carrying Bahrain's red-and-white flag and circling the Manama's financial district which is symbol of the country's prosperity in recent decades. The escalation of unrest in Bahrain prompted the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) on March 14^th at the request of the Bahraini government, to send troops of the Peninsula Shield Force to guard key facilities, such as oil and gas installations and financial institutions. Around 4000 Saudi Arabian troops were dispatched, along with by 500 police officers by the UAE police. Following the deployment of foreign forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Bahraini security forces launched a crackdown on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout and elsewhere, while the king declared a three-month state of emergency, authorising the nation's armed forces chief to take all measures to protect the safety of the country and its citizens. What has become clear is that though Gulf States may not expect to face full-scale revolts thanks to a golden bargain under which their rulers trade a share of their oil wealth for political quiescence, Bahrain is among the most vulnerable to popular pressure.

In Libya, widespread protests seeking for political reforms and democratic elections, upset at delays in the building of housing units and over political corruption, faced repress by the country’s security services. By 27^th January, the government had responded to the housing unrest with a 24 billion dollar investment fund to provide housing and development. Nevertheless, protests erupted in earnest on 15^th February and a "Day of Rage" in Libya and by Libyans in exile spread in major cities like Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Darnah, Az Zintan, and Al Bayda.

As protests progressed, the Libyan government employed artillery, warplanes, anti-aircraft weaponry, and warships against demonstrations. Active resistance to the Gaddafi regime began in Benghazi on 18^th February and covered the country’s Eastern province, while the Gaddafi regime launched a counteroffensive, trying to retake the control sending infantry and armour into cities. The high death toll urged the international community to take action and on 17^th March, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace. As result of the UN resolution, the Libyan government declared an immediate ceasefire that lasted only for a few hours, prompting coalition operations to begin. Specifically, nineteen French Air Force fighter planes entered Libyan airspace to begin reconnaissance missions in 19^th March, and flew over Benghazi to prevent any attacks on the rebel-controlled city, US and British naval vessels fired at least Tomahawk cruise missile at Libyan integrated air and ground defence systems and Coalition jets carried out airstrikes against Libyan military installations and targets. Additionally, twenty-five coalition ships, including three US submarines, began operating in the area. On 25^th March, NATO announced that it was taking over the command of the no-fly-zone operations, after several days of heated debate over who should control operations in Libya, and after a while the organisation that the Libyan government's military capabilities were significantly degraded since the operation started. As consequence of the use of violent force against protesters, a number of senior Libyan government officials resigned from their positions like the former minister of Justice and former Minister of Interior, and also a significant number of senior military officials defected.

Several peace mediation efforts were undertaken for a way out to the crisis, with most prominent a proposal by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez who offered to negotiate a settlement between the opposition and the Libyan government, an offer by South African government which proposed an African Union led mediation effort to prevent civil war, and a proposal by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan who was the 2010 winner of the al-Gaddafi prize for Human Rights, who offered the Libyan President the possibility to appoint a new President acceptable to all Libyans as means to overcome the prolonged crisis.

Latest Poll of the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research

(Photo from: arabinfomall.bibalex.org)

By Antonia Dimou

Reproduced by Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2 , March-June 2011

The Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) based in Ramallah conducted an opinion poll in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-19 March that coincided with the revolutionary wave of protests that swept the Arab World leading to regime change in Egypt and Tunisia, with the US veto that blocked a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements’ activities, and with the release of leaked Palestinian documents of the PLO negotiations department by al Jazeera satellite TV.

The opinion poll covers issues related to the events in the Arab World, the leaks by al Jazeera, Palestinian domestic conditions, the performance of the governments of Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh in the West Bank and Gaza respectively at the time of polling, the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, and the views of the public on the most vital Palestinian goals as well as the problems confronting the Palestinian society.


Findings of the first quarter of 2011 showed that Palestinians were affected differently by regional and domestic events. To begin with, the revolutionary events in the Arab World seemed to pose a threat primarily to Hamas in the Gaza Strip rather than to Fateh in the West Bank. Findings showed that two thirds (67%) of Gazans believed that there was a need for demonstrations in the Gaza Strip, while the picture was different in the West Bank where only one third (36%) believed there was need to demonstrate.


What is interesting to cite is that by contrast, if demonstrations were to erupt in the Gaza Strip, demands and slogans by 51% would focus not only on ending the West Bank-Gaza Strip split, but also on the absence of freedoms, while, if demonstrations erupted in the West Bank, demands and slogans by 24% would focus on ending occupation. An interesting finding that partly explains the necessity for the reconciliation agreement between Fateh and Hamas later the same month is that 64% of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip believed that there was urgency for demonstrations demanding regime change compared to only 36% in the West Bank.


An overwhelming majority of 92% sympathized with the demonstrators in Arab countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen and 41% believed that the first basic demand of the demonstrators in Egypt was to end the state of poverty and unemployment, 38% to safeguard freedom from oppression, and 11% to end corruption. Additionally, two thirds (66%) expected that the fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt would lead to the permanent opening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, 92% sympathized with demonstrators in the Arab World, and also two thirds (64%) expected that developments in the Arab World would have a positive impact on Palestinian conditions.


Findings show that the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leadership were negatively affected by the al Jazeera leaks with a decrease in support for Fateh and a similar decrease in the level of satisfaction with the performance of President Mahmud Abbas. Several factors led to this outcome: First, al Jazeera remains the most watched TV news station in the Palestinian territories, and second, while the PA leadership in the West Bank defended itself by accusing al Jazeera of conspiring against it, a large majority of Palestinians believed that the satellite TV station’s goal was to seek the truth and not to conspire against the PA.


Moreover, in responding to the leaks, the PA’s case remained unconvincing in the eyes of a large majority of Palestinians. Above all else, and based on the leaks, half of the public concluded that the PA’s negotiating position was not committed to the vital goals and interests of the Palestinian people. Specifically, if presidential elections were to take place in the time of polling, Palestinian President Abbas would receive 55%, and Hamas leader Haniyeh 38%. Looking ahead the day after Abbas, it is important to underline the poll’s finding according to which, if the competition for the presidency was between Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in Israel, and Haniyeh, the former would receive 64% and the latter 31%. If new parliamentary elections were to be held in the time of polling, Fateh would receive 40%, and Hamas 26%, while all other lists combined 12%, and 22% were undecided. For the vice-presidency, once again Marwan Barghouti received the majority by 30%, while 18% selected Ismail Haniyeh, 14% selected Salam Fayyad, and 11% Mustafa Barghouti.

When asked about domestic conditions 70% believed there is corruption in the PA institutions in the West Bank and 59% believed that there is corruption in the Hamas government in Gaza. Concurrently, 33% believed that people in the West Bank could criticize the PA without fear and only 19% believed that people in the Gaza Strip could criticize the authorities there without fear. Additionally, only 21% described conditions in the Gaza Strip as good or very good and 33% described conditions in the West Bank as good or very good. On the perception of personal safety and security the percentage stood at 54 in the West Bank and 67 in the Gaza Strip.


When asked about the US role in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, findings showed that the US use of its veto power to block UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement activities brought a severe blow to Palestinian public readiness to accept a large US role in the peace process. The poll found that the percentage of those in favour of such US role decreased considerably to a small minority, when in previous surveys, a large majority favoured a greater US intervention in the peace process. Specifically, a large majority of 69% expressed opposition to a larger US role in the peace process. By contrast, an August 2009 poll by the PRS showed that a majority of 61% indicated support for a larger US role in the peace process. Also interestingly, a majority of 56% supported the Arab Peace Initiative which calls for Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the resolution of the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194 in return for an Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it.


Findings also showed that 48% support and 50% oppose a mutual recognition of national identity in the sense that Palestinians will recognize Israel as the state for the Jewish people and Israelis will recognize Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after all conflicting issues are settled and a Palestinian state is established. Because of the cessation of negotiations with Israel, the Palestinian public is divided over the best means for breaking the deadlock: 33% prefers to go to the UN Security Council to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state while 25% prefers a return to confrontation and armed conflict against Israel, 18% prefers peaceful and non-violent, confrontations, and 17% prefers the dissolution of the PA. Two thirds believe that the chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the next five years are slim or non existent.


When asked about their perception of Israel’s long term goals, the largest percentage (60%) indicated that the goal of Israel is to extend its state to the whole area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River and to expel its Palestinian population, while 21% indicated that the Israeli goal is to annex the West Bank. Only 17% believed that Israel’s long term goal is to ensure its security and to withdraw from all or parts of the West Bank.


When asked about the most vital Palestinian goals, 45% believed that the most vital goal for the Palestinian people should be the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of an independent state. 27% articulated that the most vital goal is the right of return, and 10% supported the build-up of a democratic political system that will respect the freedoms and the rights of Palestinians. On the question of the problems confronting nowadays the Palestinian society, 28% supported that the most serious problem is poverty and unemployment, another 28% said that it is the absence of national unity due to the Fateh-Hamas split at the time of polling, 22% supported that it is the continuation of conflict with Israel and settlement expansion, and 11% said it is corruption of PA, Hamas and public institutions.


The PSR opinion poll’s total size of the sample was 1270 adults who were interviewed in 127 randomly selected locations, and findings present a margin error of 3%. The opinion poll was conducted with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah.

GCC Economies Sustain the Momentum

(Photo from: http://www.opfblog.com/11912/)

By Antonia Dimou

Reproduced by Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011

The economies of the Gulf projected considerable resilience during the global economic downturn. 2010 generally proved a year of normalization across the region, and 2011 is widely expected to be characterized by a steady consolidation of this turnaround, partly due to the stronger oil prices. Several factors for the expected recovery in oil prices over their relatively low level in 2009, include increased demand by China and India, a weakening in the dollar, and expected regulations of the oil business following last year’s spill by British Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Gulf oil producing economies are projected to sharply rebound by more than six per cent in 2011 while their combined budget surplus could climb by nearly 10 per cent to 130 billion dollars. Oil prices jumped by around 27 per cent to an average 77.2 dollars in 2010 and are expected to climb to 83.9 dollars and 86 dollars in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

The surge in oil prices supports the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) policy of economic diversification by fuelling the economic activity from the public to the private sector, and by supporting projection execution in the six-nation GCC, with the biggest 100 ventures under way in the region totalling a staggering 1.3 trillion dollars.

Economic diversification has been a catchphrase of economic policy in the GCC states since the first oil boom in the 1970s. It was initially prompted by concerns over the finite nature of oil and the recognition of the risks of economic instability inherent in heavy dependence on oil exports. Economic diversification, meaning the expansion of non-oil economic sectors, implies the reduction the public sector’s size, the reduction of the heavy reliance on expatriate labour, the improvement of the efficiency of monetary and fiscal policies, and the building of human capital through investment in training and education.

This baseline scenario appears to be moving fast towards the right direction, although the ongoing turmoil in parts of North Africa and the Middle East has affected negatively leading drivers of economic recovery and development. The situation in Egypt raised concerns over oil supply security through the Suez Canal and pipeline, and the ongoing events in Libya have jeopardized the output of a fairly significant oil producer as before the onset of conflict, Libya produced some 2% of the world’s oil.

The ongoing crisis is estimated to have reduced Libya’s pre-crisis output of 1.6 million barrels per day by up to three-quarters and this development, along with fears over potential contagion, pushed the oil price to its highest level since August 2008. Saudi Arabia responded to make up for any shortfall in production by putting its production at as much as 9.4 million barrels per day.

Additionally, social and sectarian tensions in GCC countries most prominently in Bahrain and Oman have put under test investor mood. While it is early to assess the ultimate economic costs of the crisis, it is obvious that sharp stand-off in Bahrain that eventually led to an intervention by GCC forces, has hit the country in ways that may have lasting economic development consequences. For as long as the region faces a period of uncertainty and investor caution, the effects are not expected to be uniformly negative.

In particular, Dubai is presented with a significant opportunity to capitalize on its enhanced cost competitiveness in real estate as investors reassess their views about Bahrain. For its part as well, Qatar investment on its real estate market has transformed it from a single road along the sea in the 1980s into a Mecca of development. The mushrooming of the Qatari real estate industry over the last six years presents an attractive example for the region. The US Patriot Acts is seen as the single major reason for massive redevelopment in the Gulf, because as foreign direct investment into the US became increasingly difficult, GCC countries focused on redeveloping their towns and shifting tourism to diversify from hydrocarbons.

Medium-to-long-term strategic programming has become a central part of the economic development plans in the GCC. Even though some of the plans are partly ambitious and programmatic statements, they substantially seek to set up longer-term guidelines on managing the countries’ oil wealth for the purpose of the transition to the post-oil era.

Qatar’s new announced National Development Strategy envisages investments of 225 billion dollars in the course of 2011-2016. Fuelled by gross investment in excess of 30% of GDP, Qatari GDP has almost quadrupled from 31.7 billion dollars in 2004 to an 110 billion dollars in 2010 with an annual average growth rate of 13.1% in 2001-2009. Also, Qatar has emerged as the world’s third-largest gas power after Russia and Iran as well as a leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter, and has made massive investments in LNG exports to Asia. However, Qatar faces enormous employment challenges with a projected need for 1.6 million new workers over the planning period.

Oman’s 2011-15 Development Plan seeks to achieve growth of at least 3% per year and the total expected investments amount to 78 billion dollars. Tourism, industry, agriculture, and fishing are identified as priority sectors. The Plan projects average oil output levels of 897,000 barrels per day and a price of 59 dollars per barrel while foreseeing average annual investment of 2.3 billion dollars in oil exploration and development as well as 1.9 billion dollars in the gas sector.

Bahrain’s Economic Vision 2030, a blueprint for the development of the country's economy, identifies key challenges and opportunities that focus on transforming the economy with the development of the quality and number of jobs for nationals, and on encouraging innovation and the development of new growth sectors. The share of Bahrainis in the national workforce is projected to grow by 29% over the coming decade, a goal essential to meeting the Vision’s central objective of doubling the real income of nationals by 2030.

The Vision envisages the economy diversifying away from oil with special emphasis on financial services, industry, logistics, business services and tourism. According to the annual Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, Bahrain is among the world's top 10 most economically free nations. This result comes in line with the aspirations of Bahrain Economic Vision 2030, and cites the commitment to structural reforms and openness to global commerce that have enabled Bahrain to become a financial hub and regional leader in economic freedom.

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2020 is an expression for the national development strategies of the Kingdom. The Vision sees Saudi Arabia emerging as a diversified and prosperous economy and focuses on the development of human resources, the expansion of the private sector and the modernization of the public sector’s structures. A number of new development projects are underway, and for instance Saudi Aramco has identified gas as a key investment priority since the Kingdom is home to the fifth-largest reserves in the world, and seeks to boost gas reserves by 5bn cu ft/day within five years.

Kuwait Development Plan 2013-2014, the first such plan since 1986, aims to turning Kuwait into a regional trade and financial hub through sustaining economic development, economic diversification and GDP growth. The Plan approved an estimated 125 billion dollars of spending focusing on both oil and non oil economic sectors, and includes a series of Mega Projects, like the construction of the Silk City (Madinat Al-Hareer) that will serve as new business hub with an estimated cost 132 billion dollars, the allocation of a round 80 billion dollars of oil sector investments to raise production capacity and modernize current facilities, the construction of a major container harbour, railway and metro systems, as well as additional spending on new cities and infrastructure projects.

Abu Dhabi’s Economic Vision 2030 aims to achieve effective economic transformation of the emirate’s economic base and bring about global integration. Abu Dhabi has a core commitment to build a sustainable and diversified, high value-added economy by 2030. This will be achieved by broadening the sectors of economic activity, enlarging the enterprise base, and growing external markets. Economic development envisions to involving the averaging of growth at 7% till 2015, and thereafter at 6% so that Abu Dhabi grows at a faster, yet still sustainable, rate.

Within overall growth and as part of efforts to diversify, Abu Dhabi aims to foster non-oil GDP growth at a higher rate than that of the oil sector, in order to reach equilibrium in non-oil trade by 2028, thus demonstrating the ability to instil extra depth within the structure of the economy. Specifically, the central goal of Abu Dhabi’s strategy is to boost the share of the non-oil sector to 64% of GDP by 2030 from the current 45%.

By concluding, in an environment where risks still abound, the result of the current combination of investor caution and government activism may be a year of uneven growth, but with oil prices strong, the GCC region is definitely looking at a significant acceleration in its headline GDP growth which undoubtedly solidifies the regional policies of diversification and long-term economic development.