By Antonia Dimou
Published on March 5th, 2018, by ModernDiplomacy,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-west/
Reproduced:
1. Mehr News Agency, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132681/Turkey-drifts-away-from-the-West
2. NATO Mutimedia Library, http://www.natolibguides.info/Turkey/articles
3. Turkish Digest, http://turkishdigest.blogspot.gr/2018/03/turkey-drifts-away-from-west-modern.html
4. Agora Dialogue, http://agora-dialogue.com/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-from-the-west/
Published on March 5th, 2018, by ModernDiplomacy,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-west/
Reproduced:
1. Mehr News Agency, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132681/Turkey-drifts-away-from-the-West
2. NATO Mutimedia Library, http://www.natolibguides.info/Turkey/articles
3. Turkish Digest, http://turkishdigest.blogspot.gr/2018/03/turkey-drifts-away-from-west-modern.html
4. Agora Dialogue, http://agora-dialogue.com/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-from-the-west/
Turkey has lost its soft
power attractiveness due to its leadership’s increasing absolutism and failed foreign policy priorities. The “zero problems with
neighbors” concept that unraveled almost at the time of the Arab Spring has
given its place to “nothing but problems with every single neighbor”. Key
dimensions of Turkish foreign policy, namely relations with
the United States (US), NATO, the European Union and MENA countries face
growing challenges.
Despite that Turkish-NATO
relations are still valued and seen in a positive light by both the public and
the Turkish government as evidenced by a recent Pew research poll, Turkey
continues to experience friction with its NATO allies, while veering closer to
Russia. Turkey’s decision to proceed with the purchase of the S-400 Russian air
defense system has raised NATO members concerns over implications on the
alliance’s interoperability given that the S-400 is not compatible with NATO
and American assets on Turkish soil and must thus operate on a standalone
basis. Even more critical, the US and NATO members that have purchased F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters worry over the security of main data transfer of
fifth-generation technology to the Turkish Air-force due to Ankara’s growing
ties to Moscow.
The prohibitive scenario for
the United States foresees the sharing of classified information between Turkey
and Russia on the way the S-400 air defense system fares against the fifth
generation F-35, a move that would help Moscow develop its anti-stealth
research. To avoid the prohibitive scenario, the likelihood of Turkey being
exposed to American sanctions has reportedly been raised in discussions during
the latest visit of US Secretary of State to Ankara as the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) signed on January 30, 2018, provides
the cessation of all American arms sales and the sanctioning of any country
that does business with banned Russian firms including the Russian government
owned aerospace defense corporation MKB "Fakel" that produces the
S-400.
Τhe S-400 purchase issue is
considered as the top of the iceberg in US-Turkish relations; the bilateral
relationship has worsened as consequence of American ties to the Syrian Kurdish
People's Protection Units (YPG), Fethullah Gulen and Reza Zarrab. A Pew
research poll of Turkish public opinion suggests a “visceral” anger toward the
US, which is now viewed as the major threat to Turkey by more than 70 percent
of the population. In this context, the main questions that emerge are the
following: How will Turkey manage its diverse interests in Syria? Is Turkey
coming to see itself more as a Middle Eastern and less as a Western power?
On Syria, Turkey continues to
transition away from its original position when
the conflict broke out in 2011 of condemning the Assad regime for two reasons: a growing desire
to stabilize Syria even if that means accepting Assad as leader, and the
prioritization of the Kurdish threat. Turkey’s interests lie in preventing an
autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Syria as evidenced by its assault in
Afrin and not in going after al-Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State (ISIS)
in Syria because such a tactic does not counter Kurdish goals. The US support
of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) composed of ethnic militias including the
YPG whose fight against ISIS led to the gain of territory formerly controlled
by the terrorist organization has been a cause of friction in US-Turkish
relations.
The strained relations have
accelerated with the alleged American decision to help the SDF form a 30
thousand border security force across the Turkish and Iraqi borders. The
Turkish assault in Afrin is considered as a step towards the partition of Syria
and Ankara is expected to control a 200 km area in northern Syria if Afrin and
Manbij fall. In a different mode, the United States strategy centers on
fighting the Islamic State and on maintaining a united and stable Syria; it
continues to support a political transition in Damascus; and, it will not back
reconstruction in the absence of such a transition.
In the cited diplomatic and
geopolitical contexts, Turkey seems to behave more as Middle Eastern rather
than a western power. Ankara has focused on the Islamic world and its Muslim
tradition in its foreign policy, though it still is a blend of western
institutions. Cooperation with NATO, efforts to access the EU and the customs
union with the EU have become less of paramount importance as neo-Ottomanism,
the Turkish leadership’s political ideology that promotes greater engagement
with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire, has profoundly become the new
conceptual framework of the Turkish foreign policy.
To capitalize in its Ottoman
experience, Turkey has thrown itself deeply into regional conflicts like the
one in Syria envisioning to patron them. The Turkish patronization is attempted
with its Islamic orientation, ties to religiously conservative constituencies
and alleged widespread popularity among the Arab critical mass.
The basic element however
that slips from Turkey’s calculations is that its allure in the wider Middle
East stems from its key position in Western clubs and institutions. Drifting
away from the West deprives Ankara of its attractiveness in the heart of
the Middle East evaporating prospects of regional cooperation and
stability.
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