MONOGRAPH - THE CRISIS IN SYRIA: DIPLOMACY, REGIONAL CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

Monograph by Antonia Dimou on the Crisis in Syria to be released soon. Published by the Institute for Security and Defense Analyses based in Athens, Greece.



The monograph focuses on the first ten months of the crisis in Syria (March 2011 till December 2011). Being written in the region as the Syrian crisis sparked, flared and spread, this monograph makes no pretence about providing answers to complex issues addressed, thus aiming to increase understanding through a series of conducted interviews with officials, international relations experts from the region, Baathist and Islamic figures as well as Syrian oppositionists.

Intelligence Squared, Greece: Debate on “Peace Cannot Be Enforced, It Must Be Inspired”

Speakers:

In support of the proposal; 

Lord Bates, Member of the UK Parliament- House of Lords, Commenced the “Walk of Truce” from Olympia to London

Peter Economides, Brand Strategist, Founder and CEO of Felix BNI

Against the proposal; 

Prof. Athanasios Platias, Chair of the Department fo International and European Studies, University of Peiraeus

Maria-Daniella Marouda, Professor of International Law, Panteion University

Moderator: Nikos Andritsos, Journalist

  

During the Debate Antonia Dimou posed the following question:

First of all, I would like to thank you for your excellent presentations, and my question is addressed to each one of you. Many times in your presentations you referred to Syria and also there was specific reference to the international levels and tools that are existent in order to enforce or inspire peace. According to the American Pentagon, Peace enforcement entails the physical interposition of armed forces between ongoing combatants to establish a cease-fire that does not exist. According to the UN, peace enforcement refers to efforts to prevent a ceasefire from collapsing or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. With this in mind, let’s move to Syria. The August 15 Report of the International Independent Commission Inquiry on Syria blames government forces and opposition armed groups for the massacre in Houla. The Report says that violence has increased in intensity and spread into new areas since February 2012 and that although the opposition is not party to the Geneva Conventions, it has to respect the principles of the International Humanitarian Law. In the context of this reality and given the increasing death toll, can international efforts to create a ceasefire in Syria succeed through peace enforcement or peace inspiration?

Maria Daniella Marouda: There are international tools and they are successful, if they are put into place. For Syria, you mentioned two definitions of enforcement and there is a third one actually, and this already shows how many problems we have with definitions, with different ideas, with different priorities. There is a third one saying that even though enforcement is associated often with authority and with violence, in the context of conflicts and peace, it’s more important the pressure, how you compel parties to come into the negotiating table and have an increased cooperation that will bring about a ceasefire, a truce and a peace agreement. So what we strive for in Syria is an opportunity to impose these mechanisms to have an increased cooperation of the parties to the conflict; if this cannot happen through the Security Council, it can happen through the General Assembly. Already, the second day of the Olympic Games again and the General Assembly issued a resolution, according to which resolution there should be an imposition of peace asking the Security Council to do it. There is a possibility institutionally in the United Nations to have the majority of States in the General Assembly to authorize imposition of measures for Syria.  So, this is a way out.

Lord Bates: Just briefly to add to those points. I do think that there was a very interesting point in the case of Syria, to say that is there a comparison into the level of resource that we put behind things. When we commenced my Walk one of the reasons why I commenced my Walk was because I was seeking to persuade the United Kingdom government, who have since repented their sin and come behind the initiative in a wonderful way, but I was seeking to persuade them to invest 20 million pounds in a project to promote peace and reconciliation under the Olympic Truce, and I failed and then a week later there was a resolution about Libya that went through the United Nations Security Council; it was passed by ten (10) people not the 193 countries that have backed the Olympic Truce and within a weekend we were able to assemble a navy, a billion dollar budget that apparently were found by somewhere and we were able to have incredible international cooperation to go in a military way. My argument is this; if only we gave a chance to put in the same resources behind peace and peace building that we put behind war, then we might find that it has more effect, if we talk some of the 180 billion dollars which the US government alone is spending in Afghanistan each year and spend some of that into efforts to bring about peace in Syria, we might get a different result. The problem is that we have become obsessed with military solutions and when you are a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.   

Results: 

36% in support of the Proposal 

60%  against the Proposal

4%  neutral position 

Athens, Wednesday 19 September, 2012 
Amphithreatre of Dim. Vileka, Building of the Hellenic Olympic Committee (HOC)

Video-Debate: "Peace Cannot Be Enforced, It Must Be Inspired"

The Intelligence Squared Greece and International Olympic Truce Centre debate on:

"Peace cannot be enforced, it must be inspired"
("Η ειρήνη εμπνέεται, δεν επιβάλλεται")



For the motion: 
Lord Michael Bates
Peter Economides


Against the motion:
Athanasios Platias
Maria - Daniela Marouda

Moderator: Nikos Andritsos

Ι Kneel Only to Put Strength and Get Up

Source: http://olympia.gr

ISDA: 12th Doha Forum and Enriching the Middle East’s Economic Future Conference, May 20-22, 2012, Doha, State of Qatar

Source: http://i-sda.eu/main/news/12th-doha-forum-and-enriching-the-middle-east%E2%80%99s-economic-future-conference-may-20-22-2012-doha-state-of-qatar

Ms Antonia Dimou, head of the Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit of ISDA, attended the Doha Forum whichwrapped up ceremonies on the 22nd of May, concluding two days of talks focused on the year’s international economic developments that affected the Middle East and the world. Held at Doha’s Sheraton on the Corniche, the Forum co-sponsored by the Center for Middle East Development of the UCLA attracted 810 high-profile delegates from around the world including a number of heads of state.

Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, as well as Foreign and Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabor Al Thani opened the event. Officials included HE Yousef Hussein Kamal, Minister of Economy and Finance of Qatar, prof. Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, HE Mourad Medelci, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, HE Andrew Swiger, Senior Vice President of Exxon Mobil Corporation USA, HE George Mitchell. Former US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace (2009-2011), HE Jose Rodriguez Zapatero, former Prime Minister of Spain, HE Martin Torrijos, former President of Panama, HE Rafiq Abdel Salam, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, Emma Bonino, Vice President of the Italian Senate and former EU Commissioner, Marwan Muasher, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan, Princess Basmah al-Saud of Inseed Holdings, Dr Teuta Arifi, Deputy Prime Minister of FYROM and HE Rodi Kratsa, Vice President of the European Parliament (2007-2012).

True to its original title, the Doha Forum is an established world-class event that celebrated its 12th edition and offered a sweeping overview of issues related to Development, Insights on the Political and Global Economy, Democracy, Development and Free Trade, the Future of Peace in the Middle East with special focus on the Arab and Israeli peace initiatives, Investment Climate in the GCC, Civil Rights, the Impact of the Arab Spring on Political Changes, and Future Trends. More focused, Doha Forum dedicated special sessions on the consequences of the Global Financial Crisis in Reshaping Economic Policy and hosted a workshop on the Greek financial collapse chaired by ISDA’s head of Middle East and Persian Gulf Unit, Ms Antonia Dimou. Speakers of the Workshop on Greece included Prof. Panayiotis Petrakis of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Alexander Moraitakis, President of NUNTIUS Financial Company, Prof. Nikolaos Milonas of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, and Sven Behrendt, Founder and Managing Director of Geo Economica, Switzerland.

The workshop on Greece argued for hours on the likelihood of the rejection of or/and the renegotiation of the troika-imposed “Memorandum of Agreement”, and the significance of the upcoming June 17 where Greeks will vote for a new government. Wrapped up in complicated terms such as Gross Domestic Product, Sovereign Debt, and derivatives the workshop on Greece attempted to explain why Greece has collapsed and why a failure of the Greek economy would have a negative if not chaotic effect not only on Greece itself, but also the EU and the US.

The workshop on Greece addressed some of the most critical questions that dominate the political and economic thinking nowadays both in Greece and in Europe. The workshop also examined the scenario of a Greek exit from the euro-zone and if Greece pulls out of the euro, what will that mean for the single currency, what would that mean for the status of Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland as well as the attitude of the markets even towards France. It endeavoured to provide answers on, what would European policymakers do at the moment of a possible Greek exit to persuade investors and depositors that Greece was the exception proving the rule of euro-unity, and if it is utopian to expect member states to default and remain within the euro-zone, and why is that so.

This year the Doha Forum highlighted Greece as a player that impacts not only the world economy but also regional trends. Upon this approach, the Forum dedicated a special workshop on Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean chaired by Jay Footlik and Mac Bernstein of the US. Speakers included Christodoulos Pelaghias, Chairman of ERPIC representing Cyprus, Ilan Mizrahi, President and CEO of TATOOM Consulting representing Israel, and John Nomikos, President of RIEAS representing Greece.

In concluding, the Doha Forum has undoubtedly highlighted Qatar’s emergence as a regional influence with the aim to achieve regional stability through the promotion of democratic and economic reforms.

Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?” From Right to Left; Prof. Panayiotis Petrakis, Alexander Moraitakis, Antonia Dimou, Prof. Nikolaos Milonas, and Sven Behrendt

.

Overview of the Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?”

Panel Overview of the Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?”

Panel Overview of the Workshop on “Gas Fields in the Eastern Mediterranean”

Overview of the Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?”

Members of the Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?” From Right to Left; Alexander Moraitakis, president of NUNTIUS Financial Company, Sven Behrendt, Founder and Managing Director, Geo Economica, Switzerland, Prof. Nikolaos Milonas of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Ms Antonia Dimou, ISDA and CMED of the UCLA, and Prof. Panayiotis Petrakis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Doha Forum Workshop on "Why Did Greece Collapse?" - Opening Remarks

By Antonia Dimou, Chair of the Workshop

Members of the Workshop on “Why Did Greece Collapse?” From Right to Left;  Alexander Moraitakis, president of NUNTIUS Financial Company, Sven Behrendt, Founder and Managing Director, Geo Economica, Switzerland, Prof. Nikolaos Milonas of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Ms Antonia Dimou, ISDA and CMED of the UCLA, and Prof. Panayiotis Petrakis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Economists and market analysts have offered various explanations as to why a failure of the Greek economy would have drastic impact on the European and United States economies. Within these explanations, terms such as Gross Domestic Product, Sovereign Debt, and derivatives are used, which at times can be quite confusing to someone who is not educated in finance or economics. Wrapped up in these complicated terms this special session will attempt to explain why Greece has collapsed - or let us put it in the right frame, if Greece has actually collapsed - and why a failure of the Greek economy would have a negative if not chaotic effect on Greece itself, the EU and the US.

This session will address some of the most critical questions that dominate the political and economic thinking nowadays both in Greece and in Europe. We will examine the scenario of a Greek exit from the euro-zone and if Greece pulls out of the euro, what will that mean for the single currency, what would that mean for the status of Portugal, Italy, Spain, Ireland as well as the attitude of the markets even towards France. What would European policymakers do at the moment of a possible Greek exit to persuade investors and depositors that Greece was the exception proving the rule of euro-unity? Is it utopian to expect member states to default and remain within the euro-zone, and why is that so? According to some experts, “default, partial or otherwise, is an essential part of the necessary debt-reduction programme”. 

The question is: How should a rescue package be organised centrally and in a manner that deflates the debt-recession crisis, rather than inflame it further? We will also hear from our speakers if there is a Proposal coming either from Greece or Europe which can ensure fiscal stability. As you know, Greece heads in less than a month to new elections to produce a government which government will almost certainly press to renegotiate the country's bail-out terms. 

Therefore, it will be interesting to listen in this session if there is a Greek Plan that exchanges greater fiscal discipline for an Investment-led Recovery Program.

DOHA FORUM, ENRICHING THE MIDDLE EAST’S ECONOMIC FUTURE CONFERENCE, (20-22 MAY 2012), QATAR

Monday, 21st May 2012

11:00-12:30 

CMED Salwa (1, 2) 

Workshop (6): Why Did Greece Collapse? 

Chair: Antonia Dimou

Speakers:

- Panayiotis Petrakis, Chair of the Department of Development and International Economics of the National Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece

- Alexander Moraitakis, President, NUNTIUS Financial Company, Greece

- Nikolaos Milonas, Professor of Finance, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece

- Sven Behrendt, Founder and Managing Director, Geo Economica, Switzerland

The full programme of the Doha Forum can be accessed at:

Το Ελληνικό Εθνικό περίπτερο στη SOFEX 2012

25-05-2012 14:55:02

ΠΗΓΗ: Defencenet.gr 

Η DEFENSYS οργάνωσε με μεγάλη επιτυχία όπως δείχνουν τα αποτελέσματα, το Ελληνικό Εθνικό Περίπτερο στην 9η Έκθεση Ειδικών Δυνάμεων “SOFEX 2012”, η οποία πραγματοποιήθηκε υπό την αιγίδα του Βασιλιά Abdullah II, την προεδρία του Πρίγκιπα Feisal Bin Al Hussein και με την πλήρη υποστήριξη των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων της Ιορδανίας, από τις 8 έως τις 10 Μαΐου 2012 στο Αμμάν.

Το Ελληνικό Εθνικό Περίπτερο διοργανώθηκε με την πλήρη υποστήριξη της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Αμυντικών Επενδύσεων και Εξοπλισμού (ΓΔΑΕΕ) του Υπουργείου Εθνικής Άμυνας. Στη SOFEX 2012 συμμετείχαν έξι αμυντικές βιομηχανίες παράλληλα με τη DEFENSYS, η ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΚΗ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΑ, τα ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΑ ΑΜΥΝΤΙΚΑ ΣΥΣΤΗΜΑΤΑ, η ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΒΙΟΜΗΧΑΝΙΑ ΟΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ, η ELMON, η ΠΥΡΓΟΣ και η SIELMAN ΑΕ.

Οι ελληνικές εταιρίες, οι οποίες αποσκοπούν στην προώθηση των αμυντικών προϊόντων και υπηρεσιών τους, καθώς και στην ενίσχυση των διεθνών δραστηριοτήτων τους και στην αύξηση των εξαγωγών τους, είχαν την ευκαιρία να συναντηθούν με την ηγεσία της χώρας υποδοχής, το βασιλιά της Ιορδανίας Abdullah II, τον Πρίγκιπα Feisal Bin Al Hussein, τον πρίγκιπα Hamzah Bin Al Hussein, τον Αρχηγό ΓΕΕΘΑ, τον Αρχηγό του Γενικού Επιτελείου Στρατού, τον Αρχηγό του Επιτελείου Αεροπορίας, τον Αρχηγό της Αστυνομίας της Ιορδανίας, τους διευθυντές Αεράμυνας, Επικοινωνιών, & Εξοπλιστικών Προγραμμάτων, καθώς και πολλές υψηλόβαθμες κυβερνητικές και ξένες αντιπροσωπείες των Ένοπλων Δυνάμεων και εμπορικούςεπισκέπτες.

Αυτή ήταν η πρώτη φορά που οργανώθηκε Ελληνικό Εθνικό Περίπτερο σε έκθεση άμυνας, μια πολύ σημαντική και επιτυχημένη προσπάθεια από τη DEFENSYS σε μια περίοδο όπου οι ελληνικές εταιρείες προσανατολίζονται στην εξωστρέφεια για την  αντιμετώπιση της οικονομικής κρίσης. 

 

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY: Palestinian Territories

Reference to an article written by Antonia Dimou

Background Information:

  There are two areas which are considered go be part of the Palestinian Authority (PA). They include the areas known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The President of the Palestinian Authority or PA is Mahmud Abbas, who was elected in 2005.

 

   These territories were placed under Palestinian rule in September 1993 through the "Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government. Arrangements provided for a transitional period of Palestinian self-rule" (Central Intelligence Agency). The agreement placed the areas under Palestinian control for 5 years, after which a permanent agreement would be negotiated. By 1999, Israel had transferred "security and civilian responsibility" of the Palestinian-populated areas to the PA, but negotiations over what would become of the the two territories were stalled due to an "intifada", which is a period of intensified Palestinian-Israeli violence, in September 2000. In 2005, Israel removed all troops and 21 settlements from the Gaza Strip for the first time since 1967. The strip was considered to be under Palestinian control, but under the terms of the agreement made, Israel continued to control the "external perimeter" which includes airspace, activity in the sea off the strip, and the border of Eqypt and Gaza. Israel also gained the ability to control the movement of goods into Gaza and the taxation system, through agreements made between PA and Israel.There is still great conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli's over the creation of a Palestinian state. 

 

Gaza Strip:

CIA - The World Factbook -- Gaza Strip.webarchive

According to the CIA World Factbook, the Palestinian territories are located in Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Israel.  The area of the Gaza strip is 360 square kilometers, which is about the size of 2 Washington D.C's. Some of the environmental issues in the area include "desertification, salination of fresh water, sewage treatment, water-borne diseases, and depletion and contamination of underground water resources." The population of this area is about 1.6 million. 99.3% of the population is Muslim and .7% is Christian, and are known as the Palestinian Arabs who speak mainly Arabic and Hebrew. 360,000 people out of 1.5 million have access to internet and telephones. 70% of the population is below the poverty line and 40% of the population is unemployed. 92.4% of the population is literate above the age of 15. Some of the major agriculture products include olives, flowers, fruit, vegetables, beef and dairy products. The industries are mainly involved in textiles and food processing. 

 

West Bank:

CIA - The World Factbook -- West Bank.webarchive

According to the CIA World Factbook, The West Bank is also in the Middle East and located to the west of Jordan. The area is 5,860 square kilometers (approximately the size of Delaware). The land is arable, but suffers from droughts similar to the Gaza Strip. The two main environmental issues include "adequacy of fresh water supply and sewage treatment." The population is approximately 2.5 million. Eighty-three percent of the population are Palestinian Arab and 17% are Jewish, while 75% are Muslim, 17% are Jewish and 8% are considered "other". The predominate language spoken is Arabic. The literacy rate is 92.4% above the age of 15, which is the same as Gaza Strip. Fortunately, the unemployment rate is much lower than Gaza Strip at 19%, and 46% of the population is below the poverty line compared to Gaza's 70%. This area's agricultural products are the same as the Gaza Strip, but the major industries include "small-scale manufacturing, quarrying, textiles, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs".

Articles 

1. Israeli's Second Disengagement of Gaza

     by Antonia Dimou (August 13, 2010)

 

 

 

   This article discussed the proposal made by Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, for a second disengagement from Gaza. The proposal "works to secure E.U cooperation to rebuild the Gaza Strip and relinquish all Israeli responsibility for Gaza including the lifting of the naval blockade on it". 

 

    The author of the article discusses how the Gaza Strip and West Bank are considered as a "single territorial entity" and that both Israeli and Palestinian parties are quoted saying just that. She finds it "legally profound" that because Israel contains control over West Bank, that under Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, Gaza will continue to be occupied territory. The Article states "territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised" (International Committee of the Red Cross). Therefore, Gaza is going to continue to be considered an Israeli occupied territory due to Israel control over the West Bank.

 

    The author, Antonia Dimou, believes there are "two major issues that need to be addressed before an Israeli disengagement takes place". The first is the possibility of a "humanitarian disaster", and the second is about the steps that need to be taken to prevent an "intractable security problem". Egypt may also play a role in the flow of goods into Gaza, but both sides have reservations on working together from past disputes.

 

  In the final words of the article, Palestinians need to unite together as one voice, and only then will they begin to prosper in their efforts for equality. 

 

 

2. Middle East Leaders in Direct Talks

 Aljazeera.net (September 14, 2010)

   Israeli and Palestinian leaders recently met in Egypt for a "second round of US-brokered direct negotiations against a backdrop of continued differences over Israel's plan to build more illegal Jewish settlements on Palestinian land". There has been no evidence that a compromise has been reached between the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinian leader, Mahmud Abbas, who are said to be in need of a "serious discussion on core issues" including "Israel's security, the borders of a future Palestinian state, the fate of Palestinian refugees and the future of Jerusalem." The article states that the U.S believes that there is a possibility for a peace deal between the two nations within the next year. Both Barak Obama and Hilary Clinton have called for a 10 month "moratorium" or legal authorized period of delay, on the illegal settlements, and also say that an "agreement could be forged between both the Israelis and the Palestinians on actions that could be taken by both sides that would enable the negotiations to continue". According to the article, the Palestinians have stated that they will not continue further negotiations with Israel if there is no moratorium. 

 

  Despite the conflict emerging, Israel has continued to build new Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, which is the proclaimed capital of the Palestinian Authority. Many believe that due to the continued building, and Israel's refusal to discontinue, the creation of a Palestinian state "does not look promising". Ultimately, the "Palestinians want a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Netanyahu, has embraced a two state solution, but has shown no sign on yielding on Jerusalem as the undivided capital of the Jewish state". 

 

 

  

3. PM begins Trilateral Meeting, says "There is a lot of work"

by Herb Keinon (September 15, 2010)

   Talks began in Jerusalem on Wednesday September 15, 2010, between the PA President, Mahmud Abbas, the Israeli Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and the U.S Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. When asked whether progress is being made the Prime Minister responded that they "are working on it..there is a lot of work". The Secretary of State held meetings with the Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman and the President Shimon Peres, as well as Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Before attending any meetings on Wednesday, Clinton "expressed hop about the latest round of Israeli Palestinian peace talks" and also stated that the Prime Minister and PA President are finally "getting down to business and have started to grapple with the core issues that can only be solved in face to face negotiations". The U.S will be supporters to the both leaders through out the process as an "active and sustained partner". These talks are believed to be revolutionary to the conflict and not "history repeating itself". Both sides believe that only good things with come from these peace talks. 

 

References: 

Aljazeera.net. (2010, September 14). Middle East Leaders in Direct Talks. Retrieved September 14, 2010, from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/09/201091412441714562.html 

 

Dimou, Antonia. (2010, August 13). Israel's Second Disengagement from Gaza. Retrieved September 13, 2010, from http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/3607.cfm.

Keinon, Herb. (2010, September 15). PM begins trialateral meeting, says "There is a lot of Work". Retrieved September 15, 2010, from http://www.jpost.com/VideoArticles/Article.aspx?id=188181

TURKEY’S POLICIES AND AMBITIONS VIS-À-VIS SYRIA

By Antonia Dimou 


The following analysis is part of a research project conducted in Jordan the period of November 2011-January 2012. The full text is to be released by the Institute for Security and Defense Analyses, Athens 

(Photo from: http://geopoliticsdailynews.blogspot.com/2012/03/blog-post_554.html)

Turkey has become more focused on the Islamic world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy, though it remains a blend of western institutions and orientation. Turkey pursues a mix of traditional western oriented foreign policy however it has incorporated two new ideological elements, the “zero-problem/conflicts” and neo-ottomanism. Neo-ottomanism is a Turkish political ideology that promotes greater engagement with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire and has profoundly become the new conceptual framework of the Turkish foreign policy.  

The dominant traditional foreign policy centers on the country’s cooperation and integration with the West, namely NATO, the efforts to access the EU and the customs union with the EU. The EU is Turkey’s major trading partner accounting for 42 percent of the country’s total trade while the US is important in the military, energy and aviation sectors. The Turkish military is heavily dependent on the US supply and technology, while Turkey realizes that turbulence in its immediate entourage from Libya and Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan necessitates close cooperation with the West and NATO. Equally interesting is the fact that the Turkish leadership acknowledges that part of the country’s allure in the Middle East stems from its key position in Western clubs and institutions. 

Borrowing from the Western rhetoric that Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West, its worldview as expressed by its leadership envisions an economically and culturally integrated Middle East as the driver for a peaceful and not the crisis-ridden periphery of today. It is in this context that Turkey supports that as the legitimate successor of the Ottoman Empire should be the focus of the re-establishment of strong Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean regions exploiting the ideological elements of the “zero-problems/conflicts” with neighbors and neo-ottomanism which employs the concepts of Islamic solidarity and of Turkish-Islamic synthesis.   

The new ideological foreign policy element of the “zero-problems/conflicts” concentrates on Turkey’s efforts to resolve problems with its immediate near abroad. This new element contradicts the traditional policy of letting long-term frozen conflicts fester. Upon this, Turkey pursued an opening to Armenia that climaxed with the sign of recognition protocols, and the acceptance of the Anan Plan to resolve the Cyprus question.

The second foreign policy element incorporates the conceptual ingredients of neo-ottomanism which solidifies Ankara’s aspirations to re-engage estranged neighbors and to serve as mediator in conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. It is in this framework that Turkey was instrumental in mediating between Syria and Israel and in opening dialogue with all groups within Iraq, including the Kurds. The idea of Turkey employing its cultural and religious links to the Middle East for the advancement of Turkish interests and regional stability has gained momentum by veteran Turkish diplomat and foreign minister Ahmed Davutoglu. His theory, best expressed in his book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik), is that most of the regional regimes are undemocratic and illegitimate, and therefore, Turkey by capitalizing on the alleged admiration among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and soft political power, reaches over the regimes to the Arab street. 

In the mindset of the Arab street, Turkey is multi-dimensional for a number of reasons and thus appealing; first, Turkey represents a successful economic model that managed to move the country from the developing countries level to the powerful economic elite of the G-20; second, Turkey represents a soft power of Islamic governance that alternates the democracy exercised by Israel. In the Arab mindset, Israel used to represent the best model of democracy in the region rooted in solid principles and institutions.

This Arab position started to gradually change when Israel took the decision to proceed in peace negotiations with the Palestinians and failed to deliver peace dividents, especially during the last 10 years. Due to the political facts on the ground, Turkey has managed in large to replace Israel as the sole source of democratic admiration.

  

To capitalize in its rapport with the people and its Ottoman experience as well as its supposed diplomatic expertise, Turkey has thrown itself deeply into the waters of the Arab Spring envisioning to patron it. The Turkish patronization is attempted with its Islamic orientation, ties to religiously conservative constituencies and alleged widespread popularity among the Arab critical mass. After the effervescent phase of social networking, the Arab Spring has entered a critical curve depicted in the electoral advances of Islamic parties, which have profoundly filled a political void in those countries where transparent political institutions and secular parties have been absent and therefore could not be created by immediate and post-insurrectionary improvisation.

  

Nevertheless, this effort cannot be translated into unfettered Turkish sway over Arab countries like Egypt, where the protests sparked and flared. Besides the fact that Egypt is too nationalist and too big to simply fall under Turkish influence, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood resentment of Turkish influence is historically persistent while the Egyptian Nour party is inclined towards the fundamentalist Wahhabis mainly controlled by Saudi Arabia. For its part, Libya is too complex and laden with resources to the point that one country cannot singlehandedly wield significant control over it, while it cannot escape from the Libyan political thinking that Turkey has initially defended the former Libyan President by condemning NATO military action to overthrow him.

   

The only country that Turkey seems to have a significant ideological and political leverage is Tunisia, though it is too far and too Francophone. The Tunisian al-Nahda party that has won the elections imitates the rhetoric of the Turkish ruling AKP and upholds it as a democratic party that has won three elections fairly and which has avoided the excesses of the Iranian clerical political system as well as the salafi banner supported by Saudi Wahhabis. The degree of intermeddling and Turkish ideological influence over the majority Tunisian political party is denoted by the fact that the leader of the al-Nahda party, Rachid Ghannoushi, has published his political writings in Turkey and maintains close relations with the Turkish Prime Minister.

In pursuit of its posturing as a leading Muslim power that determines the regional currents, Turkey has aimed to uniquely position itself in the case of Syria. Turkey’s apparent motive is that the end of the Syrian President Assad’s rule in Damascus could mark a period of much increased Turkish influence in Syria. It is in this context that since the beginning of the Syrian protests and while Syrian-Turkish official diplomatic efforts were intensified for solving the crisis, Ankara has concurrently played an active role in organizing the opposition lending it invaluable international legitimacy by hosting a series of meetings. The Syrian Conference for Change with the attendance of 300 participants in the Mediterranean resort of Antalya took place on May 31^st to June 2^nd, 2011, and produced a final declaration which called on the Syrian President to resign from all of his duties and positions and to hand over authority to his vice-president in accordance with constitutional procedures until the election of a transitional council that will draft and implement a new Syrian constitution that shall call for free and transparent parliamentary and presidential elections within a period not to exceed one year from the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad.

 

After sustained efforts by Syrian opposition groups and Turkey as the host country of a series of opposition meetings since April 2011, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was officially announced in Istanbul on October 2, 2011. The efforts of Turkey towards the internationalization of the Syrian crisis have been instrumental by supporting the formation of the SNC and its political program that seeks to delegitimize the Assad regime in the Arab and international arenas. Towards this end, according to a prominent advisor to the Secretary General of the SNC, “the SNC aims to exert political pressure to further isolate the regime politically, diplomatically, and financially by breaking down its pillars of support both domestically, regionally and internationally”. Most prevailing among the goals of the SNC is to deliver the voice of the Syrian protests and their demands to the International Community since key grassroots organizers and activists allegedly serve on the SNC membership, Secretariat General, and the Executive Committee. It is in this context, that the Turkish government invited a delegation of the SNC to attend the World Economic Forum conference titled “Platform for International Cooperation” held in Istanbul on November 23-25, 2011. The conference was an important venue attended by government officials and businesspeople from more than 40 countries where the SNC delegation was offered the opportunity to address the whole assembly and present their political agenda.  

Turkey has methodically managed to enjoy significant political clout in the Syrian opposition with the aim to be uniquely positioned in the post-Assad Syria. The view of the SNC towards Turkey is best summarized as; "Turkey has been supportive of the Syrian revolution and considers Syria’s security and stability a matter of national interest for the entire region. Turkey and other countries may play a positive role during the transition, but it will be up to the Syrian people to draft the path of their future. At the same time, it is natural to expect Syrians to remember who sided with the people of Syria and who supported the Assads". 

The policies of Turkey against the Syrian regime have been intensified with the provision of logistical support to the Free Syrian Army that employs defectors from the Syrian army as well as of political support for the formation of a Military Council whose main goal is to topple the regime and protect citizens, public and private property and preventing chaos once the regime falls while its members cannot participate in any political party or religious movement. 

Turkey allegedly seeks the de jure establishment of a no-fly zone over Aleppo in Northern Syria following the example of Libya.  Specifically, the aim of the no-fly zone is to create a secured zone that would serve as humanitarian corridor and to turn Aleppo into a Syrian Benghazi much like the Libyan city that served as the political and military base of the Libyan opposition. This however is a risky game as the experience with no-fly zones over countries such as Iraq has shown that such measures in the absence of any viable political solution can complicate the situation. The case of Iraq is indicative, where the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq and the Shiite regions in the south of the country, without a prior mandate from the UN Security Council, has enjoyed limited success between 1991 and 2003. Under the protection of US forces, that destroyed the anti-aircraft defense of Iraq and the military bases on the ground, the Kurds established de facto autonomy in Northern Iraq. At the same time, the southern part of the country continues to be under a state of complete lack of security and daily armed clashes, taking for granted the entry of militants of Islamist organizations such as al-Qaeda.  

On a parallel basis, Turkey supports the economic sanctions against Syria as proposed by the Arab League. Having considered its improving relations with Syria as a key foreign policy success during the last decade, Turkey has invested heavily and solidified economic cooperation with its Arab neighbor. More than 50 agreements and memoranda of understanding in fields ranging from transportation and security to energy and water are in place, the most strategically important envisioning the irrigation of 150,000 hectares of farmland in the province of al-Hasakah using water from the Tigris river as well as the construction of a dam on the Orontes river for power generation and irrigation. The allocation and use of the Tigris River waters forms the traditional core of political and strategic considerations for Syria, therefore the sharing of benefits and expertise between the two countries presented a major shift from the intractable approach of the past. Equally important has been the agreement for the linkage of Syria’s natural gas pipeline that is part of the 1,200 kilometer “Arab Natural Gas Pipeline” that exports Egyptian natural gas to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, with a separate line to Israel to the proposed Nabucco pipeline that crosses Turkey from central Asia into Europe, and which aims to constitute another vein that will support the Nabucco project. It is important to note that Syria purchases around 1.5 billion kilowatts of electricity from Turkey annually to meet its increasing energy needs.  

Also, trade between the two countries expanded to such levels that Turkey’s trade volume reached 1.8 billion dollars as of 2009, while investments of Turkish companies in Syria account to nearly 260 million dollars. The signing of agreements on “Preventing Double Taxation”, “the Reciprocal Stimulus and Protection of Investments” as well as the establishment of the “Free Trade Agreement” provided the legal foundations that bind the two counties and which foresee that in a 12-year period, industrial products exported from Turkey to Syria will be free from custom taxes in increments, while products entering Turkey from Syria are currently entirely free from customs taxes.

  

Therefore, Turkey’s suspension of all financial relations with Syria and the freezing of Syrian government assets in the country have the potential to cause a serious setback in bilateral trade and economic relations overall between Turkey and Syria. Syria for its part has already struck out at Turkey by placing a 30 percent tariff on Turkish imports thus increasing the prices of all Turkish products that jumped 30-40 percent overnight. In response, Turkey opened two additional crossings to Iraq in order to assist local merchants to bypass Syria in trade with the Gulf and Egypt. On a parallel basis, Turkey announced that it will stop all transactions with the Commercial Bank of Syria, except for the existing ones, and that it will halt all credit agreements signed with Eximbank to finance Syrian infrastructure projects.

 

Turkey’s Regional Motivations 

It is no secret that Turkey under its current leadership has invested major political capital in methodologically deepening relations with Syria and constituted a ready mediator willing to help Damascus mend its strained relations with neighbors such as Israel. Turkey has facilitated a series of Syrian-Israeli peace talks that ended in December 2008 with the main focus on that if Syria were able to achieve peace with “security” and obtain greater US and Turkish involvement, it might be willing to pull away from Iran’s orbit. Therefore, the change in Turkey’s posture toward Israel has been largely a tool to advance the country’s re-orientation rather than any sense in its cause. The decline of Turkey’s relationship with Israel that started in Davos in response to Israel's December 2008 invasion of Gaza and later on over the flotilla episode aboard the Mavi Marmara provided the basis for Turkey’s ambitious regional agenda, one that primarily targets Iranian posture.  

The motives of the unfolding Turkish policy vis-à-vis Syria lie behind its commitment to re-affirm Turkey’s close relationship with the US and its intention to outweigh Iranian regional influence. The rivalry between Sunni Turkey and Shia Iran is not new. On the contrary, it is historically rooted since Turkey and Iran are widely viewed as the diminished heirs of two major competing Muslim empires, the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire, and this rivalry has currently evolved to the egos level of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and Iranian President Ahmadinejad.

 

In certain aspects, Syria seems to have become the focus of the Iranian-Turkish rivalry that largely touches upon the interests and expectations of regional countries and the West. Specifically, regional countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain that maintain large Shia minorities have invested heavily in putting forward Arab League sanctions against Syria and support the increasing role of Turkey in intra-Arab affairs since they view the Syrian crisis as a golden opportunity to diminish Iranian influence and posture in the heart of the Middle East. According to the Gulf States perspective, Iran anticipates that Shiite groups in the GCC states are frustrated by their failure to establish democracy and impose limits on authoritarian rule and therefore it is a matter of time for these groups to turn to the Iranian “big brother” for support.

  

Upon this line of thought, an Iraqi official who meets with Iranian policymakers on a regular basis has claimed that a group in Iran announced a project involving “national Shia security”, and examines “the Jewish experiment in exporting their idea slowly and calmly,” apparently a reference to international Zionist organizations’ role in advocating pro-Israel interests. The Shia protests in Bahrain in the midst of the Arab spring were portrayed by the Gulf states as a sectarian Shia plot indicative of the fear of the expanded Iranian and Shia influence on the predominantly Sunni Arab world, and not as a discontent stemmed chiefly from their lower standard of living, unofficial exclusion from sensitive government positions, and Sunni domination of parliament. Gulf States widely perceived that a possible overthrow of the monarchy in Bahrain whose 70 per cent of the population is Shia could serve as springboard for Iranian ambitions that perceive Bahrain as the 14^th province of Iran. The Gulf States’ interests coincide with those of the West and Turkey since Iranian dominance is also perceived as posing a strategic threat to vital security assets. For example, Bahrain hosts the Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NSA Bahrain) and the US Navy 5^th fleet headquarters. Literally located in the heart of the Gulf, the naval base and the headquarters are a key strategic asset for the US presence in the wider Middle East, as they permit the overlooking of the oil installations and trade routes, the support of the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the fight against naval piracy in the Red and the Arabian Seas. 

It is in this geopolitical framework that Turkey aspiring to broaden its horizons has got itself deeply into the waters of the Syrian crisis to diminish the Iranian influence and present itself as the neo-ottoman mediator and defender of the larger Sunni Muslim neighbourhood, with the ultimate aim to serve as the anchor for a new geopolitical alignment. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutogolu admitted in the recent past that “rather what we (Turkey) are trying to do is to contribute to the establishment of a permanent peace in our region. If by order this is Pax Ottomana, Pax in the meaning of order, we (Turkey) are trying to establish an order, it is not wrong to say such thing”.

  

The Turkish rivalry with Iran seems to take into account its regional ambitions for establishing a regional order with a watchful eye on the interests of greater outside powers. By encircling diplomatically and possibly militarily Syria, Turkey estimates that Iraq and Lebanon will follow suit and thus a coincidence of Western and Turkish interests will empower the regional leadership role of Turkey with the blessing of the former. Undoubtedly, Iraq presents an arena of Turkish-Iranian competition and Western interests where the Shia-Sunni divide is dominant and where the Iranian influence has extended over religious Shia political parties that shape Iraqi politics at the national level and at the provincial and local levels in central and southern Iraq. Lebanon for its part is largely perceived as the satellite of Iran and therefore Turkey concerns about further consolidation of Iranian influence near its borders through the enhanced power of Hezbollah.  

Turkey’s Domestic Agenda and Its Relevance to Syria 

There has been a certain degree of artistry by the Turkish leadership in tilting Turkey towards the Middle East with the redefinition of its domestic priorities and politics. Though few expected that the EU will embrace Turkey membership, a Turkish ambition viewed according to a former Jordanian Foreign minister more like the hope of the devil in heaven, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan exploited the profound EU rejection to undermine Ataturk’s Westernizing legacy and to pursue an ambitious domestic agenda. 

  

Having realized the urgent need to address the issue of Turkey’s minorities and of a non-military solution to the Kurdish problem, with a clear distinction between meeting the needs of the Kurdish population and defeating the Kurdistan’s Workers Party, the PKK, Turkey advertised the so-called National Unity project whose nature directed towards the country’s minority groups most prominently the Kurds and the Alevis that maintain a significant presence in neighboring countries like Syria.

  

The Turkish government’s initial efforts to reach out to the Kurds to calm the turbulent internal front have become futile. The early encouragement to start using the Kurdish language in the political and public arenas was widely accepted by the Kurds along with the Turkish government’s agreement to receive a group of Kurdish returnees from Northern Iraq in 2009. Reforms and gestures towards the Kurdish ethnic minority were accredited to the National Unity project indicating that democratization is part of the solution to the Kurdish issue to finally defeat Kurdish separatists. The argument that the strengthening of the society leads to a strong state did not go hand in hand with reforming the constitution to recognize that Turkey has certain minorities whose rights of religion and freedom of expression are secured.  

  

On a parallel basis, the outline of a roadmap for an opening to the Alevis viewed as adherents of a form of Islam influenced by Shiism and Sufism was a major aspect of the National Unity project. The Turkish government sponsored a series of workshops to address Alevi issues that pertained to granting cem houses the status of worship places, opening a special institute to train Alevi clerics, and supporting financially the operational costs of the cem houses. Nevertheless, the opening has not gained any traction due to lack of genuine engagement with Alevi organizations except for Eyli Beyt widely seen as in bed with the Turkish government. Alevis remained largely skeptical to the project as evidenced in a survey conducted by the Eurasian Public Research Center which showed that 33.9 percent supported that they are target of permanent discrimination, while only 11 percent believed that the Turkish government was sincere with its National Unity Project.

     

The Turkish government’s initial plans to reach out to the Kurds and the Alevis led to increasing criticism of the project by all segments of the Turkish media and the political groups, thus de-generating the initial debate, and prompting the Turkish government to abandon its rhetoric about the National Unity project.  

Coming to today’s critical situation in Syria and the conflicting relationship of Turkey with its once close ally, there are increasing worries that the former is in position to exploit the Kurdish and Alevi cards to create instability to the latter’s domestic front. The inability of Turkey to apply the “zero problems/conflicts policy” with neighbors to its own Southeast with the promotion of the National Unity project may prove, under the current circumstances, detrimental to its national interests. The Turkish leadership’s recent threats to increase its military presence across the Syrian border may be insufficient to deter Syria and Iran from subversively supporting Kurdish separatists, while the Prime Minister’s late November 2011 apology for expulsions and massacres against Alevis in the Eastern province of Dersim in 1937-1939 was perceived as provocative affront to the Alevis.

For a comprehensive opening, Turkey needs to have proceeded with the implementation of effective policies that would have over the long-term improved the economic, political and cultural life of Turkey’s Kurds and Alevis, therefore preventing their exploitation by regional players. The interview of President Assad at the Syrian TV on August 21, 2011 sent a concrete message to all directions with Turkey being considered as the main recipient according to which “The consequences of any action against Syria would exceed by far what they could possibly bear for two reasons. First, the geopolitical position of Syria and second, the Syrian capabilities only some of which they would be able to bear… The countries that make threats are themselves weak politically and socially. They are weak, much weaker than in the past”. Looking at Turkey’s domestic front, one cannot help but see that nowadays it has to deal with the landscape it faces not aesthetically but pragmatically to meet emerging challenges.