Wednesday, April 18, 2018

Cyprus and Turkey: Walking a Line Between Boom and Bust on East Mediterranean Natural Gas

By Antonia Dimou


Originally Published at In Depth Newsletter, Vol. 15, Issue 2, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University fo Nicosia, March 28, 2018  

http://cceia.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/IN_DEPTH_2018_15_2.pdf





In search of commercially viable levels of hydrocarbon resources, Cyprus third international licensing round for three blocks within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) resulted in the awarding of licenses to Italian ENI and French Total for Block 6; ENI for block 8; and, American Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum for block 10. The July 2017 drilling in block 11 commissioned to Total and ENI in the second licensing round has been critical as first results show that the geology of Egypt’s Zohr gas field extends into Cyprus’s EEZ. This assessment raises expectations for the findings of the two drillings scheduled for the second half of 2018 in block 10 that lies in close proximity to the super-giant Zohr gas field.

Additionally, ENI’s recent gas discovery in Block 6 offshore Cyprus with Calypso 1 NFW that could contain more than 230 bcm of gas paves the way for focused exploration leading to successful drillings given the geological structure’s similarity to that of Zohr’s field. It is estimated that oil majors’ plans center on connecting gas discoveries in Cyprus with Egypt’s by pipeline and re-export reserves as liquefied natural gas (LNG) by utilizing the Egyptian Idku and Damietta LNG facilities.

Political tensions however as consequence of the collapse of the Cyprus Peace talks and competing EEZ claims between Cyprus and Turkey can impact negatively regional energy cooperation. The prevention of ENI’s Saipem 12000 drill ship from reaching block 3 southeast of Cyprus by military means highlights not only the exercise of unilateral steps by Turkey as a third country in the Cypriot setting but also the existence of accrued problems related to maritime boundaries and to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A number of Cypriot energy experts maintain that “the Philippines arbitration case vs China over South China Sea” can serve as model for the settlement of competing EEZ claims between Cyprus and Turkey, while many from the Turkish side consider the Malta-Libya arbitration case as more appropriate given that Turkey is not signatory to the UNCLOS.

There is widespread belief that the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is prerequisite for constructing a pipeline that would connect Israeli Leviathan field to the Turkish coast given that the pipeline will have to cross through the island’s EEZ. Thus, Nicosia could effectively exercise its veto power to the pipeline under its rights as a signatory of the UNCLOS.

Turkey seems to solidly promote its potential as a trading hub, on the basis that the country’s geographic location and growing demand for natural gas- reflected by its annual imports of approximately 48 bcm- qualify it as a trading hub rather than a transit country. It is in this context that Turkey proceeds with market liberalization and regulatory reform in cooperation with private oil and gas companies; intends to create a reference price to be able to influence the pricing of gas in the region; and, plans to increase oil and gas exploration and production activities so that the country turns into a viable energy hub for Europe.


It is noteworthy that the normalization of Turkish relations with Russia falls within Ankara’s broader strategy to become a competitive regional market player and a strong transmission system operator. The reason is that Ankara’s emergence as a prominent regional energy player can be achieved through the development of adequate physical entry and exit points for capacity allocation, thus securing diversification of supplies and energy liquidity. Turkey, which imports 98% of its gas, must diversify energy sources but its energy dependence is connected to Russia. It is no secret that long-term energy contracts and a “take-or-pay” clause tie Russia and Turkey together for at least 8 more years. According to the take-or-pay provision, the contract places the danger of worsening energy market conditions on the buyer, by requiring the buyer to always be accountable for the payment of a minimum purchase commitment, thus leaving the seller to deal only with the market price risks.

When it comes to the East Mediterranean, the declared decision by Turkey to carry out seismic surveys off Cyprus’s southwestern Paphos along with the its intention to proceed with offshore exploration in the northern part of the island through its state-owned Turkish National Oil Company highlight the shift of its focus on exploration efforts to the Mediterranean region. The latest gas discoveries in the East Mediterranean coincide at a time of tension in Turkish-US relations.  Turkey so far appears cautious in not crossing a threshold beyond which Washington would be forced to respond decisively as evidenced by the recent unimpeded arrival of Exxon Mobil’s Med Surveyor and Ocean Investigator to Limassol port. The operation of Exxon Mobil’s chartered research vessels  in Cyprus’s southwest coast falls within the American position that the Republic of Cyprus has the right to develop energy resources within its EEZ.

No doubt that the existence of sufficient gas quantities available for export is necessary for the monetization of East Mediterranean gas. Upon this reality, Cyprus and neighboring Egypt should consider the joint monetization of their gas resources on the basis that economies of scale could reinforce profitability and produce higher government revenues. Commitment on resolving the Cyprus problem is important and, in the meantime, implementation of concrete confidence building measures such as Track-II diplomacy between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the future use of the East Mediterranean natural gas resources could invalidate any third country’s meddling in Cyprus. Concurrently, Cyprus should speedly proceed with the establishment of a National Investments Fund where revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation will be deposited for the benefit of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, while Turkey needs to refrain from harsh political rhetoric and military provocations to avoid incidents at sea or in the air that carry the risk of regional escalation.

Evidently, the principle of good neighbourly relations should unequivocally commit the East Mediterranean’s littoral countries so that prosperity becomes a shared gain; or otherwise intensified tensions run the risk of trapping the region in a state of persistent stagnation.



Monday, April 16, 2018

Interview to Radio 98.4

Interview by Antonia Dimou with George Sahinis to Radio 98.4 on Greece's Geopolitical Role, March, 9, 2018; Συνέντευξη στο Ράδιο 9.84 για τον εξ αντικειμένου γεωπολιτικό ρόλο της Ελλάδας. Ηχητικό στον σύνδεσμο:


Α. Δήμου: Συνέντευξη στον Γιώργο Σαχίνη - Ο εξ αντικειμένου γεωπολιτικός ρόλος της Ελλάδας

Η Τουρκία σε επιδρομή από το δυτικό σύστημα
Πυλώνας ασφάλειας και σταθερότητας η χώρα για τη Δύση

«Η Ελλάδα εξαιτίας των γεωπολιτικών ανακατατάξεων στη περιοχή, έχει καταστεί εξ αντικειμένου, πυλώνας ασφάλειας και σταθερότητας για τη Δύση», είπε στο Ράδιο 98.4, η αναλύτρια Διεθνών Σχέσεων κ. Αντωνία Δήμου, εξηγώντας γιατί η ισχύος. 

H Τουρκία γίνεται πλέον το μεγάλο ερωτηματικό για όλους τους μεγάλους παίκτες


Πηγή:

https://www.neakriti.gr/article/editors-blogs/giorgos-sahinis-blog/1502113/adimou-o-ex-adikeimenou-geopolitikos-rolos-tis-elladas/#.WqLlHdNl_7k.twitter

Sunday, April 15, 2018

Η ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ ΑΠΟΜΑΚΡΥΝΕΤΑΙ ΑΠΟ ΤΗΝ ΔΥΣΗ


Της Αντωνίας Δήμου*

Δημοσίευση στο Armyvoice.gr στις 8 Μαρτίου 2018, 
http://www.armyvoice.gr/2018/03/i-tourkia-apomakrinete-apo-ti-disi.html

Το παρόν άρθρο αποτελεί μετάφραση του αγγλόφωνου κειμένου που αρχικά δημοσιεύθηκε στο moderndiplomacy.eu


(Φωτο: Πηγή- Bigbusiness.gr)

Η Τουρκία έχει απολέσει την ελκυστικότητά της ως πυλώνας σταθερότητας και ασφάλειας στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Μέσης Ανατολής αφενός λόγω της αυξανόμενης απολυταρχικής πολιτικής της ηγεσίας του προέδρου Ερντογάν και αφετέρου λόγω των αποτυχημένων προτεραιοτήτων της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής. Το περίφημο δόγμα "των μηδενικών προβλημάτων με τους γείτονες" που αναδείχθηκε την περίοδο της Αραβικής Άνοιξης έχει αντικατασταθεί από την ίδια την πραγματικότητα η οποία συμπυκνώνεται στο "τίποτα, άλλο παρά προβλήματα με έκαστο γείτονα". Βασικές πτυχές της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής, όπως οι σχέσεις με τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες (ΗΠΑ), το ΝΑΤΟ, την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και τις χώρες της περιοχής ΜΕΝΑ εμφανίζουν αυξανόμενες προκλήσεις.

Παρότι οι σχέσεις Τουρκίας-ΝΑΤΟ εξακολουθούν να αποτιμώνται θετικά τόσο από την κοινή γνώμη όσο και την τουρκική κυβέρνηση, όπως άλλωστε καταγράφεται σε πρόσφατη δημοσκόπηση του αμερικανικού κέντρου έρευνας Pew με έδρα την Ουάσιγκτον, η Τουρκία εξακολουθεί να συντηρεί σχέσεις τριβής με συμμάχους στο ΝΑΤΟ και την ίδια στιγμή να έρχεται πιο κοντά στη Ρωσία. Η απόφαση της Τουρκίας να προχωρήσει στην αγορά του ρωσικού συστήματος αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας S-400 έχει εγείρει ανησυχίες στα κράτη-μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ σχετικά με τις επιπτώσεις που ανακύπτουν στη διαλειτουργικότητα με την Συμμαχία, δεδομένου ότι το σύστημα S-400 δεν είναι συμβατό με τις νατοϊκές και αμερικανικές υποδομές που βρίσκονται επί τουρκικού εδάφους και ως εκ τούτου θα πρέπει να λειτουργήσει σε  αυτόνομη βάση. Ακόμη πιο κρίσιμο είναι το γεγονός ότι, οι ΗΠΑ και τα κράτη-μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ που έχουν αγοράσει τα αμερικανικά πολεμικά αεροσκάφη F-35 Joint Strike Fighters εκφράζουν ανησυχίες ως προς την ασφάλεια της μεταφοράς στην τουρκική πολεμική αεροπορία δεδομένων που αφορούν την τεχνολογία πέμπτης γενιάς εξ’ αιτίας των ενισχυμένων δεσμών της Άγκυρας με τη Μόσχα.

Το «απαγορευτικό» σενάριο για τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες προβλέπει την ανταλλαγή διαβαθμισμένων πληροφοριών μεταξύ Τουρκίας και Ρωσίας σχετικά με τον τρόπο που το σύστημα αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας S-400 λειτουργεί έναντι των μαχητικών αεροσκαφών πέμπτης γενιάς F-35, μια κίνηση που θα βοηθήσει τη Μόσχα να αναπτύξει την έρευνα για την αντιμετώπιση μαχητικών stealth. Προκειμένου να αποφευχθεί το «απαγορευτικό» σενάριο, στη διάρκεια της πρόσφατης επίσκεψης του υπουργού Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ στην Άγκυρα φαίνεται να έγινε σαφής αναφορά στην πιθανότητα η Τουρκία να υποστεί αμερικανικές κυρώσεις καθώς ο νομοθετική Πράξη Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) που υπογράφηκε την 30η Ιανουαρίου 2018 προβλέπει την παύση όλων των αμερικανικών πωλήσεων όπλων και την επιβολή κυρώσεων σε οποιαδήποτε χώρα συνεργάζεται με απαγορευμένες ρωσικές εταιρείες, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της ρωσικής κρατικής αεροπορικής εταιρείας MKB "Fakel" που παράγει τους S-400.

Το ζήτημα της αγοράς του συστήματος S-400 θεωρείται η κορυφή του παγόβουνου στις αμερικανό-τουρκικές σχέσεις. Οι διμερείς σχέσεις έχουν επιδεινωθεί ως επακόλουθο των αμερικανικών σχέσεων με τις Συριακές Κουρδικές Μονάδες Λαϊκής Προστασίας (YPG), τον Fethullah Gulen και τον Reza Zarrab. Δημοσκόπηση του αμερικανικού κέντρου έρευνας Pew αποτυπώνει την οργή της τουρκικής κοινής γνώμης προς τις ΗΠΑ σε ποσοστό που φθάνει το 70%, οι οποίες θεωρούνται ως η μεγαλύτερη απειλή για την Τουρκία. Στο εν λόγω πλαίσιο, τα βασικά ερωτήματα που ανακύπτουν είναι τα ακόλουθα: Με ποιο τρόπο πρόκειται να διαχειριστεί η Τουρκία τα διαφορετικά της συμφέροντα στη Συρία; Η Τουρκία βλέπει τον εαυτό της περισσότερο ως μια Μεσανατολική και λιγότερο ως δυτική δύναμη;

Στο μέτωπο της Συρίας, η Τουρκία απομακρύνεται σταθερά από την αρχική θέση του 2011 οπότε και ξέσπασε η διένεξη η οποία συνίστατο στην καταδίκη του καθεστώτος Assad για δύο λόγους: Πρώτον, την απόφαση να σταθεροποιηθεί η Συρία, ακόμη και αν αυτό μεταφράζεται σε αποδοχή του Assad ως ηγέτη, και δεύτερον, την προτεραιοποίηση της κουρδικής απειλής. Ως γνωστόν, τα συμφέροντα της Τουρκίας έγκεινται στην αποτροπή δημιουργίας αυτόνομης κουρδικής περιοχής στη Βόρεια Συρία, όπως αποδεικνύει η τουρκική εισβολή στην Αφρίν, και όχι στην καταπολέμηση των  θυγατρικών οργανώσεων της Αλ Κάιντα και του Ισλαμικού Κράτους (ISIS) στη Συρία με δεδομένο ότι εν λόγω πολεμική τακτική δεν ακυρώνει τους κουρδικούς στόχους. Η αμερικανική υποστήριξη των Συριακών Δημοκρατικών Δυνάμεων (SDF), που σημειωτέον αποτελούνται από εθνοτικές πολιτοφυλακές συμπεριλαμβανομένου του YPG, των οποίων ο αγώνας κατά του Ισλαμικού Κράτους οδήγησε στην κατάληψη εδαφών που προηγουμένως ελέγχονταν από την τρομοκρατική οργάνωση, αποτέλεσε βασική αιτία τριβής στις αμερικανό-τουρκικές σχέσεις.

Η όξυνση στις διμερείς σχέσεις ενισχύθηκε έτι περαιτέρω λόγω της υποτιθέμενης αμερικανικής απόφασης για υποβοήθηση των Συριακών Δημοκρατικών Δυνάμεων (SDF) να σχηματίσουν μια συνοριακή δύναμη ασφαλείας της τάξης των 30.000 μαχητών, στα κοινά  σύνορα με την Τουρκία και το Ιράκ. Η τουρκική εισβολή στην Αφρίν θεωρείται ως βήμα για την κατάτμηση της Συρίας καθώς στην περίπτωση που οι οι Αφρίν και Μάνμπιζ «πέσουν», η Άγκυρα αναμένεται να ελέγξει μια περιοχή 200 χιλιομέτρων στη βόρεια Συρία. Σε διαφορετικό επίπεδο, η στρατηγική των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών εστιάζει στην καταπολέμηση του Ισλαμικού Κράτους και τη διατήρηση μιας ενωμένης και σταθερής Συρίας,  καθώς και στην υποστήριξη πολιτικής μετάβασης ως προϋπόθεση για τη στήριξη της ανασυγκρότησης της αραβικής χώρας.  

Στο εν λόγω διπλωματικό και γεωπολιτικό σκηνικό, η Τουρκία φαίνεται να συμπεριφέρεται περισσότερο ως μεσανατολική παρά ως δυτική δύναμη. Η Άγκυρα έχει επικεντρωθεί στον ισλαμικό κόσμο και τη μουσουλμανική παράδοσή κατά τον σχεδιασμό και εκτέλεση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής της, παρότι εξακολουθεί να κεφαλαιοποιεί δυτικούς θεσμούς και οργανισμούς. Η συνεργασία με το ΝΑΤΟ, οι προσπάθειες ένταξης στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (ΕΕ) και η τελωνειακή ένωση με την ΕΕ έχουν μειωμένη σημασία, καθώς ο νεο-οθωμανισμός ως πολιτική ιδεολογία της τουρκικής ηγεσίας που προωθεί την μεγαλύτερη ανάμιξη σε περιοχές που βρίσκονταν προηγουμένως υπό Οθωμανική κυριότητα, αποτελεί καταφανώς το νέο ιδεολογικό πλαίσιο της τουρκικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής.

Προς κεφαλαιοποίηση της οθωμανικής εμπειρίας, η Τουρκία ενεπλάκη έντονα σε περιφερειακές συγκρούσεις όπως αυτή στη Συρία, με στόχο να αναδειχθεί σε προστάτιδα δύναμη. Η τουρκική προσπάθεια συντελείται με την ενίσχυση του ισλαμικού προσανατολισμού της και των δεσμών με θρησκευτικές συντηρητικές περιφέρειες καθώς και με την υποτιθέμενη ευρεία δημοτικότητα στην αραβική κρίσιμη μάζα.

Το βασικό στοιχείο, ωστόσο, που εκφεύγει των υπολογισμών της Τουρκίας έγκειται στο γεγονός ότι η ελκυστικότητα της στην ευρύτερη Μέση Ανατολή προέρχεται από τη θέση που κατέχει σε δυτικούς οργανισμούς. Η απομάκρυνση της από τη Δύση αφενός αφαιρεί από την Άγκυρα την ελκυστικότητά της στην καρδιά της Μέσης Ανατολής, και αφετέρου εξαντλεί τις όποιες προοπτικές για περιφερειακή συνεργασία και σταθερότητα.


Αντωνία Δήμου είναι επικεφαλής του Τομέα Μέσης Ανατολής στο Ινστιτούτο Άμυνας και Ασφάλειας με έδρα την Αθήνα καθώς και Εταίρος στο Κέντρο για την Ανάπτυξη της Μέσης Ανατολής στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Καλιφόρνια στο Λος Άντζελες.



Tuesday, April 10, 2018

Analysis: Turkey Drifts Away from the West

By Antonia Dimou

Published on March 5th, 2018, by ModernDiplomacy,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-west/
Reproduced:
1. Mehr News Agency, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132681/Turkey-drifts-away-from-the-West
2. NATO Mutimedia Library, http://www.natolibguides.info/Turkey/articles
3. Turkish Digest, http://turkishdigest.blogspot.gr/2018/03/turkey-drifts-away-from-west-modern.html
4. Agora Dialogue, http://agora-dialogue.com/2018/03/05/turkey-drifts-away-from-the-west/



Turkey has lost its soft power attractiveness due to its leadership’s increasing absolutism and failed foreign policy priorities. The “zero problems with neighbors” concept that unraveled almost at the time of the Arab Spring has given its place to “nothing but problems with every single neighbor”. Key dimensions of Turkish foreign policy, namely relations with the United States (US), NATO, the European Union and MENA countries face growing challenges.

Despite that Turkish-NATO relations are still valued and seen in a positive light by both the public and the Turkish government as evidenced by a recent Pew research poll, Turkey continues to experience friction with its NATO allies, while veering closer to Russia. Turkey’s decision to proceed with the purchase of the S-400 Russian air defense system has raised NATO members concerns over implications on the alliance’s interoperability given that the S-400 is not compatible with NATO and American assets on Turkish soil and must thus operate on a standalone basis. Even more critical, the US and NATO members that have purchased F-35 Joint Strike Fighters worry over the security of main data transfer of fifth-generation technology to the Turkish Air-force due to Ankara’s growing ties to Moscow.

The prohibitive scenario for the United States foresees the sharing of classified information between Turkey and Russia on the way the S-400 air defense system fares against the fifth generation F-35, a move that would help Moscow develop its anti-stealth research. To avoid the prohibitive scenario, the likelihood of Turkey being exposed to American sanctions has reportedly been raised in discussions during the latest visit of US Secretary of State to Ankara as the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) signed on January 30, 2018, provides the cessation of all American arms sales and the sanctioning of any country that does business with banned Russian firms including the Russian government owned aerospace defense corporation MKB "Fakel" that produces the S-400.

Τhe S-400 purchase issue is considered as the top of the iceberg in US-Turkish relations; the bilateral relationship has worsened as consequence of American ties to the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), Fethullah Gulen and Reza Zarrab. A Pew research poll of Turkish public opinion suggests a “visceral” anger toward the US, which is now viewed as the major threat to Turkey by more than 70 percent of the population. In this context, the main questions that emerge are the following: How will Turkey manage its diverse interests in Syria? Is Turkey coming to see itself more as a Middle Eastern and less as a Western power?

On Syria, Turkey continues to transition away from its original position when the conflict broke out in 2011 of condemning the Assad regime for two reasons: a growing desire to stabilize Syria even if that means accepting Assad as leader, and the prioritization of the Kurdish threat. Turkey’s interests lie in preventing an autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Syria as evidenced by its assault in Afrin and not in going after al-Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria because such a tactic does not counter Kurdish goals. The US support of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) composed of ethnic militias including the YPG whose fight against ISIS led to the gain of territory formerly controlled by the terrorist organization has been a cause of friction in US-Turkish relations.

The strained relations have accelerated with the alleged American decision to help the SDF form a 30 thousand border security force across the Turkish and Iraqi borders. The Turkish assault in Afrin is considered as a step towards the partition of Syria and Ankara is expected to control a 200 km area in northern Syria if Afrin and Manbij fall. In a different mode, the United States strategy centers on fighting the Islamic State and on maintaining a united and stable Syria; it continues to support a political transition in Damascus; and, it will not back reconstruction in the absence of such a transition.

In the cited diplomatic and geopolitical contexts, Turkey seems to behave more as Middle Eastern rather than a western power. Ankara has focused on the Islamic world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy, though it still is a blend of western institutions. Cooperation with NATO, efforts to access the EU and the customs union with the EU have become less of paramount importance as neo-Ottomanism, the Turkish leadership’s political ideology that promotes greater engagement with areas formerly under the Ottoman Empire, has profoundly become the new conceptual framework of the Turkish foreign policy.

To capitalize in its Ottoman experience, Turkey has thrown itself deeply into regional conflicts like the one in Syria envisioning to patron them. The Turkish patronization is attempted with its Islamic orientation, ties to religiously conservative constituencies and alleged widespread popularity among the Arab critical mass.

The basic element however that slips from Turkey’s calculations is that its allure in the wider Middle East stems from its key position in Western clubs and institutions. Drifting away from the West deprives Ankara of its attractiveness in the heart of the Middle East evaporating prospects of regional cooperation and stability.





Friday, February 9, 2018

OP-ED: Athens Rally on Macedonia ΑΠΟΨΗ: Συλλαλητήριο Αθήνας για τη Μακεδονία



Ήμουν και εγώ στο συλλαλητήριο της Αθήνας για τη Μακεδονία:
  • Για να διατυπώσω με ευκρίνεια ότι η Μακεδονία είναι ελληνική όπως άλλωστε έχουν διατυπώσει πριν από εμένα αρχαίοι  ιστορικοί και φιλοσόφοι όπως ο Ηρόδοτος, Θουκυδίδης, Στράβωνας και να ενώσω την φωνή μου με τους Έλληνες της διασποράς
  • Για να ενδυναμώσω τη διαπραγματευτική δύναμη της όποιας ελληνικής κυβέρνησης στους γύρους των συνομιλιών που πρόκειται να διεξαχθούν
  • Για να καταστήσω σαφές ότι ο αλυτρωτισμός που εμπεριέχεται στο Σύνταγμα και τα βιβλία της γειτονικής χώρας πυροδοτεί αστάθεια μακροπρόθεσμα και ως εκ τούτου πρέπει να εκλείψει
  • Για να τονίσω προς όλες τις κατευθύνσεις εντός και εκτός Ελλάδας ότι η Αθήνα επιδιώκει σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας και συνεργασίας με την γειτονική χώρα
  • Για να αποδείξω ότι η αγάπη για την πατρίδα είναι ξένη προς τον ρατσισμό και τον φασισμό
  • Για να τιμήσω τους Έλληνες προγόνους μου οι οποίοι θυσιάστηκαν προκειμένου εγώ σήμερα να ζω ως ελεύθερη πολίτης και να ασκώ το δικαίωμα του «διαδηλώνειν»  

I was also at the Athens rally for Macedonia:

  • To state that Macedonia is Greek as evidenced by ancient historians and philosophers like Herodotus, Thucydides, and; Stravon and to unite my voice with the Greeks of diaspora
  • To strengthen the negotiating power of any Greek government in the future rounds of talks
  •  To clarify that irredentism in the neighboring country’s Constitution and the school text books is triggering long-term instability, and therefore must be eliminated
  • To emphasize at all directions, within and outside Greece, that Athens seeks for good relations and cooperation with the neighboring country
  •  To prove that love for the homeland is foreign to racism and fascism
  •  To honor my Greek ancestors who were sacrificed so that I can live today as a free citizen and be in position to exercise the right of "demonstrating"



Tuesday, December 19, 2017

Energy As An East Mediterranean Opportunity and Challenge

By Antonia Dimou

Published at National Security and the Future Journal, Vol. 18, No 1-2, 2017


Introduction

The East Mediterranean’s gas resources can promote cooperation, resolve conflicts and deliver financial benefits contributing to the economic development of Israel, Greece and Cyprus, advance the energy security of Jordan and Turkey, and present new prospects for Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians. 

Figure 1: The main gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean sea 

ISRAEL: Untying the Gordian Knot of Natural Gas 

The approval of a revised framework for gas regulation by the Israeli government eight years after the discovery of offshore gas in Israel resolved the antitrust stalemate but has done little to address other challenges that delay the development of Israeli gas fields such as high risks for potential buyers and uncertainly over export markets. Preuzmite članak u PDF formatuDespite the approval by the Israeli government of natural gas exports to Egypt, the deal signed between  Israeli Tamar gas field’s partners and the Egyptian Dolphinus Holdings for the latter to purchase $1.2 billion of gas for a minimum of 5 billion cubic meters (cbm) in the first three years , has not yet materialized. Israel is deprived of an outlet for its gas through the Egyptian under-used LNG export facilities in Idku operated by BG Group and Damietta by Union Fenosa Gas to process Israeli gas to Europe and other lucrative markets in Asia. 
The only secured export agreement is the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) signed between Noble Energy Inc and Jordan’s National Electric Power Corporation (NEPCO) for the supply from the Leviathan gas field of approximately 1.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) over a 15-year period for electricity production .  
Out of all export options, the construction of a pipeline that connects Israeli Leviathan gas field to the Turkish coast remains financially attractive despite Israeli reservations over the likelihood of tying its gas into a single market where there is considerable competition. For the gas pipeline project to proceed, it has to overcome the longstanding Cyprus conflict as the pipeline requires crossing Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
The Leviathan gas field’s development whose 9 bcm gas surplus is destined for export is to be carried out in two stages: the first lies in four development wells and an annual capacity production of 12 billion cubic meters (Bcm), and the second stage lies in four additional wells and an increase of the capacity production by another 9 bcm. Nevertheless, uncertainly prevails over progress on the basis that even secured GSPAs to supply gas from the Leviathan field to domestic buyers such as IPM Beer Tuvia Ltd are subject to regulatory approval . 
Israel’s energy policies should focus on the strengthening of relations between Tel Aviv and Nicosia in parallel to any Israeli collaboration with Ankaraso that an agreement on joint monetization of export-oriented gas resources is favored; regional energy cooperation through increased energy security, and incentivizing American oil and gas companies to proceed with investment in exploration activities and production commitments in Israel; and, look into multiple gas export options so that Israeli gas is not tied to a single market where changing bilateral relations or geopolitical conditions can affect the sustainability of exports and thus impact negatively the country’s energy wealth..

SYRIA: Redefining The Regional Energy Map’s Centre of Gravity 

Geopolitics of energy dominate the crisis in Syria. Foreign powers battle control of natural gas resources and the trade routes that bring energy to consumers. Russia seeks to maintain investments in the energy sector in so-called “Safe Syria,” which is a promising zone of natural gas reserves in the territorial waters off Syria’s Mediterranean coast. The significance that Russia attributes to joining the Eastern Mediterranean energy game is underlined by the fact that energy giant Gazprom has reportedly taken over the gas exploration and drilling rights off the Syrian coast from Russian state-controlled Soyuzneftegaz, which in 2014 signed a 25-year agreement with the Syrian government that concedes exclusive exploration rights in Syria’s EEZ . 
Syria contains a number of gas fields that have been periodically seized since 2014 by the Islamic State, principally in Palmyra, a city that serves as transit for pipelines carrying gas from fields in Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces in northeastern and eastern Syria respectively . ISIS focus around the area of Palmyra is attributed to the fact that the city is the hub between the transfer of the entire Syrian gas production and the power plants that supply electricity and gas to most parts of Syria. The regime’s control of Shaer field (the largest field northwest of Palmyra that feeds the national grid) is considered significant because it impedes the Islamic State from amassing further disproportionate rewards compared to its limited investment of combat manpower. 
But as ISIS territory shrinks it seeks to substitute traditional sources of revenue like transit tolls and wage taxes with financial profits deriving from the sale of oil and gas. Upon this strategy, the terrorist organization allegedly sells energy to the Syrian government to power the capital of Damascus and other parts of the country. 

Figure 2: Transition route 

Qatar’s energy agenda in Syria needs to be highlighted as it includes a pipeline that would connect Qatar and Turkey through Syria, in order to join the Nabucco pipeline and ultimately reach Europe. For its part, Iran’s energy strategy in Syria centers on the Iran-Iraq-Syria Islamic pipeline project, originally signed in 2011. The project is intended to transport Iranian gas through the Gulf to Iraq, then to Syrian and Lebanese ports, with Europe as the final destination.
Notably, Russia’s decision to enter the Syrian conflict has an aspect linked to the control of the country’s energy supply routes. It is acknowledged by regional energy experts that the eight Russian military bases which have been developed over the last year across Syria are along the oil and gas routes with most prominent the base of Tartus where Syria’s prime export terminal is located. Equally important, Russia favors the Shia pipeline that would carry oil from Iran through Iraq into Syria over the Sunni pipeline that would carry oil from Qatar to Turkey via Syria. 
The international community’s policies should focus on the resolution of the Syrian conflict as a prerequisite for the development of the country’s untapped offshore gas resources and for attracting foreign investment in the context of a regional energy cooperation setting.

Cyprus in Need Not to Mistake Energy Activity with Achievement 

Provided the existence of commercially viable hydrocarbon resources, Cyprus is assessed to get significant economic benefits in the form of job creation, foreign direct investment as well as royalties and taxes paid to the state treasury by energy suppliers. The island’s recent third licensing round for the blocks 6, 8 and 10 within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has attracted international energy majors such as ENI, Total, Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum on the basis of closeness to the Egyptian Zohr and the Israeli Leviathan gas fields . The rationale is to connect gas discoveries in Cyprus with Egypt’s by pipeline and re-export reserves as liquefied natural gas by utilizing the Egyptian Idku and Damietta LNG facilities. Evidently, the development of Cypriot gas fields necessitates synergies among local and international players, users and producers, eager to export gas to a broader market.
The criteria for the evaluation of the third licensing round’s applications have lied in the technical and financial ability of the energy companies; the financial proposal of the applicant to obtain a license; applicant’s commitment to training of personnel; political considerations in having energy majors involved in the Cypriot blocks; and, any irregularities and lack of responsibility that the applicant may have demonstrated under a previous license in Cyprus or in any other country.
No doubt that a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem should be fortified by the implementation of concrete confidence building measures (CBMs) such as Track-II diplomacy between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the future use of the East Mediterranean natural gas resources. All this despite the conventional practice which says that the connection between politics and the development of hydrocarbons should be limited.
Policies should focus on the resolution of the Cyprus conflict as prerequisite for cooperation over East Mediterranean gas production; the creation of an East Mediterranean Energy Cooperation Council (EMECC) that will support the regional energy industry. Members should include governments, energy companies and service providers. The council will serve as a clearinghouse for ideas and plans for mutually beneficial energy developments in the region; and, support of the joint monetization of Cypriot and Egyptian gas resources on the basis that economies of scale reinforce profitability and produce higher government revenues.
Figure 3: Offshore Exploration Licenses Republic of Cyprus

GREECE: Pivotal to Regional Gas Development 

Greece has been pivotal to the development of Israel’s natural gas with the acquisition of the Tanin and Karish fields by facilitating competition in the Israeli market in accordance with the revised Israeli regulatory framework. Greek private E&P company Energean Oil and Gas currently owns 100% and is the Operator of the two Israeli gas fields  considered as a world class asset with 2,4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, contingent reserves, and more than 20 million barrels of light oil, contingent and perspective reserves.
Israel has facilitated Greek energy interests, which can help Europe diversify supply of energy resources. Energean’s ability to present a reliable Field Development Plan (FDP) for both fields so that first gas is produced in 2020 looks promising. The company has emerged as a smart investor given it managed to acquire two new licenses in Israel and another two in Western Greece during the low part of the cycle of the upstream industry; it also has a powerful shareholder basis such as ship owners, petroleum engineers, former officials from the financial sector, and the US based fund Third Point; a long term off take agreement with BP; and, the company is backed by financial institutions like the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. 
Pursuant to the overall strategy of Greece in not only penetrating the East Mediterranean energy landscape but also in exploiting and developing its own gas fields in the Ionian Sea and South of Crete, the Greek Ministry of Energy is ready to sign a contract with French Total’s JV with Edison and Hellenic Petroleum for offshore Block 2 located west of the island of Corfu as outcome of the 2014 International Licensing Round .

Figure 4: Areas of Operation 
It may nevertheless be risky for Greece to re-launch a new Licensing tender at the current low price levels considering increased exploration costs in deep and ultra-deep waters as well as the fact that Athens political instability dissuaded interest of international energy companies as already evidenced in the 2014 International Licensing Round where no bid occurred for the seventeen out of the twenty offered fields. 

PALESTINE: Seeking a Way Out of The Energy Deadlock

The Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field, one of the first regional discoveries back in 2000 remains untapped despite its location close to the shore. The field’s new operator, the Royal Dutch Shell that owns 60%, estimates that its development is impeded by low oil and gas prices . For a breakthrough in the field’s $500 million development, the project’s financial support either by the World Bank’s Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund or by American financial institutions like the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) can prove vital. The value of American financial support in the field’s development is two-fold as it can help address Palestinian development challenges and advance U.S. foreign policy priorities.
The exploitation of the Gaza marine gas field would help generate revenues, offer a domestic source for electricity generation and for water desalination, and prioritize export to neighboring counties like Jordan. Already, in implementation of its strategy to diversify energy sources of supply, Jordan has signed a Letter of Intent (LOI) to import 1.5-1.8 bcm per year from the Palestinian field.  
Noteworthy, a pessimistic outlook seems to prevail for the development of the Rantis oil project in the West Bank due to high political risks . Only one offer was received that did not even meet the technical or financial conditions of the tender issued in 2014. To ensure the development of the oil project, the Palestinian Authority considers the establishment of a Palestine Investment Fund-led national consortium to attract international operators.
Figure 5: Areas of Operation

LEBANON: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back On Natural Gas

Lebanon’s decision to open a new pre-qualification round for oil and gas companies interested in participating in the first International Round for five offshore blocks marks a breakthrough after three years of political impasse. 
The Lebanese government’s approval of a decree stipulating Exploration and Production Agreements (EPA)and another decree on the delimitation of Lebanon’s territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have aimed to pave the way for tendering Lebanon’s offshore area. According to energy experts, both decrees create more problems rather than provide solutions due to lack of transparency that favors avidity and rent-seeking behavior among the various sectarian groups that dominate the political decision-making process.
Figure 6: Overlap of Israeli and Lebanese claims
Despite persistent American diplomatic efforts discouraging Lebanon and Israel from energy exploration in contested waters, Beirut decided to initiate a tender process to award licenses, which Israel considers its own. A bilateral crisis could erupt with Israel if Lebanon proceeds with non-consensual economic activity in the disputed area; thus openness to dialogue between Lebanon and Israel is critical when it comes to the northern limit of Israel’s Territorial Sea and EEZ in accordance with the International Maritime Law. 
Challenges that could undermine the development of Lebanon’s gas potential lie in the lack of strong governance. The country’s domestic politics is overwhelmed by constant conflicts over the distribution of political power; the absence of an anti-corruption framework, and lack of free, non-discriminatory competition. Often, weak institutional and administrative frameworks in Lebanon guarantee a gap between declared government plans and ultimate delivery. No doubt that the development of potential discoveries could help Lebanon reduce its domestic energy-deficiency and dependence on oil imports if an exploration, production and monetization model based on best-practice standards and technical expertise materializes. 
Policies should focus on the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms for the Lebanese oil and gas industry, such as the creation of sovereign wealth funds that take part of the gas profits and allocate them to the development of infrastructure projects; and, encouragement of sound institution-building to promote transparency by disclosing to the public all information pertaining to the energy sector including licenses, contracts, and production and revenue data.

Egypt and Turkey Share Common Regional Gas Ambitions 

Situated right off of the Egyptian coast, Zohr field is possibly the largest gas field in the world, with an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The development of the Zohr gas field expected to produce 20-30 bcm annually for 20 years will primarily serve the Egyptian domestic market, making up for a rapid decline in production which has left Cairo increasingly struggling to meet its domestic demand . Concurrently, it will free up much needed funds for other sectors of the economy, such as health and education. 
The impact of the Zohr gas field could well go beyond Egypt’s boundaries, due to its location and infrastructure given that it is close to Cypriot Aphrodite and Israeli Leviathan gas fields, thus allowing the development of the fields to be coordinated, and the economies of scale needed to put in place a competitive regional gas export infrastructure. Cooperative scenarios foresee gas imports from Cyprus and Israel to Egypt with the aim of being exported as LNG to Europe and Asia; despite domestic controversy, Egyptian companies have conducted talks to import gas from Israel, and the Egyptian government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Cyprus to import gas from Aphrodite field.
New discoveries guarantee that in the long-term Egypt’s production will reach levels of self-sufficiency; it is in this context that British Petroleum (BP), a heavy foreign investor in Egyptian fields, recently completed a number of transport and processing agreements accelerating the development of the Atoll field which contains an estimated 1.5 trillion cubic feet of gas ; announced the construction of a natural gas processing plant in Rosetta (Rashid) city, with a capacity ranging from 600-700million cubic feet per day; and, publicized the discovery of a new natural gas field in the BaltimSouth Development Lease in the East Nile Delta, 12 kilometres from the shoreline.
Figure 7: Areas of Operation
Additionally, the Suez-Med Pipeline and the Suez Canal’s extension can be viewed as motivators of Egypt’s prioritization of gas production. These projects provide preferential economic zones; special arbitration and policies, such as restoration of corporate funds spent in Research & Development; and provision of government loans in local currency with low interest rates. However, regulatory changes in the rest of the country that could turn Egypt’s gas sector into a must-be place for both suppliers and investors are slow, especially when it comes to regulating gas prices and trading services.
Equally interesting are Turkey’s ambitions to become a major Eurasian energy hub. The concept of creating a regional trading hub in proximity to the East Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Europe with Turkey at the epicentre gains significant ground on the basis of viewing natural gas as a shared economic benefit in the form of transit fees, new refineries and trading facilities. It is estimated that despite the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, the East Mediterranean gas is trapped given that global low gas prices make less feasible the development of regional fields and the construction of pipelines. At the same time, the presence of cheap Russian gas and the discovery of new resources in Africa and the US make the East Mediterranean gas less attractive. To overcome these hurdles, East Mediterranean gas could be shipped to Turkey viewed by many energy experts as trading hub. Existing gas pipelines in Turkey guarantee the presence of qualified technical labour force capable to maintain and repair energy infrastructure, while its close vicinity to energy producers and consumers makes the country attractive to East Mediterranean neighbours.

Epilogue

Gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have the potential to transform the energy outlook of individual countries, as well as foster regional energy cooperation. This is a period of disruption with financial upheavals and political instability, hence new opportunities emerge for those who are bold and ready to work. Regional countries need to identify to this group.


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