The Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty as a Starting Point for Thinking Creatively about a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East

(Photo from Wikipedeia)

By Antonia Dimou

The idea of arms control is not foreign in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through time, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan have agreed to a variety of arms control and confidence building measures with regards to disengagement of their forces, demilitarization, and limitation of forces agreements. In this context, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty incorporates a number of arms control measures which address the security concerns of each side and provides a blueprint of genuine partnership for peace in the regional context. Israel's treaties with Egypt and Jordan shows that "full peace" is a relative term that varies in content and has evolved over time.

While the intricate and intrusive Sinai military arrangements are the key to what the Egypt-Israel agreement posits as "maximum security," the Jordan-Israel agreement offers "good neighbourly relations and cooperation" as the true source of "lasting security." In practical terms, this includes cooperation on both a bilateral basis for e.g. to combat terrorism and prevent cross-border infiltration, and on a regional basis with the aim to create a Conference of Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, and a regional zone free from weapons of mass destruction.

Specifically, according to Article 7, the parties “undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible, in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterized by the renunciation of the use of force, and by reconciliation and good will.” Also, according to par.3 article A, both parties undertake “to refrain from the threat of use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party”.

From the start of the multilaterals, Jordan has advocated the need for a new regional institutional framework to support the objectives and reinforce arms control talks. After a series of talks throughout 1994 the idea of setting up a regional security center with headquarters in Amman as a venue for seminars and training on arms control and regional security was endorsed. Since 1995 when the ACRS Group, the only formal regional arms control mechanism halted, the role of Jordanian civil society in promoting the establishment of a WMDFZ in the region has been critical as the only forum for regular dialogue on non-proliferation and arms control issues.

The Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS) previously known as the Cooperative Monitoring Center associated with the Royal Scientific Society was established in 2002 in Amman jointly with the US Department of Energy and Sandia National Laboratories. The institute’s activities include conducting studies with regional experts on technical aspects of arms control with the aim of reducing the motivation of regional states to acquire WMD. It hosts workshops on regional biosecurity and biosafety and on approaches to national implementation of WMD agreements. Also, the Middle East Security Consultants (MESC) established in January 2011 in Amman includes a group of experts whose main focus is on the political developments of the Arab World, the future Arab-Israeli relations, and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) proliferation.

Equally significant is the role of the El Hassan Science City (EHSC) located in Amman that has established a strong relationship with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and supports the efforts of the organisation to ensure that testing of nuclear weapons is banned in all its forms. Upon the logic that the organization is central to global and regional disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, Jordan has given a home to the CTBTO auxiliary seismic station at Tel al- Asfar, which has been in operation since 2002.

Jordan supported the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which had been “… the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended”. In fact, Jordan was among the Arab countries that joined consensus in exchange for a call on “all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to take practical steps….aimed at making progress towards….an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD and their delivery systems”, and on “all states party to the NPT to assure the early establishment by regional countries of such a zone”.

The relationship between the Middle East WMDFZ and a regional peace agreement has gained much debate. For Israel, a comprehensive agreement must precede the establishment of the zone. This linkage was also acknowledged in the 1995 NPT Middle East Resolution albeit in a subtle manner. Since the weapons build upon the region is consequence of the conflict and tensions between regional states, the root causes of the conflict must be addressed as a priority. The Arab position that a WMDFZ should be established prior to a comprehensive peace settlement is not accepted by Israel. To Israel peace comes first, and denuclearisation last. In a way, this concept is embedded in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty that speaks for a WMDFZ as a goal “to be achieved in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace”.

It seems that there are two major prerequisites for any negotiation on a WMDFZ to be successful; First, better knowledge of the risk assessment, strategic and threat perceptions of the various regional players. National security has been perceived as a zero-sum game, wherein gains for one side have been viewed as constituting a potential threat to the other. There has been little recognition that arms control or arms reductions and the search for political agreements in this area would serve either national or mutual interests. On the contrary, when considering its regional environment, each state may come to the conclusion that its national security requires increasing its own level of armaments or even turning to WMD. For instance, Israel considers itself under an existential threat from Iran, but Iran feels threatened by Israeli capabilities and cannot ignore the presence of US forces or bases in most of its neighbour­hood.

Second, there is need to increase the regional flow of informa­tion, regarding military spending and arms transfers, and to develop confidence and security-build­ing measures. The collection, by an impar­tial body, of data related to military budgets, transfers, and non-proliferation measures can be a first necessary step towards disarmament in a WMDFZ.

Jordan is a strong advocate of a WMDFZ that rids the region from the threats of using these weapons. It is noteworthy that in 2004, the kingdom had become target of a terrorist organisation that planned t to unleash a Chemical Weapons attack within Jordanian proper. Specifically, Jordanian authorities captured trucks with 20 tons of chemicals like Vx nerve agent and explosives planned to cause explosions that would have dispersed the toxic chemicals and would have killed as many as 20,000 people. The planned chemical attack on Jordan has re-configured the whole WMD debate inside the kingdom.

Nowadays, Jordan has declared its interest in acquiring nuclear power, a policy not embarked in response to Israel’s supposed nuclear capabilities. Jordan’s planning to utilize nuclear power and pursue its nuclear program is driven by economic considerations including the use of nuclear power as a source of energy and to produce desalinated water much needed for a country with limited natural resources and an expanding population.

The need for energy security seems to sit with a deep fear of having nuclear capable countries in the Middle East. This should not be the case. The nuclear agenda in the region has flipped from military to socio-economic in most of the political thinking of regional governments, while a raft of international agreements and protocols have enmeshed most of these governments in a peaceful, regional nuclear structure. Measures such as the IAEA Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, Additional Protocol measures, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty will change the landscape with the cooperation of most regional actors.

In this regional framework, and in line with the second major prerequisite for the establishment of a WMDFZ, Jordan plans to establish a Regional Data Centre that will cooperate with the CTBTO to facilitate researchers from neighbouring countries and help preparations to implement the verification regime beyond its borders. Jordan has gained invaluable experience by establishing and expanding the first National Data Centre currently based at the Jordan Seismological Observatory, and developed rare technical expertise that can be shared with regional countries.

Additionally, in line with the Jordan-Israel peace treaty that provides for “lasting security”, Israel and Jordan periodically conduct joint earthquake exercises to practice techniques in evacuation and to test preparedness for an earthquake in the region, and/or of the simultaneous occurrence of an earthquake and nuclear disaster.

The cornerstone of establishing a Middle East WMDFZ is the political commitment of regional countries to lead this undertaking as well as institutionalized planning, systematic studies and efforts on the political, technical and legal aspects to achieve timely results. Significant track-II efforts can help produce progress on the matter, while enhancing the role of science and technology, cooperative monitoring, and action programs on the national and regional levels can all serve the ultimate goal of creating a Middle East WMDFZ.

* This article is part of a paper presented in Budapest late September 2011.

BOOKS PRESENTATION *

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT:

Parallel Discourses

Edited by Elizabeth Matthews

Published by Routledge -276 pages

Price £ 90.00 hardback

This unique book brings together Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints on a number of key issues and topics, making clear the points of agreement as well as the views that divide. The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is considered intractable by many, and is frequently characterised by the violence between the two sides. In attempts at peace, the starting point for negotiations is a cessation of violence; beneath this, however, lies a plethora of other issues to be addressed.

The chapters deal first with three major issues that require compromise and resolution for a peace treaty to be realized namely water, refugees, and borders, territory and settlements. The book also studies three important concepts that can either impede or promote peace and democracy, that are human rights, peace culture and education. Thus, the book presents an invaluable tool to better understand the divergent and even convergent interests of Israelis and Palestinians on issues and concepts vital to the peace process. As such, the book is a valuable resource for courses on conflict resolution, the Middle East peace process, and political science.

SYRIA’S KURDS

History, Politics and Society

By Jordi Tejel

Published by Routledge -194 pages

Price £ 80.00 hardback

This book is a decisive contribution to the study of Kurdish history in Syria since the mandatory period (1920-1946) up to nowadays. Jordi Tejel provides fine, complex and sometimes paradoxical analysis about the articulation between tribal, local, regional, and national identities, on one hand, and the formation of a Kurdish minority awareness vis-à-vis the consolidation of Arab nationalism in Syria, on the other hand.

Using unpublished material, in particular concerning the Mandatory period (French records and Kurdish newspapers) and social movement theory, Tejel analyses the reasons of this "exception" within the Kurdish political sphere.

In spite of the exclusion of Kurdishness from the public sphere, especially since 1963, Kurds of Syria have avoided a direct confrontation with the central power - most Kurds opting for a strategy of "dissimulation" - cultivating internally the forms of identity that challenge the official ideology. The book explores the dynamics leading to the consolidation of Kurdish minority awareness in contemporary Syria, an ongoing process that could take the form of radicalization or even violence.

EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK
Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World

By Bruce K. Rutherford

Published by Princeton University Press – 304 pages

Price £ 20.95 Cloth

This book examines the political and ideological battles that drive Egyptian politics and shape the prospects for democracy throughout the region. Bruce Rutherford argues that secularists and Islamists are converging around a reform agenda that supports key elements of liberalism, including constraints on state power, the rule of law, and protection of some civil and political rights. But will this deepening liberalism lead to democracy? And what can the United States do to see that it does? In answering these questions, Rutherford shows that Egypt's reformers are reluctant to expand the public's role in politics. This suggests that, while liberalism is likely to progress steadily in the future, democracy's advance will be slow and uneven.

Essential reading on a subject of global importance, Egypt after Mubarak draws upon in-depth interviews with Egyptian judges, lawyers, Islamic activists, politicians, and businesspeople. It also utilizes major court rulings, political documents of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the writings of Egypt's leading contemporary Islamic thinkers.

A PRIVILEGE TO DIE

Inside Hezbolla’s Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel

By Thanasis Cambanis

Published by Free Press – 336 pages

Price $27.00

Veteran Middle East correspondent Thanassis Cambanis offers the first detailed look at the surprising cross section of people willing to die for Hezbollah and its agenda to remake the map of the region. Part standing army, part political party, and part theological movement, Hezbollah's widespread popularity rests on its ability to offer its followers economic reform, health care, efficient courts, and safe streets, as well as victory over Israel. With its promise of perpetual war, Hezbollah has ushered in a militant renaissance and inspired fighters in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, Iraq, and beyond.

To understand Hezbollah is to understand the fighters and engineers, and upon this logic, Cambanis follows a few Hezbollah families through the ups and downs of the 2006 war with Israel and the continuing preparations for another conflict, letting us listen in to Hezbollah members' intimate discussions at the kitchen table and on the battlefield. Cambanis's reporting puts a human face on the “Party of God”, so we might understand the ideological and religious roots of today's conflict. His riveting narrative provides an urgent and important exploration of militancy in the Middle East.

IRAN

Social, Economic and Political Developments

Edited by Joshua Owenstein

Published by Nova Science Publishers Inc – 169 pages

Price $ 103.50

This book brings together a variety of perspectives and presents a combination of writers who do not always publish in the same volume or collection. Much of the debate over US policy toward Iran has centred on the nature of the current regime. Some believe that Iran, a country of about 70 million people, is a threat to US interests because hardliners in Iran's regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to challenge US influence and allies in the region.

This book explores Iran's political history, regime structure, economic conditions, stability, and presidential elections. The chapters deal with two important issues namely Iran’s nuclear program and its compliance with international obligations, and an overview of its ballistic missile program. The uniqueness of this book is that it contains a distinct and eclectic variety of viewpoints that pertain Iran’s policy and security dynamics. As such, the book is a valuable tool for scholars and policy-makers.

* The Books were initially presented in Middle East Observer.

Oman Power and Water Summit, 2011

By Antonia Dimou

A series of topics ranging from investment in power and water infrastructure development to wastewater management strategies and renewable energy technologies was discussed at the “Oman Power and Water Summit” that was held on May 22-25, 2011 at the Grand Hyatt Muscat. The Summit was under the patronage of the Omani Public Authority for Electricity and Water, and brought together senior representatives from ministries and public authorities, power and water generation, transmission and distribution companies, renewable energy experts, international and local contractors, developers, consultants and suppliers to discuss the future of Oman’s power and water sector.

Since the market restructuring in 2005, the electricity and water sectors in Oman have benefited from public and private sector investment with significant levels of foreign direct investment in power and water production facilities. The Omani government’s decision to move away from publicly owned generation and transmission systems results in a host of opportunities for the private sector to get involved in the extension of the Sultanate’s utilities industry for the years to come. Specifically, the government is engaged in an ambitious programme that encourages the private sector to contribute towards an estimated 7.8 billion dollars worth of investment needed to bolster the sultanate’s power and water systems. In addition to increasing capacity, upgrades and technological improvements are also necessary to maximize efficiency of power and water transmission and distribution.

In this context, with all major projects and exciting developments in this particular industry sector, the “Oman Power and Water Summit” offered an invaluable opportunity for policymakers, industry professionals and leading industry players to get together and to learn from each other as they all contribute to the continued growth of the industry.

Participants in the Summit had the chance to review power and water demand forecast and upcoming projects, explore projects for future investment in Oman’s power and water sector, assess power generation and desalination resources required to meet fast growing energy demand, evaluate the privatisation process of generation, transmission and distribution networks, discuss the challenges in developing independent water and power projects, find out the latest developments and cost-effective technologies within the power and water industry, appraise the potential of renewable energy sources as a solution to the sultanate’s growing energy needs, and learn about best practices to improve environmental compliance of existing and new infrastructure.

The four-day Summit held two essential interactive workshops extended to ensure that attendees will get to the heart of the event’s most critical issues and uncover practical solutions that one can apply in his own company.

The first workshop entitled “Asset Management Capability Assessment and Roadmap for Implementation” examined the real benefits that asset management has brought to organisations worldwide, and presented effective strategies to maintain one’s assets in a fit-for-service condition, while also extending their life-cycle in the most reliable, safe and cost effective manner. During this interactive session, challenges, innovative solutions and best practices were discussed, and attendees undertook a mini asset management benchmarking exercise for their companies, which broadly assessed their competency level as measured against the key fundamental building blocks of best practice asset management. Attendees also discussed the preferred approach for organisations to undertake a full asset management review, and typical road maps for change, including time and resource management.

The second workshop entitled: "The scope of Further Liberalisation of Oman's Electricity and Related Water Sector and Development of the IPP/IWPP Models in GCC Electricity Markets" considered teh scope fro further market liberalisation.

The privatisation of power and water facilities remains a work in progress with a mixture of publicly owned and private companies operating under licenses granted by the industry regulator. The Sector Law that established the new electricity and related water sector market structure in 2005 includes provisions to facilitate further market liberalisation, including a liberalisation measure that would permit IPP/IWPPs to sell capacity and output to persons other than the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company.

Additionally, Oman’s vital power and water sector is entering a new phase in its aggressive development market by investments in world-class green-field power generation projects, by the potentials of waste-to-energy plants, the value of solar energy in oil production, and the status of pilot renewable energy projects that are currently being implemented in rural areas. During this interactive workshop, the implications and opportunities of further liberalisation for the IPP/IWPP market in Oman was discussed, and there was provision of the key requirements for the successful development of power generation and water desalination capacity.

Key speakers in “Oman Power and Water Summit” included the Chairman of the Omani Public Authority for Electricity and Water, Mohammed Abdullah Al-Mahrouqi, Chief Executive Officer of the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP), Bob Whitelaw, the General Manager of Majan Electricity Company, Ahmed Bin Saif Al-Mazrouy, the General Manager of Wadi Al Jizzi Power Company, Zahir Al Bahri, the Director General of Projects in the Public Authority for Electricity and Water Zaher Khaled Sulaiman Al-Sulaimani, and Head of Power Systems Operation and Maintenance of the Petroleum Development of Oman, Mohammed Aghbari. Major sponsors of the “Oman Power and Water Summit” were the companies of Siemens, Wärtsilä, Future Pipe Industries, HBK Contracting, DYK Inc, ABB, Khimji Ramdas LLC, SolarTotal, Greenergy and General Electric.

THE ARAB SPRING:

A REGION IN TRANSITION**

"
"Americans are Watching the Events
with Curiosity"

"

INTERVIEW WITH Colonel (Ret) Normand L. St. Pierre


Conducted by Antonia Dimou

Q. A metaphor for the unrest spreading across the Arab world is an earthquake that is changing the ground underneath. Is there a common cause and what are the reasons of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?

A. While the impact of sudden change and chaos may resemble that of an earthquake, the similarities end there. The revolutions, changes, and upheavals have a human component and are not entirely inevitable. There are no non-reversible outcomes. On the other hand, in each of the North African and Gulf scenarios, there were a variety of social, political, economic, and even cultural decisions by leadership and the revolutionaries themselves that could have made the need for protests/unrest unnecessary.

For instance, in nearly all cases to date, leaders could have opted out for an acceptable replacement or elections. Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, etc. had those options. They chose not to believe they were vulnerable – but for years citizens wanted them out. Besides corruption, however, and their own increasing loss of control, it is probably safe to say that their countries, and others in the region, have recently suffered the whip end of the global recession resulting in the severe drop in expatriate earnings, increasing cost of imports, increasing cost of energy, obligatory rises in subsidies, etc. Although leadership changes came, there was also an expectation that economic improvements would soon follow – this was as large a driver as the push for democracy.

Q. The split in NATO over its Libya operation has brought into light the differences within the alliance over the terms and goals of the mission, and the inevitably limiting effect of the alliance's consensus-based decision-making, as initially France was reluctant to hand NATO control of the Libyan mission, while Germany and Turkey opposed any military intervention, sparking the most bitter debate since the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. As the situation stands today, do you think that NATO in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis needs to look into and undertake some form of mission and structural revision?

A. NATO is not organized for quick action nor pursuing common objectives, when there is no threat to the actual member states nor clear ends. For many of the NATO members, Libya had become a new “friend” or at the very least provided a new “near abroad” market for resources and investment. Even as we speak the mission remains unclear and creeping toward more complexity. The greatest gap is between those favoring “protection of the population” vis-à-vis “elimination of Qadhafi.” A review should be conducted frequently, consistent with the views of the UN. But, more important than reviews is the need for clarity of purpose – that’s what will gain popular support by participants and continue funding streams.

Q. The strategic goal of the NATO operation and the UN Security Council Resolution that authorized it is to stop the fighting in Libya, creating a cease-fire and enabling a political solution. Has the manner in which NATO pursued the mission been consistent with that goal?

A. I cannot say for sure whether pursuit of the mission has been consistent because to achieve the UN Security Council Resolution goals there will be several interpretations of what the centres of gravity might actually be. Some will want to press against the front lines, others will target logistics, and yet again some will aim at the leadership and its resources.

Q. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have triggered a domino effect of protests calling for democratic reforms across the Arab world. It looks like a wave in the making that might remake geopolitical and internal arrangements of politics within and across the Arab world. That said, do you share the view that we are witnessing the end of the old Middle East, and how should the US act to protect its vital regional interests without appearing to be a fair-weather ally or encouraging instability?

A. I do not believe that there has been a change in the old way of doing business. There is simply no deep and fundamental understanding of democracy beyond voting and the need to be able to change leaders occasionally. If Ben Ali had stepped aside, there would have been elections again in Tunisia, without a revolution. If Mubarak had called for elections, or even stated that he was not running for election (he had great opportunities to do so at least twice in 2010), there would have been no great uproar in Tahrir Square.

Middle Easterners still want a “sheikh of sheikhs”, a charismatic, powerful figure who will fairly disperse the spoils. How this individual comes to power is less important. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the population was seeing the pie poorly divided, with the top leaders (government, business and military) getting more than is tolerable.

The US has many regional interests, from military basing and access to trade and resourcing. But the US must hedge its bets - the revolutions are not complete, for e.g. in Egypt. If the military is unable to promote civilian rule quickly, or if the military is sufficiently weakened that a popular mish-mash takes over then the future will be difficult if not chaotic.

Q. According to regional experts, the massive wave of protests in Tunisia and Egypt in particular set off a chain reaction that has blown up the entire region, and has engulfed most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East, with spreading effects into countries like Syria. That said, how is what is happening in the Arab world being seen by the Americans at the moment and how is it affecting the US?

A. Americans are watching the events with curiosity and as usual are cheering the underdogs. But let’s be honest, none of the uprisings has been significant or meaningful. No strategy nor policy of note has been impacted. Even the rise in oil prices is seen as speculation-based and not the result of regional problems.

On the other hand, Syria is a very interesting case in that it touches directly on the core US issue of the “Israeli” question. What happens in Syria could affect that process, impact Iranian influence in the region and Lebanon, and affect Hizballah’s ability to cause mayhem. This is the show to watch. Disturbances in Saudi Arabia would be a close second.

Q. US policy is a major balancing act. The United States has several interests at stake in the Middle East, like fighting terrorism and guaranteeing Israel's security. On the issue of Israel’s security, recently some concerns surfaced with regards to whether the new president-to-be in Egypt will honour the peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979 or whether the treaty will be revised at best, or scrapped at worst. How do you think the US should deal with such a new policy challenge?

A. The arguments for who benefits from the peace treaty tend to offset each other. Both Israel and Egypt have done well. Assuming logic prevails, Egyptians will realize that abandoning the Treaty will be costly, including a loss in tourist and investment revenues in the Sinai, a need to beef up forces in order to move them into the Sinai, and a loss of the annual one billion dollars plus from the US - and possible loss of US cooperation in military co-production.

The US should be active in promoting continuity on the one stable front Israel has (even Jordan is a bit shaky these days). An outbreak of friction between Egypt and Israel would be extremely costly to the US in many ways – to include deployment costs, logistical support to one or the other, etc.

Q. Calls for Arab governments to embrace democracy have been central to US policy that took into account the conflicting socio-political pressures that have long divided Arab societies. The recent uprisings in the wider Middle East which called for democratic reforms have given rise to discussions as to whether Turkey's relative success at wedding democratic freedoms with radical Islam can serve as a model. What is your opinion on that?

A. Turkey is of course a fairly good example; however, the Turks have been working at it for some time to fine tune and their experience in Europe is broader. It is too early to tell whether the revolutions in the Middle East will all lead to democratization. To date I would see we have seen a recognition of “people power.”

There’s always the possibility that this will not so much translate into democracy as much as a tool with which to beat governments into submission. The question then will be who gets to wield that tool.

* Colonel (ret) Normand L. St. Pierre recently completed six years as the MFO Director General’s Representative in Cairo, Egypt and is now a private consultant on Middle East issues. His interest in the Middle East began in 1980, while still in the US Army. As a regional specialist, he was assigned twice to the US Embassy in Tunisia, served as an advisor to the Lebanese Army in the ‘80s, and was later the US Defense Attaché to Syria.

Prior to his retirement from the military Colonel St. Pierre was the Middle East Division Chief in the Strategic Policy Division of the Joint Staff and then Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs for the Middle East and Asia at JCS. He was subsequently the political military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State, Near East Affairs at the US State Department. Prior to his work with the MFO he was a Regional Manager for a major US firm in Algeria for four years.

Mr. St. Pierre is a graduate of Bentley University and received his Masters in International Relations from Boston University. He and his wife Pearl currently reside in Leeds, Maine.

** SOURCE: Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011

THE ARAB SPRING:
A REGION IN TRANSITION**

"

"The Reason of the Protests in the Northern Part of Cyprus was not Lack of Democracy"

"

INTERVIEW WITH Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki

Conducted by Antonia Dimou

Q. We have witnessed protests and heavy clashes between protesters and governments in the region in recent months. Is there a common cause and what are the reasons of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?

A. It seems that there is indeed both a common cause and common reason of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. All the countries that have been affected -- or are on the verge of being affected -- by popular uprisings have had one thing in common: a very lax approach to democracy.Whether the leaders of those countries have been “self-imposed” or helped to rule by the foreign powers, both groups have tended to totalitarian rather than democratic practices.

All in all, they hardly have represented the real will of majority in respective countries. This, topped with the strained economic conditions and unemployment, resulted into a series of revolutions.

In fact, it is interesting to observe that the revolution did not get an immediate positive response from the Western democracies. People from the region were many times asked to start and support democratic reforms and were promised the help, including President Obama in his famous Cairo speech.

Q. The events in Libya and the international military intervention have provided a significant test but also an opportunity for Turkey's stated desire to create a foreign policy that combines realism with idealism. How has the Libyan situation highlighted Ankara’s stature as a more independent regional leader in the Middle East and its efforts to maintain its traditional alliances, taking into account the recent tensions between Turkey and NATO as well as some of its member countries, in particular France?

A. It seems that Turkey’s support for cease-fire is gaining firmer ground, also among other NATO’s member states. Also, it has been no secret that the influence of Turkey in the region is not only because of its ties with ruling elites but – or maybe particularly – with the peoples of region. In this light, Turkey, seeing it from its own perspective, would like to see the region ruled by democracy in peace, whoever is in charge. Just remember Prime Minister’s Erdogan speech in which he addressed former Egyptian President Mubarak.

When it comes to France, I think that part of the tension between these two countries is stemming also from the role both of them tend to play in the region. (Even though I believe that given historical and geographical terms, Turkey’s engagements make more sense). France, as we know, has been taking a leading role not only in designing the future Mediterranean, that includes also part of the region known as MENA, but has been trying to spread and strengthen its influence also in the Middle East.

Q. A number of initiatives to solve the Libyan conflict have been proposed by various governments. In this context, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodgan announced a three-phase road map which provides for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Qaddafi's forces from the besieged cities, the need to set up security zones for humanitarian aid, and, most importantly, a comprehensive democratic transformation process that will take into account the legitimate interests of the Libyan people. That said, how do you evaluate the Turkish peace initiative and what are the motives for Turkey to establish itself as mediator?

A. As far as Libya is concerned, cease-fire between rebels and Gaddafi’s option in Libya still remains the best option and priority for Turkey. From the statements made by Turkey till now on this issue, it seems that Turkey is in favour of a democratically supported leadership in Libya but at the same time is trying to avoid any further bloodshed.

It seems that Turkey believes that with the prolongation of war between rebels and the still official Libyan government, the consolidation of the country is being put in jeopardy. I believe this approach is much in line with what Turkey has demonstrated many times in last years that is Turkey favours diplomacy, though with a slow progress, over a resort to the military force.

Q. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have triggered a domino effect of protests calling for reform across the Arab world. On all fronts, Syria, a key regional player considered by certain regional circles as cornerstone of Turkey’s Middle East policy, is facing a wave of domestic protests. Realistically, Turkish-Syrian relations have flourished in recent years as Turkish-Israeli relations have waned and grown cold. The creation of an economic bloc of Turkey-Syria-Lebanon-Jordan, with the removal of visa requirements and the injection of Turkish investment and technological know-how, is an undoubted fact. That said what is your estimate on the possible impact that the prolongation of the domestic crisis in Syria could have on its multi-facet relationship with Turkey, and on the regional structure of power?

A. Continuity of instability in the region will have enormous consequences not only for Turkey but also for the rest of the world. We have already begun to pay huge prices for oil and gas and it seems to be only the beginning. On the other hand, for any regime to survive in this region, it should boost up its democratic credential and pursue an unabated reform process. If legitimate demands of the Syrian public are not addressed peacefully we are likely to see the spill over effects in that country too.

Just like the US was trying to manage the transition period in Egypt, Turkey through its good offices is trying to secure a peaceful and stabile transition in Syria. We should not forget that for having any transition to democracy, heads do not always have to fall down.

Q. The anti-regime protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere have given rise to discussions as to whether Turkey's relative success at wedding democratic freedoms with religion can serve as a model. The Turkish model is quite interesting because Turkey has managed to marry conservative Islam with forms of western democracy without giving up traditional social values, while keeping the social base and the political structure in some kind of harmony. Do you agree with the notion that Turkey could present a genuine alternative model to regional countries like Egypt which currently undergo a political transformation?

A. Not really. Turkey’s historical encounter with democracy has been totally different than those in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. But, of course, Turkey can serve as an inspiration.

Yet, here I would like to draw attention to the article written by President Gul and published in New York Times on April 21 in which he argues that democracies can hardly be established in the Muslim world without solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Unless the conflict is solved in an even-handed manner, there will be always radicals exploiting it for their own ends blurring legitimacy of democracy.

Q. In recent months a series of protests took place in the northern part of Cyprus targeting the economic protocol signed with Turkey as well as the latest economic-measures package concluded in late 2009 which includes the privatization of some public institutions and wage cuts. What is your estimate for the protests in the northern part of Cyprus? Do you think that they have been inspired and motivated by the regional protests in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere?

A. It is needless to say that even though Cyprus is also located in the region, political systems established there have hardly anything in common with the regional political systems in question. The fact that the political system in the north part of Cyprus is de jure not recognized by other states but Turkey does not mean that de facto there is no running democracy. Turkish Cypriots have had couple of decades old experience with free democratic elections and their results.

Moreover, they did not rise against their own government. They protested against the government of the country they financially depend on. Turkey allocates annually about $580 million from its own budget for northern Cyprus. Northern Cyprus, on the other hand, needs this financial support because it has no other means to generate a state income. Political decisions of other countries not to trade with the Turkish Cypriots put it effectively into isolation.

So, the reason of the protests in the northern part of Cyprus was not a lack of democracy but austerity measures proposed by a country – i.e. Turkey -- that has been till now a source of the financial injections for the Turkish Cypriot economy.

* Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki is the Deputy Director of the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) and a Vice-Chair of the International Relations Department of Istanbul Kültür University where she teaches courses on international law and political thought. She completed her Masters and doctoral studies at Comenius University in Bratislava, at the Faculty of Law. Between 2003 and 2008 she worked as the Cyprus project coordinator and a senior research fellow at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Foreign Policy Program. A regular columnist at the Turkish Daily News, Dr. Tiryaki writes extensively for various national and international academic journals and newspapers. Her fields of expertise include Turkish foreign policy, Cyprus, the Middle East and North Africa, Armenia and the European Union.

** SOURCE: Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011