Antonia Dimou

Rogue States, the United States,
and Post-Saddam Iraq:
The Cases of Iran and Syria

Antonia Dimou

Working Paper, Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA, May 2003

The U.S. campaign against terrorism that came after the 11 September 2001 attacks and its subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have paved the way for the emergence of two major trends in U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. The first is the socalled multilateral coalition building within the region, and the second deals with the enforcement of a pre-emptive strategy, projected through military or economic means.[1]

Additionally, asymmetrical threats, predominantly in the form of terrorism, have destroyed the myth of fortress America and pointed up the fact that isolationism is no longer an option and that joint efforts between the United States and key Arab states are a prerequisite for the prevention of similar future “operations.”

In this context, this paper will try to present the position and policies of two major rogue states, Iran and Syria, during the Iraq crisis that was accelerated by the U.S.-led military operations against Baghdad. An effort will also be made to describe both states’ concerns and apprehensions over the critical matter of an emerging regional security system in the post-Saddam era.

Additionally, this paper will present the background as well as the body of major issues and preconditions that could set the stage for future U.S.-Syrian and U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Security and counter-terrorism partnerships to maintain regional stability are among the priorities that both Iran and Syria should address as vital prerequisites for their embodiment in the international system and in any regional architecture.

In conclusion, the paper will try to identify the impact of a possible U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Syrian rapprochement on regional groups of states, most prominently the conservative flank represented by Saudi Arabia as well as the moderate side of the region represented by Jordan.

Syria: An emerging regional player
The U.S. military occupation of Iraq might exacerbate old tensions or, alternatively, provide unprecedented opportunities for Syria. The accusations of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Syria was providing Iraq with military equipment during the war, coupled with the threat of sanctions, have given rise to speculations that Syria might be Washington’s next target. However, the imminent use of force against Syria seems to have been ruled out.[2]

The sanctions threat has actually hardened, and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act was reintroduced in Congress.[3] Notably, the same legislation had 150 supporters in Congress the previous year.[4] The bill demands that Damascus end support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, ceases its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and withdraws its military forces from Lebanon.[5] Once passed in the Congress, the legislation will impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria until the U.S. president certifies that the list of demands is fulfilled.

Specifically, failure to comply with the act will lead to punitive sanctions that may include a ban on U.S. companies investing in Syria,[6] freezing of Syrian assets in the United States, and reducing diplomatic contacts.

It is very likely that the bill can be used as an additional diplomatic tool to pressure Syria. Nevertheless, under the present circumstances, sanctions may only have a restraint impact. U.S. economic leverage over Damascus is limited. U.S. aid and military sales are currently barred by law, U.S. flights do not include Syria, and only the U.S. Conoco- Philips oil company is operating in the Arab country. If the United States goes on without the UN and no international sanctions are imposed, the impact on Syria will undoubtedly be minimal.

The list of U.S. demands on Syria clarifies that the regime of Bashar al-Assad is under political pressure to disengage from all the extremist and rejectionist organizations that are based in Damascus. The United States and Syria have a large disagreement in the way they differentiate between “terrorism” and “resistance.” Hamas and Hezbollah [7] are on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. From the Arab perspective, however, including Syria and moderate states like Jordan,[8] the Palestinian and Arab groups, which operate for the sake of Palestinian independence, should not be classified as terrorist organizations. In the eyes of the Arab world, Hamas is a liberation movement against the Israeli occupation while Hezbollah spearheaded the liberation campaign to remove the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon. Thus, a distinction between terror and liberation movements should be made.

Syria has currently ruled out the closure of offices of groups that the United States calls “terrorist.” Similarly, it is not expected to curtail its support for Hezbollah immediately, as it is viewed as a strategic asset in fending off potential Israeli aggression. In the long term however, it is very probable that Syrian support for Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon may become a liability. Since the radical groups’ presence in the Syrian capital has become part of a diplomatic U.S.-Syrian conflict, the organizations’ offices are expected to close down. According to statements of these organization’s officials, such a development will have a minimal impact on Syria and on their course of action, since they mainly operate in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon.[9] It should be mentioned that Damascus has also been the warehouse of opposition groups to the Saddam regime. Among them are the Kurdish factions of Talabani and Barzani as well as the Dawwa Shi’ite Muslim group that has long operated in Northern Iraq.

From a positive perspective, the list of U.S. demands on Syria is concentrated on its constructive role in the emerging new Middle East. Notably, Syria has to start the democratization process that will move the country away from the one-party system, cooperate over the post-Saddam Iraq, revive peace negotiations with Israel, support the Israeli-Palestinian talks, and liberalize its economy.

Concerning the Syrian role in post-Saddam Iraq, there is a widespread sense that the case of Lebanon should not repeat itself. Syria impeded U.S. efforts to turn the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon into a major strategic advance in the region.[10] Syria intervened in Lebanon’s 1975 civil war, kept thousand of troops and ever since, the influence of Damascus on Beirut’s defense and foreign policy has been extremely decisive. Having said that, a “Lebanon strategy” against coalition forces in Iraq is an unwelcome development. Efforts to rebuild Iraq along democratic lines will be hampered if the stability of Iraq cannot be guaranteed or if U.S. troops are in constant danger.[11] Taking for granted that Arabs with Syrian passports have crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border to carry out attacks, Syrian cooperation with the United States over Iraq could possibly pave the way for a smooth transitional period to democracy or at least minimize the danger emanating from Iraq’s western flank.

Syria’s cooperation in the post-September 11 era against the al-Qaeda terrorist group has demonstrated avenues for potential cooperation between Washington and Damascus in the wider Middle East. Syria voted for the UN Resolution 1441 calling on Iraq to disarm but opposed the use of military force. Its opposition to the war stemmed from a combination of national interests and pan-Arab ideals. Furthermore, Syria allied itself with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 and also supported the U.S.-led first Gulf war in 1991. It is the only country on the State Department’s “terrorism” list that maintains full diplomatic relations with the United States. Although Syria maintained close relations with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, it never signed a bilateral military pact or granted use of its bases. The late President Hafez al-Assad made sure that he met with all U.S. presidents from Nixon to Clinton, and though Israel occupies the Golan Heights, no attack against the state of Israel has taken place from Syrian territory.[12]

The missing element in the U.S.-Syrian relationship is trust. That is why fears and prejudices must be replaced by the promise of collaboration, and hostilities should be transformed into new partnerships. U.S.-Syrian relations should not be an exception to emerging cooperation in the post-Saddam era. The first public indications of a more accommodating Syrian position were made with the submission of a draft resolution to the UN Security Council, where Syria currently holds a seat, calling for a Middle East free of WMD. The ultimate aim is that the region turns itself into a zone free from weapons, both conventional and nonconventional.

U.S.-Syrian cooperation over Iraq could pave the way for promoting plans for regional security. According to the Syrian position, the alacrity with which the Iraqi military collapsed might have reinforced the fallacy that the same results can be achieved in other countries. That is why the United States should acknowledge its limits and adopt a more moderate approach to settle differences with other states and even enhance shared or one-sided interests, without alienating the world.

As well, U.S.-Syrian cooperation could serve Damascus in preventing an independent Kurdish state, since its emergence could be bad precedent for Syria’s own Kurdish population (11 percent of its total population). Moreover, the resumption of the lucrative Syrian-Iraqi trade ties and of Iraqi oil imports may take place.[13]

On another level, fears of encirclement by states that are neutral or friendly toward the United States and Israel, namely, Turkey, Jordan, and possibly a post-Saddam Iraq, profoundly affects Syrian strategy. Encirclement means that Syria’s leverage with Israel is reduced in a way that turns the U.S.-Syrian rapprochement into a strategic benefit, and the resumption of the Syrian-Israeli peace process useful.[14] In this context, Washington has reportedly asked Egypt to convince Syria to support the Middle East “road map.”[15]

Syria’s influential role in the peace process mainly emanates from its significant leverage with anti-peace radical organizations like Hezbollah and its solid relations with Iran.[16] Syria has maintained strong relations with Iran for the last twenty-four years and is affiliated in the so-called “Axis of Evil.” Iran is the main pillar of support for Hezbollah, founded through a mutual agreement between Syria and Iran to fight Israel.[17] Since the Bush administration considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, Syria is viewed as a state that sponsors terrorism. The United States fears that Hezbollah poses a threat to Israel and to its own security, and that it is only a matter of time before the organization carries out trans-national attacks. This fear is based on what happened in 1983 when 242 U.S. Marines were killed in a Hezbollah member-led suicide attack in Lebanon.[18]

It is interesting, however, that though Tehran would like Damascus to adopt a hard-line policy toward Israel, it has stated officially that it would respect any Syrian decision to establish official diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.[19] Syria has held several peace talks with Israel since 1991, but the negotiations broke down in 2000 over the fate of territories captured by Israel. Even secret Israeli-Syrian contacts have periodically taken place. A case in point is the secret track of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the late President Hafez al-Assad with the mediation of American millionaire Ron Lauder. It was disclosed that Lauder presented Syria a document entitled “Lauder in the name of the Prime Minister of Israel” in September 1998 that contained a proposal to discuss borders that would be based on the 4 June 1967 lines.[20]

It is also interesting to note that while the peace process resumed between Israel and Syria in Washington in December 1999, messages between Israel and Iraq were exchanged. Baghdad had at that time reassured Tel Aviv that since peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians were underway, Iraq would have no reservations to working out a relationship with Israel.[21] In light of this past overture, any future decision by the post-Saddam Iraqi regime to restore bilateral relations with Israel will not be new.

Similarly, on Israel’s side, there is a strong lobby that has traditionally called for an end to the state of war with Iraq.[22] For Israel, without Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the threats on the eastern front will disappear. And since Egypt and Jordan have already signed peace agreements, the Israeli government will be able to concentrate exclusively on the Palestinians.[23]

Iran and its policy of active neutrality
Iran is situated in an unstable neighborhood. It has thus adopted the policy of active neutrality, with the aim of strengthening its role regionally and internationally. This policy can actually be broken down into two parts. The first is a proactive effort to prevent the outbreak of war in the region. The second part deals with Iran’s commitment to resist the use of force through cooperation, in the event of any regional attack such as the U.S.-led military operations against Iraq.

A glimpse of the workings of the Iranian policy of active neutrality can be seen in the Islamic Republic’s position during the recent U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Tehran allegedly provided valuable information to the United States before its attacks on Afghanistan. The Canadian daily National Post revealed that Iranian officials sent a message to Washington through Canada saying that Tehran would not oppose targeted military strikes against those believed responsible for the attacks.[24] As well, Iran’s response to the September 11 attacks with the form of strong condemnations, and its tacit approval of U.S. operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated aspects of the Iranian policy of active neutrality.

For the first time since 1979, Iran and the United States shared a common goal: the destruction of al-Qaida and the ousting of the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan. It is worth remembering that since 1988, formal discussions among American and Iranian diplomats have occurred over to the Afghan question as part of the Six-Plus-Two group, composed of Afghanistan’s six neighboring states (Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), Russia, and the United States.

During the crisis in Iraq and in accordance with Tehran’s policy of active neutrality, the Iranian authorities have discreetly cooperated with the United States in providing “logistics and transport facilities” to the Iraqi opposition, mostly the Shi’ites in the South and the Kurds in the North. The Iranian side also committed itself to offer U.S. forces basic assistance such as rescuing pilots that might be forced to crash-land in the Iranian territory and permitting the use of Iranian airspace.[25] A small number of soldiers controlled by the al-Badr Brigade were allowed by the Iranians to enter Iraqi Kurdistan to monitor any development that might be detrimental to Iranian national interests.

Specifically, the al-Badr Brigade has held a “token” parade near Suleymanyeh, the “capital” of the region controlled by the Patriotic Union of (Iraqi) Kurdistan. Based in the Southern oil rich province of Khoozestan and near the borders with Iraq, the brigade, made up mostly of Iraqi Shi’ites who fled the violent actions of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, is trained and equipped by Iranian militaries of the Revolutionary Guards. The Badr Brigade, an army estimated at fifteen thousand men, is the military wing of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI), the main Shi’ite opposition organization.

The establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would be an unwelcome development to Iran. An independent Kurdish state currently seems to be out of the question, partly due to the political pressures exerted by other countries in the region. Apart from Iran, this powerful opposing force includes Syria and Turkey. In a meeting in Turkey on October 2002, President Khatami made a statement according to which the governments of Iran, Syria, and Turkey strongly oppose to an independent Kurdish state.[26] However, autonomy in a federal Iraqi state is an attractive option promoted by the two main Kurdish factions of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, which have improved their relations, reopened their parliament, and drafted a constitution calling for an Iraqi federation of a Kurdish region.

At this stage of the Iraqi issue, Iranians seem to fear fall-out from the war, namely refugees and the possibility of being out of the process of redefining the post-Saddam Iraqi ruling system. Additionally, the Iranian political establishment fears that the United States will turn toward Iran after Iraq. The British-American coalition has tried to reassure Tehran, however. In an interview to Le Monde on 26 March, the British ambassador in Iran confirmed that he personally gave some guarantees to Iranian President Khatami, that “the People’s Mojahedeen, an Iranian opposition group based in Iraq, won’t have a place anymore in the post-Saddam Iraq.” Furthermore, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad delivered a message from Washington to the Iranian clerical leadership in mid-March, according to which the United States does not intend to extend the war on Iraq to Iran.[27]

The possibility of encirclement by U.S. troops seems to pose a direct, physical threat to Iranian national interests. The war in Afghanistan left U.S. troops to the east of Iran, while the result of the war on Iraq could have the Islamic Republic encircled by U.S. troops. Iran is already under pressure from the United States. It has been labelled member of the “Axis of Evil,” and allegations of state-sponsored terrorism, the provision of financial assistance to “terrorist” groups, and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction have been made. Encirclement means that Iran could easily become the next country attacked in the context of the U.S. “war against terrorism.” Even if Washington does not attack, encircling Iran might put pressure on the Islamic Republic to speed up reform processes.

According to statements made by Iranian officials, U.S. military action against Iran does not seem out of the question, especially if, despite international interventions, the Islamic Republic gets closer to completing its nuclear reactors at Bushehr and Natanz. According to them, President Bush’s renewal in the beginning of March of the sanctions imposed eight years ago against the Islamic Republic was a first, hostile step. The sanctions, first put in place by the Clinton administration in March 1995, block Americans, individuals or companies, from financing, supervising, or managing Iran’s oil development projects, as well as from exporting sensitive military equipment to Iran.

Therefore, the religious establishment in Iran seems to argue that if the Islamic Republic developed an atomic weapon, it would not have to worry about the United States one day doing what it has just done to Iraq. It is obvious that Iran’s leaders are much less worried about what happens in Iraq than about the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil” doctrine.

Thus, their recent decision to go public with their nuclear technology was intended not only to impress the neighborhood but also to curtail the chance that Washington might, as a pretense for military action, accuse them of working clandestinely. Iran has oil and gas, so electricity produced by nuclear means does nothing to advance the authority of the regime, but, obviously, in the realpolitik Middle East, nuclear weapons do.

On another level, a democratic post-Saddam regime in Iraq might pressure Iran to provide its people with more democratic reforms. Iranian officials know that democratic developments in Iraq may cross the border. To many analysts, Iran seems ripe at the moment for change. Recently, the Iranian daily Bahar revealed that the religious authorities of Iran have decided to abolish stoning, a punishment reserved in the Islamic Law [28]. The abolishment is widely viewed as a victory of the European Union’s (EU) human-rights delegations that set the ban of this form of punishment as a precondition for the conclusion of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and Iran.

According to these analysts, the ultimate change in Iran, while being expedited by events in neighboring countries or the preconditions set by friendly countries (that is, European states), seems to be currently evolving from within the Iranian society. It is expected that any reform will be founded on Iranian aspirations for democracy, as any foreign intervention in this process might impede the ultimate goal: reforms through an openly exercised, democratic process.

Iran is the sole Islamic democracy of the region that is legitimized through continuous elections. It remains both a political ally in resolving regional disputes and conflicts and a factor that can either stabilize or destabilize the closest regional allies of the United States.[29] The fundamental perceptions of the Islamic school of thought about government and the ruling system in Iran are completely different from the views that prevail in the Arab world. Nevertheless, Islamism continues to pervade as a guide for action and for legitimization of the political process. The legacies of Khomeini’s leadership—consensus formation, coalition building, and factional compromise—have been inherited by his former student and now leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, the Azeri origin supreme religious leader.[30]

The revolutionary zeal and populism in Iran seem to be gone.[31] The re-entry of Iran into regional politics as a legitimate player will change the strategic map of the wider Middle East. Additionally, if the United States and Iran re-establish relations, the supreme religious authorities in Iran may put hostility against Israel on ice.[32] The recent presidential re-election of the moderate cleric Mohammed Khatami has given a boost for further changes within the Islamic Republic. One of the most significant elements is that the current transition is initiated by the same people who played very significant roles during the Revolution of 1979.[33] For the time being, the only ones that may not realize that the Islamic Revolution is coming to an “end” may be certain Western circles that prefer confrontation to cooperation.

Regional impact of U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Syrian rapprochement
The return of a pro-Western, moderate, oil-rich Iraq as a legitimate member of the international community, along with the gradual restoration of U.S.–Iranian and U.S.–Syrian relations could affect the relative standing of some of the region’s states and contribute to the solidification of a new security arrangement. Having said that, it is to be expected that the so-called conservative group of regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, will face challenges and dangers. Alternatively, however, unprecedented opportunities may be introduced to the moderate group of regional countries that includes Jordan.

Saudi Arabia
The regime change in Iraq may affect Saudi Arabia directly. The Saudi kingdom is expected to gradually lose its importance in U.S. strategic rationale for the Middle East.[34] Total oil reserves in Iraq could exceed Saudi Arabia’s and daily production could reach 10 million barrels, making it the world’s largest producer. In that sense, Iraq might be viewed as a second Saudi Arabia.

The second challenge posed by Iraq to Saudi Arabia is democracy. A secular, democratic Iraq is expected to expose Saudi Arabia’s underdevelopment and corruption. This trend was actually pre-declared and reinforced by certain events such as the al-Khobar bombings and the September 11 attacks.[35]

Saudi Arabia is one of the countries that are currently undergoing severe tests as a consequence of September 11 and the Iraq crisis. Pressure is being exerted on the regime to control the religious establishment and reform, though the religious authorities are in practical terms stronger than the House of the Saud. Modern Saudi Arabia was the product of an alliance struck between a local ruler (Mohammed Ibn Saud) and a religious reformer (Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab).[36] If the Saud political establishment fails to meet the proposed requirements and introduce reforms, the future of the kingdom does not look too bright in political terms.[37]

Additionally, in case Iraqi democratization is enhanced and U.S.-Iranian rapprochement gradually takes place, Saudi Arabia might lose its regional significance to such a degree that a “Balkanization” process starts. According to certain political circles in the region, Saudi Arabia may be split into easily controlled sheikhdoms.[38]

Having said that, one should look at the long-term effects on the region that may lead to the gradual change of the strategic map of the wider Middle East. In the golden fifties, the regional security system supervised by the United States had three distinct pillars: Turkey, Israel, and Iran. The Islamic Revolution contributed to the collapse of this security arrangement. Since then, Saudi Arabia has functioned as the third pillar, replacing Iran.

Despite all that, it seems that the United States has never become completely comfortable with the idea of losing Iran. Nowadays in Iran there is a widespread internal movement that asks for reforms, part of which seem to be accepted and promoted by the Iranian theocratic regime.[39] Besides, Tehran is the sole democracy of the region. Iran possesses a strategic location and by itself constitutes a regional power in military as well as in geopolitical terms that can stabilize the U.S. allies in the region. Given the fact that Saudi Arabia does not comparatively possess the same strengths as Iran, although it has functioned as the third leg of the aforementioned regional security architecture since 1979, the Islamic Republic may get its old position back.


Jordan
Jordan has advocated that a piecemeal approach not be adopted toward Iraq. The main achievement of the Kingdom of Jordan has been its ability to preserve neutrality and avoid violation of the Arab League Charter during the Iraq crisis.[40] Actually, a reorientation and a redefinition of Jordanian neutrality have taken place in almost the same way the Iranian policy of active neutrality has been expressed. Jordan permitted the use of its airspace as well as one of its northern military bases by U.S. forces that had been in the Kingdom to train Jordanian troops on the use of the Patriot missile systems as well as on other logistical affairs.[41]

A direct, negative consequence of the Iraq crisis on Jordan’s economy has been the loss of Iraqi oil. Amman was dependent on Iraqi oil, sold to it at preferential prices. This exclusive, sole source is currently unavailable. In the long term, however, Jordan is expected to extricate its economy from a prolonged slump by providing its products to a huge Iraqi market. Additionally, if relations improve between Iraq and Israel, capital movement is also expected to take place among Jordan, Iraq, and the state of Israel.

According to Jordanian political circles, Jordan’s very survival has been a major trade-off gained by the US administration during the diplomatic and military preparations against Iraq.[42]

Based on existent scenarios relating to the establishment of a post-Saddam ruling system, a constitutional monarchy, either as an umbrella for any newly formed government or as an independent institution, presents a significant option. In this context, and despite the existence of conflicting views,[43] the Hashemite option seems to be an attractive way out. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that monarchy in Iraq, in historic terms, has not been a unifying experience.

The Hashemite option seems viable only if a constitutional monarchy is to be established in Iraq. According to one of the Bush’s advisors, “everything is a matter of priorities after all.” The restoration of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq could undoubtedly work for the long-term benefit of Jordan, since a Hashemite Iraq, along with a Hashemite Jordan, could be unified in economic terms.[44] To move one step further, in case post-Saddam Iraq restores relations with Israel as a first step, and Iran and Syria re-enter the regional economic and security system at a latter stage, the aforementioned unified economic area could extend from Iran to Israel.



Notes
1. This power can be demonstrated in two ways: a) The United States calls the shots and dictates its needs; b) Washington strikes Arab targets (i.e., Iraq) in order to eliminate future problems in the region. Roundtable Discussion, presentation by Edward Walker, Director of the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs under the Clinton administration and former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 30 October 2001.
2. Secretary Powell clarified that the United States has no war plans for regime change in any other country, while President Bush has reportedly rejected a contingency plan for an attack on Syria. Moreover, Powell stated that the situation in Syria is not identical to that in Iraq due to the fact that there are diplomatic relations and continued contacts. Al-Nahar (Lebanese daily), 18 April 2003.
3. The act was introduced by Reps. Eliot Engel and Ileana Ros Lehtinen in April 2003.
4. The White House intervened to block the bill last year.
5. President Bush accused Syria of possessing weapons of mass destruction without specifying whether they are developed in Syria or received from Iraq as alleged by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
6. U.S. exports and investments are banned, with the exception of foodstuffs and medicine.
7. U.S. congressmen have differentiated their stance toward Hezbollah by saying that the organization’s humanitarian and governmental actions are legal and that any other Lebanese group has the right to resist the occupation of its territory in line with UN resolutions. The four-member U.S. Congressional delegation toured the Middle East in 2001 and comprised Darrell Issa (R-California), John Cooksey (RLouisiana), Brian Kerns (R-Indiana), and Nick Rahall (D-West Virginia). See “Arab-American Congressman: Hezbollah Legitimate,” Tehran Times, 19
November 2001.
8. Statements made by Jordanian Minister of State Saleh Qallab. Moreover, the U.S. request to freeze assets of these organizations is not applicable to Jordan because neither group maintains bank accounts in Jordanian financial institutions.
9. Washington Post, 20 April 2003, and Al-Rai (Jordanian daily), 20 April 2003.
10. Jim Lobe, “Calls to Attack Syria Come from a Familiar Choir of Hawks,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 16 April 2003. Available at http://www.fpif.org.
11. Jerusalem Post, “Editorial: The Turkish Treatment,” 16 April 2003.
12. Amir Taheri, “Who’s Next? No One and Everyone,” Arab News, 11 April 2003.
13. U.S. officials announced that the oil pipeline from Basra to Syria was cut, ending the flow of 150 thousand barrels per day at a price of $5 a barrel. Moreover, trade between Syria and Iraq reached 5 billion dollars the period 1998–2000.
14. Al-Hayat (international Arabic daily), 20 April 2003.
15. Al-Rai, 21 April 2003.
16. Alon Ben-Meir, “The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace,” Middle East Policy 3, No.1 (1994).
17. Military equipment is transferred to Hezbollah from Iran through Syria.
18. Ali Shukri, “The Syrian Factor,” 17 April 2003. Available at http:///www.opendemocracy.net.
19. Iran News Agency (IRNA), 25 January 2001.
20. Akiva Eldar, “Who Really Stopped Ron Lauder?” Ha’aretz (Israeli daily), 20 January 2000.
21. The reassurance came unofficially from senior Iraqi politician Tareq Aziz. Foreign Report, “Watch Iraq,” 14 December 1999.
22. This lobby includes Labor party politicians Moshe Shahal and Eliahu (Fuad) Bin Eliezer. Ibid.
23. Interview conducted in Jordan, December 2002.
24. At the same time, Iran’s supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei advised the United States against a full-scale war in Afghanistan. “Iran Argues for UN-led Coalition Against Terror,” Reuters, 18 September 2001.
25. Iran Press Service, 10 December 2002.
26. Agence France Presse, 15 October 2002.
27. Iran Press Service, 16 March 2003.
28. The newspaper quoted Hojjatoleslam Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi, the head of the Supreme Court of Administrative Justice, who said that the practice of stoning has been abolished.
29. Thomas M. Ricks, “Power Politics and Political Culture: U.S.-Iran Relations,” in Samih Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhni, Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran, 1992), 254.
30. The leader has the power to dismiss the president but he will not do so as long as his position is not threatened. The leader’s right is included in the Iranian Constitution.
31. The extremist and moderate as well as the pragmatic and doctrinaire trends have tended to coalesce. All have realized that highly sensitive ideological politics have proven detrimental to the interests of the state. Consequently, all concurred that in order to survive they must opt for a balanced political course and provide tangible benefits for their constituencies. The new leadership faced a dilemma on how to reconcile the ideas of Khomeini with their own vision. The relationship between the two ideological doctrines and state interests is complex. A first step in approaching this delicate relationship was made with the 1988 decrees that set up a Council for
Maintaining and Protecting the Interests of the System (Shura Ta’amiin va Hifz Manafe Sistam), the Council for Discussing Plan Priorities (Shura Tashkhiis Maslehate Nidham) and the Council to Review the Constitution in 1989 (Shura Baaznigari Qanoun Assasi). Manochehr Dorraj, “Populism and Corporatism in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Political Culture,” in Farsoun and Mashayekhni, op.cit., 150–51.
32. “Possible Washington-Tehran Dialogue?” Cosmos 2, No. 4, (Nov/Dec 1997), newsletter, Institute of International Relations, Athens. Moreover, former Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy revealed in an interview with Yediot Aharonot the establishment of a secret forum of dialogue between Iran and Israel in the late 1990s. The aim was to explore ways to decrease tension in bilateral relations as well as to use the influence of the powerful Israeli lobby in Washington so that a gradual lifting of the sanctions (ILSA) imposed on Iran takes place.
33. “Reassessing the Iranian Revolution, 1979–1999,” Cosmos 2, No.10 (Nov/Dec 1998), newsletter, Institute of International Relations, Athens.
34. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
35. James Joghby, “A Non-Story and the U.S.-Saudi Relationship,” Jordan Times, 3 December 2002.
36. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1968), 39.
37. Interview conducted in Syria, December 2002.
38. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
39. Op. cit., n. 6.
40. All Arab countries are signatories to the Arab League Defense Policy that is similar to NATO.
41. Interview of King Abdalalh II of Jordan with CNN’s Larry King, “Live on Iraq,” 27 March 2003.
42. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
43. The Hashemite option is supported by the Pentagon, while the State Department sustains a more conservative approach. Interview conducted in Jordan, November 2002.
44. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.