Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Annapolis: a view from Amman*


El Hassan bin Talal
On the eve of the Annapolis conference in the United States, Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan proposes the key outlines of the Israeli-Palestinian and regional peace to which it should aspire. (26 November 2007)


The middle-east conference to be convened in Annapolis, Maryland on 27 November 2007 must, if it is to be effective, be conceived as a return to a peace-building process whose objective is to realise a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse. Most of the issues to be addressed are exceptionally complex: they relate in particular to the overwhelming issue of the Palestinian diaspora, and include matters such as confidence-building, inclusive security, regional conflict-prevention, attitudes to extremists, the gap between final and permanent status, and the need to combine a peace process with a reconciliation process.

The discussion in advance of the conference has included the significant letter sent to the United States president and secretary of state on 10 October by a distinguished non-partisan group of former senior US officials: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Lee H Hamilton, Carla Hills, Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, Thomas R. Pickering, Brent Scowcroft, Theodore C Sorensen, and Paul Volcker (see "'Failure Risks Devastating Consequences", New York Review of Books, 8 November 2007).

The letter, in stating that a "positive outcome" at the conference "could play a critical role in stemming the rising tide of instability and violence" also emphasises that this is a moment to display "the ambition as well as the courage to chart new ground and take bold steps".

In light of this and other contributions, what follows is the view from Amman, as I see it, on the eve of the Annapolis conference. The text is in two parts: the first dealing with the core ingredients of a peace settlement, and the second with some of the outstanding questions that it needs to address if the settlement is to endure.


Part One: In transit - how peace begins
Peace and reconciliation
Peace is not reconciliation. What is needed between Israelis and Palestinians is genuine reconciliation. This has to start with an acknowledgment of the genuine claims of the Palestinians and the acceptance of responsibility for what happened to them.

Reconciliation mechanisms include truth commissions and victim compensation. Addressing claims by both sides as to the wrongs they have suffered in order to settle the record and avoid the festering of claims is desirable. This mechanism should be used for reconciliation as well as for the reduction of prejudice and hatred. The time has come to shed prejudice and build intra-societal dynamics and respect for the other irrespective of national origin, religion, and creed.

Without reconciliation there can be no lasting peace. Peace treaties are instruments through which we can arrive at a "warm peace" between adversaries. The two peace treaties that did not succeed in achieving warm peace are those between Israel and Egypt and Jordan respectively; this outcome is due to the failure to normalise inter-state peace in the ranks of the people and to transform the official state-to-state accords into human accord between people. That can only be achieved if human justice is assured through the application of the agreed terms on the ground. A fear of people-to-people peace must be overcome. Beyond bilateral peacemaking, regional cooperation could craft a new partnership in the region to replace rejection and hatred with visible mutual respect and acceptance as well as humanitarian standards of interaction.


Confidence-building
Before the commencement of negotiations, a number of confidence-building measures can be implemented: for example, the bilateral release of detained people, the removal of checkpoints or mahsums, free access to places of worship in Jerusalem, and both sides' decision to refrain from violence.

As these take effect, other specific measures should be developed; some should apply immediately and others throughout the course of the negotiations as means to implement any agreement reached. Respect for human life and for people's dignity is essential to confidence-building, as is the primacy of rule of law and stability. There is a need for international support to establish a legal system and the rule of law in Palestine as a way of insuring its future stability, paving the way to democracy, encouraging foreign investment and economic development and guaranteeing the existence of a peaceful, secular and democratic state.


From final status to permanent status
The dynamics between "final status" and "permanent status" provide the missing link to lasting peace. The question is: how to bridge that gap? Final status is bilateral. Permanent status starts with confidence-building measures and ends with fundamental and comprehensive, not selective, guarantees of a regional order.

Final status is reached at the conclusion of negotiations between adversaries - Palestinians and Israelis in our case. A more important goal is a permanent-status solution in which cooperation becomes the order of the day.


Statehood
It is clear that there is broad consensus that there is to be a Palestinian state. This necessarily implies that its nationals will enjoy citizenship rights in their country. The issues here are different and concern the sovereignty of the state: they include its communications with other neighbouring states; freedom of egress and ingress; how the state will administer its airport and port facilities; customs, police and security issues; whether it will have a sovereign army or be demilitarised; and the extent of any limitations on its right to make independent treaties.

The majority of people in the world enjoy the benefits and responsibilities of citizenship as a fundamental right; the Palestinians should not be an exception if peace is to endure. The two-state solution could undoubtedly be a wise one. It would be wiser yet to honour United Nations Resolutions that address the issue of Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories. Acquisition of any territory by force should not be condoned nor should such acquisition be rewarded.

The continued acquisition of territory endangers hopes for any viable Palestinian state. The retention of any Palestinian territories by Israel should only be accepted by mutual consent based on minor adjustments of the 4 June 1967 lines and on the basis of fair reciprocity concerning the areas exchanged and their respective potential and market value.

Issues of a trans-boundary nature should be addressed and resolved; these include (but are not limited to) water resources, transportation, electrical transmission, labour rights and drug-trafficking and other criminal issues. The issue of citizenship of the two states should be agreed upon and reciprocity guaranteed.

The matter of Palestinian statehood and all the complexities of trans-boundary issues are not limited to Palestinians because the diameter of conflict goes beyond the parameter to all national "brand names". An appreciation of the regional carrying capacity (or aménagement de territoire) would introduce socio-economic planning parameters for all the riparians of the Jordan Valley within a water and energy community for the environment, following the model of the coal and steel community which was seminal to the creation of the European Union. Such models can also be applied to the other vital elements pertaining to sovereignty as previously touched upon; among them boundary-crossings, air and maritime navigation, army and police.


Security
The issue of security for both Israel and the Palestinian state is not solely a bilateral concern. Except for specifically bilateral issues, the security of Israel and the Palestinians should be the shared responsibility of the outer-perimeter countries. Any threat to their security coming from the east would threaten Jordan as well. The same applies to dangers coming from the north or south: these would threaten the respective perimeter countries. A meaningful security arrangement should depend on a regional order, including a pact for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of arms control, rather than mere unilateral deterrent instruments.

Achieving full inclusiveness requires a regional code of conduct for a process of human security and cooperation; this in turn would include a regional community for water and energy and a regional social charter. These instruments should constitute the building-blocks for a regional security package consolidated by the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation for the Middle East. Again, I emphasise that Europe provides an ideal model for such a structure. A conflict-prevention capability must form an integral part of such a process. A country which is party to a regional security conference must not pursue the development of weapons of mass destruction.

These measures would help move the region away from unilateral partisan prejudice to a regional approach of intra-independence, initiating a new societal dynamic where morality and good governance in economy and society would open the way for more inclusion of citizens in matters concerning their welfare and destiny.

There have been "track I" and "track II" negotiations between Jordan and Israel; Egypt and Israel; and Jordan, Egypt and Israel - which have over the past ten years demonstrated that such undertakings can produce useful results.


Attitudes to "extremists" and "the other"
The western attitude to Hamas and its translation into action by western governments has not been even-handed. There are groups similar to Hamas in Israel, among western Jews and also among Christians - and for that matter among many religious denominations and political persuasions. But that does not mean that all of the members of such a group are extremists nor does it mean that some of their extreme views cannot be negotiated. Yet, while Hamas is condemned and boycotted by all, similar groups such as those mentioned above are supported in the west, both by the private and public sectors. Legitimising everything that is done on one side and demonising everything that is done by the other side is a historically failed recipe for peace. Even-handedness is a much-needed prescription to address the complicated issues of conflict.


Part Two: Resources, faiths, and refugees
The new state of Palestine must have the capacity to sustain itself and to develop. Without economic viability and the prospect of economic growth, it will turn into a de facto Bantustan for Israel, offering only cheap labour and ultimately a great deal of increasing alienation and suffering. An economically emergent Palestine, beginning with economic and human guarantees for the Palestinians themselves, is the key to stability and peace. Thus, it is indispensable to have an economic-development plan at the ready so that any part of it that would need the mutual cooperation of the two states is taken into account within the proposed peace agreement.

This plan must include such matters as currency convertibility, freedom of movement of goods, access to ports and airports, reduction of restrictions on freedom of movement of people and secure investment opportunities. In addition, joint economic-growth projects must be considered in depth, which would include Jordan in such comprehensive and far-reaching issues as: sharing of water resources, various water and irrigation projects, a joint transportation system (roads, buses and trains) that offer the potential of practically connecting the three states and enhancing their respective economies, joint or shared utilities and other similar sub-regional infrastructure projects (some of which, in the Gaza area, may also involve Egypt). In short, economic interrelationships and mutual economic interests not only make for a healthy neighbourhood but also consolidate peace through real economic empowerment, ultimately translating into real social improvement.


The population-resources equation
This factor must be examined carefully. We must ensure equity in resource- allocation. The production of Jaffa oranges, which are grown with water drawn from the coastal aquifer and from the Jordan River, has resulted in Palestinians being denied access to their traditional water sources. Examples such as this highlight the need to address resource allocation in a comprehensive manner. The territories of historic Palestine are water- and energy-poor; but there are unproven reserves of natural gas in the territorial waters which may be extractable in the future.

Resource allocation will remain a vital issue, not only in the lands of historic Palestine but also in the outer-perimeter countries due to demographic shifts within the region and from outside. The long-standing animosity surronding this protracted conflict has not only barred cooperation between the outer-perimeter countries and Israel on the protection of natural resources, but has adversely impacted these shared resources. For instance, the unilateral actions undertaken by Israel and by Jordan and, separately, by Syria have adversely impacted on the Dead Sea basin including the Jordan River system and the Dead Sea itself.

The population-to-natural-resources equation largely determines the carrying capacity of physical land space. Admittedly, there have been distortions in this equation. The crucial issue of carrying capacity can only be addressed by a supranational authority, because only a supranational authority could be expected to be non-partisan in terms of human, economic and natural resources. Such an authority should in no way proscribe the attainment of final status. Carrying capacity (and recovery capacity for that matter) is a medium-to-long-term policy vision of intra-state and intra-communal relations through a rational utilisation of competing resources. A supranational vision would promote equity where now there is asymmetry, and sharing where now there is dominance by one side over another.

After almost a century of enmity and confrontation, the time has come for a meaningful recovery from human suffering on all sides and for environmental recovery. People's recovery includes their empowerment to fight want, enjoy human rights and exercise democracy; to reap the benefits of societal innovation during the transitional stages; to normalcy of relations between nationalities and between peoples and their systems of government. All this should be underlined by efforts to aid the human capacity to recover from the traumatic effects of protracted conflict. The recovery of natural resources would be possible through regional cooperation in mechanisms such as the proposed community of water and energy and other concepts that promote supranational innovation and interdependence.

It is necessary at this point to emphasise that any move towards economic and social development, in addition to peace-building, must be founded on humanitarian principles, respecting life and dignity. Israel has for too long used might as a right against the Palestinians, looking at Arab and Muslims as the enemy. This must change. Similarly, Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims must learn to look at Israelis and Jews in a positive manner. We must revive the essence of beliefs that existed at the foundation of the Abrahamic faiths, beginning with reclaiming the dignity of the human being. Without that there can be no peace, no reconciliation and no future for this region or beyond.


Jerusalem
The overwhelming historic and spiritual importance of Jerusalem to all Abrahamic faiths and thus to all believers in the world, as well as others for whom Jerusalem and its sites (holy and archaeological) are part of the world's cultural heritage, makes this among the most sensitive issues of the conflict. This is a city with a unique status in the consciousness of the great monotheistic faiths.

Therefore we must confront the challenge of preserving the municipal administration of the city as an integral whole but with rigid observance of equal treatment to all religious denominations and equal participation of representatives of all faith communities in the city's government. This may require special-status legislation for Jerusalem within the context of a municipal administration with independent moral authority above all others in order to guarantee non-discrimination.

Jurisdiction over the walled city of Jerusalem is of vital importance. This issue encompasses the preservation of moral authority for the city in terms of ecumenical communication among the three monotheistic faiths, with no faith impairing the functioning of another. Moreover, the Jordan-Israel peace treaty gives Jordan a specific role in the management of the holy sites of the city, both Muslim and Christian. This requirement recognises the rights of all Arabs, Muslims and Christians, in the management of their holy space. Viewing the city, old and new, merely within the limited and short-sighted parameters of a territorial and political bargaining-chip ignores this important spiritual role and this moral responsibility. The city of Jerusalem, within its spiritual and emotional context, can contribute greatly to recovery, cooperation and the sustainability of peace.

Territories surrounding walled Jerusalem are subject to the provisions governing the fate of the occupied territories. Distrust should be allayed through reconciliatory acts on the ground. The issue of faith communities' right of return to Jerusalem, which also applies to internally-displaced persons, is essential within this context. For example, we could ask what message is sent to the Palestinians of Shu'fat when it is proposed that the town be dislocated from the Greater Jerusalem area in return for its refugees relinquishing their right of return.

Jerusalem and other holy sites have a special significance for the followers of the three Abrahamic faiths as reflected in the faith-based communities living in the region of these holy sites. It is therefore important to be sensitive to the maintenance of these communities as historically relevant and culturally and spiritually irreplaceable and to reject depopulation policies.


On refugees: the right of return
The right to leave and return to one's own state is guaranteed in the international covenant on civil and political rights without discrimination. No discrimination should be used against the Palestinians seeking to come home. This is a binding legal obligation and not merely a principle of justice and equality. The Palestinians' right of return must be recognised in the successor state, namely Israel. That principle has to be recognised even though for a variety of reasons there may be conditions on the exercise of such a right, for example family reunification. For those denied such a right of return, the principle of compensation should be established and the peace treaty should contain a mechanism for such compensation. Those who could not exercise their right of return in the successor state and who have been given compensation should be allowed to settle in the new state of Palestine.

The right of return for Palestinian refugees in accordance with the principles of justice and equality is a primary issue. If the right of return is to be denied to Palestinian refugees and those living in the diaspora, it should equally be denied to non-Israeli Jews living in that diaspora.

There is also an imperative issue of the legal characterisation of the new state of Palestine. It could be considered as a successor state of the original state of Palestine in reliance upon the 1947 partition plan of the general assembly of the United Nations, with respect to the territories occupied by Israel, post-1967, which had been administered by Jordan and by Egypt, acting as de facto trusties of these territories.

Palestinian refugees, displaced and stateless families, scattered across the world, and particularly in neighbouring countries, are a key factor in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The denial of their existence, plight, misery, humanitarian aspirations, dignity and right to lead a normal life in a country of their own would drive the younger generation of refugees, and others, to further despair, frustration and extremism. The ultimate goal of the peace process - to have a durable peace, a stable region and normal and popular acceptance of Israel - cannot be achieved through denial of the refugee issue.

On the other hand, the claim that responding to the Palestinian refugees' aspirations would erase the Jewishness of the state of Israel is simply distorted. Israel itself has stretched the definition of "Jewishness" by practically "importing" people from Sudan, Russia, Ethiopia and South America. Not all of these immigrants can claim a pure Jewish bloodline. The latest studies offer triumphant figures of greater Israeli population growth than Palestinian. Recognising the rights of the refugees, as displaced and stateless persons, is a matter of human, moral and legal importance.

While the implementation of such rights is a matter that involves difficult decisions for a new life, new citizenship, expenses of restarting, and time-span (among other issues), the assumption that time will make the refugees forget their rights and that new generations will be less insistent is an illusion.

Foremost among the rights of refugees is the right to compensation: for those who had to leave as well as those who were expelled over the years or prevented from returning.


Conclusion
This is a conflict which should have run its course. Paradoxically, it has come full circle after over sixty years involving five international wars and a harsh occupation for a large segment of the Palestinian which continues today.

In 1947, a partition plan was proposed which was rejected by the Arab states. Following that the state of Israel was established in 1948. After the first war between the newly-founded state of Israel and the Palestinians and supporting Arab states, armistice agreements were established in 1949, leaving Israel with 23% more of the territory allotted to it by the partition plan. Since then the Palestinians and Arab states at first rejected the state of Israel and shunned peaceful coexistence with it. The subsequent acceptance by treaty of Israel by Egypt and Jordan gives hope that a similar peace treaty will follow with Syria and Lebanon. This would complete the circle of peace between these contiguous states.

To the Palestinians and their Arab supporters, the acceptance of a two-state solution is a return to the partition plan, which was earlier rejected. It is one of the tragedies of humanity that political settlements must sometimes be forged through years of hardship and pain but now that we have reached this point, it is essential to make sure that the two-state solution works. That is why, in addition to peace, we need mechanisms for reconciliation, economic development initiatives, allocation of resources, joint enterprises and mechanisms and structures for effective cooperation between states.

The nature of the future state of Palestine will depend very much on the degree of cooperation and support it gets from the state of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. Laying down the foundations for this sub-regional community will not only be of importance for the economic viability of Palestine, but also for the sub-region's peaceful coexistence, prosperity and security. Just as Palestine needs Israel for its economic development, so Israel needs Palestine for its security, and all four states need to cooperate for a peaceful and prosperous future.

A mere peace agreement cannot be viewed as the sole requirement to achieve a lasting peace. It must be followed by a number of other agreements and mechanisms which further its goals and aspirations. Without these supporting measures, the issues raised in this article and perhaps many more, will fester and the imagined peace will only raise expectations without establishing foundations for its fulfilment. The past offers many examples of such disappointment. Enforcement measures and transitional mechanisms to peace are essential to esure a smooth implementation of a final settlement. These would also provide a confidence-building infrastructure and help deal with future difficulties.

Peace will not endure with just one agreement.


* This article is published by El Hassan bin Talal, and openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence.

Rogue States, the United States,
and Post-Saddam Iraq:
The Cases of Iran and Syria


Antonia Dimou

Working Paper, Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA, May 2003

The U.S. campaign against terrorism that came after the 11 September 2001 attacks and its subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have paved the way for the emergence of two major trends in U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. The first is the socalled multilateral coalition building within the region, and the second deals with the enforcement of a pre-emptive strategy, projected through military or economic means.[1]

Additionally, asymmetrical threats, predominantly in the form of terrorism, have destroyed the myth of fortress America and pointed up the fact that isolationism is no longer an option and that joint efforts between the United States and key Arab states are a prerequisite for the prevention of similar future “operations.”

In this context, this paper will try to present the position and policies of two major rogue states, Iran and Syria, during the Iraq crisis that was accelerated by the U.S.-led military operations against Baghdad. An effort will also be made to describe both states’ concerns and apprehensions over the critical matter of an emerging regional security system in the post-Saddam era.

Additionally, this paper will present the background as well as the body of major issues and preconditions that could set the stage for future U.S.-Syrian and U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Security and counter-terrorism partnerships to maintain regional stability are among the priorities that both Iran and Syria should address as vital prerequisites for their embodiment in the international system and in any regional architecture.

In conclusion, the paper will try to identify the impact of a possible U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Syrian rapprochement on regional groups of states, most prominently the conservative flank represented by Saudi Arabia as well as the moderate side of the region represented by Jordan.

Syria: An emerging regional player
The U.S. military occupation of Iraq might exacerbate old tensions or, alternatively, provide unprecedented opportunities for Syria. The accusations of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Syria was providing Iraq with military equipment during the war, coupled with the threat of sanctions, have given rise to speculations that Syria might be Washington’s next target. However, the imminent use of force against Syria seems to have been ruled out.[2]

The sanctions threat has actually hardened, and the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act was reintroduced in Congress.[3] Notably, the same legislation had 150 supporters in Congress the previous year.[4] The bill demands that Damascus end support for groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, ceases its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and withdraws its military forces from Lebanon.[5] Once passed in the Congress, the legislation will impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria until the U.S. president certifies that the list of demands is fulfilled.

Specifically, failure to comply with the act will lead to punitive sanctions that may include a ban on U.S. companies investing in Syria,[6] freezing of Syrian assets in the United States, and reducing diplomatic contacts.

It is very likely that the bill can be used as an additional diplomatic tool to pressure Syria. Nevertheless, under the present circumstances, sanctions may only have a restraint impact. U.S. economic leverage over Damascus is limited. U.S. aid and military sales are currently barred by law, U.S. flights do not include Syria, and only the U.S. Conoco- Philips oil company is operating in the Arab country. If the United States goes on without the UN and no international sanctions are imposed, the impact on Syria will undoubtedly be minimal.

The list of U.S. demands on Syria clarifies that the regime of Bashar al-Assad is under political pressure to disengage from all the extremist and rejectionist organizations that are based in Damascus. The United States and Syria have a large disagreement in the way they differentiate between “terrorism” and “resistance.” Hamas and Hezbollah [7] are on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. From the Arab perspective, however, including Syria and moderate states like Jordan,[8] the Palestinian and Arab groups, which operate for the sake of Palestinian independence, should not be classified as terrorist organizations. In the eyes of the Arab world, Hamas is a liberation movement against the Israeli occupation while Hezbollah spearheaded the liberation campaign to remove the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon. Thus, a distinction between terror and liberation movements should be made.

Syria has currently ruled out the closure of offices of groups that the United States calls “terrorist.” Similarly, it is not expected to curtail its support for Hezbollah immediately, as it is viewed as a strategic asset in fending off potential Israeli aggression. In the long term however, it is very probable that Syrian support for Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon may become a liability. Since the radical groups’ presence in the Syrian capital has become part of a diplomatic U.S.-Syrian conflict, the organizations’ offices are expected to close down. According to statements of these organization’s officials, such a development will have a minimal impact on Syria and on their course of action, since they mainly operate in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon.[9] It should be mentioned that Damascus has also been the warehouse of opposition groups to the Saddam regime. Among them are the Kurdish factions of Talabani and Barzani as well as the Dawwa Shi’ite Muslim group that has long operated in Northern Iraq.

From a positive perspective, the list of U.S. demands on Syria is concentrated on its constructive role in the emerging new Middle East. Notably, Syria has to start the democratization process that will move the country away from the one-party system, cooperate over the post-Saddam Iraq, revive peace negotiations with Israel, support the Israeli-Palestinian talks, and liberalize its economy.

Concerning the Syrian role in post-Saddam Iraq, there is a widespread sense that the case of Lebanon should not repeat itself. Syria impeded U.S. efforts to turn the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon into a major strategic advance in the region.[10] Syria intervened in Lebanon’s 1975 civil war, kept thousand of troops and ever since, the influence of Damascus on Beirut’s defense and foreign policy has been extremely decisive. Having said that, a “Lebanon strategy” against coalition forces in Iraq is an unwelcome development. Efforts to rebuild Iraq along democratic lines will be hampered if the stability of Iraq cannot be guaranteed or if U.S. troops are in constant danger.[11] Taking for granted that Arabs with Syrian passports have crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border to carry out attacks, Syrian cooperation with the United States over Iraq could possibly pave the way for a smooth transitional period to democracy or at least minimize the danger emanating from Iraq’s western flank.

Syria’s cooperation in the post-September 11 era against the al-Qaeda terrorist group has demonstrated avenues for potential cooperation between Washington and Damascus in the wider Middle East. Syria voted for the UN Resolution 1441 calling on Iraq to disarm but opposed the use of military force. Its opposition to the war stemmed from a combination of national interests and pan-Arab ideals. Furthermore, Syria allied itself with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88 and also supported the U.S.-led first Gulf war in 1991. It is the only country on the State Department’s “terrorism” list that maintains full diplomatic relations with the United States. Although Syria maintained close relations with the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, it never signed a bilateral military pact or granted use of its bases. The late President Hafez al-Assad made sure that he met with all U.S. presidents from Nixon to Clinton, and though Israel occupies the Golan Heights, no attack against the state of Israel has taken place from Syrian territory.[12]

The missing element in the U.S.-Syrian relationship is trust. That is why fears and prejudices must be replaced by the promise of collaboration, and hostilities should be transformed into new partnerships. U.S.-Syrian relations should not be an exception to emerging cooperation in the post-Saddam era. The first public indications of a more accommodating Syrian position were made with the submission of a draft resolution to the UN Security Council, where Syria currently holds a seat, calling for a Middle East free of WMD. The ultimate aim is that the region turns itself into a zone free from weapons, both conventional and nonconventional.

U.S.-Syrian cooperation over Iraq could pave the way for promoting plans for regional security. According to the Syrian position, the alacrity with which the Iraqi military collapsed might have reinforced the fallacy that the same results can be achieved in other countries. That is why the United States should acknowledge its limits and adopt a more moderate approach to settle differences with other states and even enhance shared or one-sided interests, without alienating the world.

As well, U.S.-Syrian cooperation could serve Damascus in preventing an independent Kurdish state, since its emergence could be bad precedent for Syria’s own Kurdish population (11 percent of its total population). Moreover, the resumption of the lucrative Syrian-Iraqi trade ties and of Iraqi oil imports may take place.[13]

On another level, fears of encirclement by states that are neutral or friendly toward the United States and Israel, namely, Turkey, Jordan, and possibly a post-Saddam Iraq, profoundly affects Syrian strategy. Encirclement means that Syria’s leverage with Israel is reduced in a way that turns the U.S.-Syrian rapprochement into a strategic benefit, and the resumption of the Syrian-Israeli peace process useful.[14] In this context, Washington has reportedly asked Egypt to convince Syria to support the Middle East “road map.”[15]

Syria’s influential role in the peace process mainly emanates from its significant leverage with anti-peace radical organizations like Hezbollah and its solid relations with Iran.[16] Syria has maintained strong relations with Iran for the last twenty-four years and is affiliated in the so-called “Axis of Evil.” Iran is the main pillar of support for Hezbollah, founded through a mutual agreement between Syria and Iran to fight Israel.[17] Since the Bush administration considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, Syria is viewed as a state that sponsors terrorism. The United States fears that Hezbollah poses a threat to Israel and to its own security, and that it is only a matter of time before the organization carries out trans-national attacks. This fear is based on what happened in 1983 when 242 U.S. Marines were killed in a Hezbollah member-led suicide attack in Lebanon.[18]

It is interesting, however, that though Tehran would like Damascus to adopt a hard-line policy toward Israel, it has stated officially that it would respect any Syrian decision to establish official diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.[19] Syria has held several peace talks with Israel since 1991, but the negotiations broke down in 2000 over the fate of territories captured by Israel. Even secret Israeli-Syrian contacts have periodically taken place. A case in point is the secret track of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the late President Hafez al-Assad with the mediation of American millionaire Ron Lauder. It was disclosed that Lauder presented Syria a document entitled “Lauder in the name of the Prime Minister of Israel” in September 1998 that contained a proposal to discuss borders that would be based on the 4 June 1967 lines.[20]

It is also interesting to note that while the peace process resumed between Israel and Syria in Washington in December 1999, messages between Israel and Iraq were exchanged. Baghdad had at that time reassured Tel Aviv that since peace negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians were underway, Iraq would have no reservations to working out a relationship with Israel.[21] In light of this past overture, any future decision by the post-Saddam Iraqi regime to restore bilateral relations with Israel will not be new.

Similarly, on Israel’s side, there is a strong lobby that has traditionally called for an end to the state of war with Iraq.[22] For Israel, without Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, the threats on the eastern front will disappear. And since Egypt and Jordan have already signed peace agreements, the Israeli government will be able to concentrate exclusively on the Palestinians.[23]


Iran and its policy of active neutrality
Iran is situated in an unstable neighborhood. It has thus adopted the policy of active neutrality, with the aim of strengthening its role regionally and internationally. This policy can actually be broken down into two parts. The first is a proactive effort to prevent the outbreak of war in the region. The second part deals with Iran’s commitment to resist the use of force through cooperation, in the event of any regional attack such as the U.S.-led military operations against Iraq.

A glimpse of the workings of the Iranian policy of active neutrality can be seen in the Islamic Republic’s position during the recent U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Tehran allegedly provided valuable information to the United States before its attacks on Afghanistan. The Canadian daily National Post revealed that Iranian officials sent a message to Washington through Canada saying that Tehran would not oppose targeted military strikes against those believed responsible for the attacks.[24] As well, Iran’s response to the September 11 attacks with the form of strong condemnations, and its tacit approval of U.S. operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated aspects of the Iranian policy of active neutrality.

For the first time since 1979, Iran and the United States shared a common goal: the destruction of al-Qaida and the ousting of the Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan. It is worth remembering that since 1988, formal discussions among American and Iranian diplomats have occurred over to the Afghan question as part of the Six-Plus-Two group, composed of Afghanistan’s six neighboring states (Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), Russia, and the United States.

During the crisis in Iraq and in accordance with Tehran’s policy of active neutrality, the Iranian authorities have discreetly cooperated with the United States in providing “logistics and transport facilities” to the Iraqi opposition, mostly the Shi’ites in the South and the Kurds in the North. The Iranian side also committed itself to offer U.S. forces basic assistance such as rescuing pilots that might be forced to crash-land in the Iranian territory and permitting the use of Iranian airspace.[25] A small number of soldiers controlled by the al-Badr Brigade were allowed by the Iranians to enter Iraqi Kurdistan to monitor any development that might be detrimental to Iranian national interests.

Specifically, the al-Badr Brigade has held a “token” parade near Suleymanyeh, the “capital” of the region controlled by the Patriotic Union of (Iraqi) Kurdistan. Based in the Southern oil rich province of Khoozestan and near the borders with Iraq, the brigade, made up mostly of Iraqi Shi’ites who fled the violent actions of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, is trained and equipped by Iranian militaries of the Revolutionary Guards. The Badr Brigade, an army estimated at fifteen thousand men, is the military wing of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI), the main Shi’ite opposition organization.

The establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq would be an unwelcome development to Iran. An independent Kurdish state currently seems to be out of the question, partly due to the political pressures exerted by other countries in the region. Apart from Iran, this powerful opposing force includes Syria and Turkey. In a meeting in Turkey on October 2002, President Khatami made a statement according to which the governments of Iran, Syria, and Turkey strongly oppose to an independent Kurdish state.[26] However, autonomy in a federal Iraqi state is an attractive option promoted by the two main Kurdish factions of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, which have improved their relations, reopened their parliament, and drafted a constitution calling for an Iraqi federation of a Kurdish region.

At this stage of the Iraqi issue, Iranians seem to fear fall-out from the war, namely refugees and the possibility of being out of the process of redefining the post-Saddam Iraqi ruling system. Additionally, the Iranian political establishment fears that the United States will turn toward Iran after Iraq. The British-American coalition has tried to reassure Tehran, however. In an interview to Le Monde on 26 March, the British ambassador in Iran confirmed that he personally gave some guarantees to Iranian President Khatami, that “the People’s Mojahedeen, an Iranian opposition group based in Iraq, won’t have a place anymore in the post-Saddam Iraq.” Furthermore, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad delivered a message from Washington to the Iranian clerical leadership in mid-March, according to which the United States does not intend to extend the war on Iraq to Iran.[27]

The possibility of encirclement by U.S. troops seems to pose a direct, physical threat to Iranian national interests. The war in Afghanistan left U.S. troops to the east of Iran, while the result of the war on Iraq could have the Islamic Republic encircled by U.S. troops. Iran is already under pressure from the United States. It has been labelled member of the “Axis of Evil,” and allegations of state-sponsored terrorism, the provision of financial assistance to “terrorist” groups, and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction have been made. Encirclement means that Iran could easily become the next country attacked in the context of the U.S. “war against terrorism.” Even if Washington does not attack, encircling Iran might put pressure on the Islamic Republic to speed up reform processes.

According to statements made by Iranian officials, U.S. military action against Iran does not seem out of the question, especially if, despite international interventions, the Islamic Republic gets closer to completing its nuclear reactors at Bushehr and Natanz. According to them, President Bush’s renewal in the beginning of March of the sanctions imposed eight years ago against the Islamic Republic was a first, hostile step. The sanctions, first put in place by the Clinton administration in March 1995, block Americans, individuals or companies, from financing, supervising, or managing Iran’s oil development projects, as well as from exporting sensitive military equipment to Iran.

Therefore, the religious establishment in Iran seems to argue that if the Islamic Republic developed an atomic weapon, it would not have to worry about the United States one day doing what it has just done to Iraq. It is obvious that Iran’s leaders are much less worried about what happens in Iraq than about the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil” doctrine.

Thus, their recent decision to go public with their nuclear technology was intended not only to impress the neighborhood but also to curtail the chance that Washington might, as a pretense for military action, accuse them of working clandestinely. Iran has oil and gas, so electricity produced by nuclear means does nothing to advance the authority of the regime, but, obviously, in the realpolitik Middle East, nuclear weapons do.

On another level, a democratic post-Saddam regime in Iraq might pressure Iran to provide its people with more democratic reforms. Iranian officials know that democratic developments in Iraq may cross the border. To many analysts, Iran seems ripe at the moment for change. Recently, the Iranian daily Bahar revealed that the religious authorities of Iran have decided to abolish stoning, a punishment reserved in the Islamic Law [28]. The abolishment is widely viewed as a victory of the European Union’s (EU) human-rights delegations that set the ban of this form of punishment as a precondition for the conclusion of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and Iran.

According to these analysts, the ultimate change in Iran, while being expedited by events in neighboring countries or the preconditions set by friendly countries (that is, European states), seems to be currently evolving from within the Iranian society. It is expected that any reform will be founded on Iranian aspirations for democracy, as any foreign intervention in this process might impede the ultimate goal: reforms through an openly exercised, democratic process.

Iran is the sole Islamic democracy of the region that is legitimized through continuous elections. It remains both a political ally in resolving regional disputes and conflicts and a factor that can either stabilize or destabilize the closest regional allies of the United States.[29] The fundamental perceptions of the Islamic school of thought about government and the ruling system in Iran are completely different from the views that prevail in the Arab world. Nevertheless, Islamism continues to pervade as a guide for action and for legitimization of the political process. The legacies of Khomeini’s leadership—consensus formation, coalition building, and factional compromise—have been inherited by his former student and now leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, the Azeri origin supreme religious leader.[30]

The revolutionary zeal and populism in Iran seem to be gone.[31] The re-entry of Iran into regional politics as a legitimate player will change the strategic map of the wider Middle East. Additionally, if the United States and Iran re-establish relations, the supreme religious authorities in Iran may put hostility against Israel on ice.[32] The recent presidential re-election of the moderate cleric Mohammed Khatami has given a boost for further changes within the Islamic Republic. One of the most significant elements is that the current transition is initiated by the same people who played very significant roles during the Revolution of 1979.[33] For the time being, the only ones that may not realize that the Islamic Revolution is coming to an “end” may be certain Western circles that prefer confrontation to cooperation.


Regional impact of U.S.-Iranian and U.S.-Syrian rapprochement
The return of a pro-Western, moderate, oil-rich Iraq as a legitimate member of the international community, along with the gradual restoration of U.S.–Iranian and U.S.–Syrian relations could affect the relative standing of some of the region’s states and contribute to the solidification of a new security arrangement. Having said that, it is to be expected that the so-called conservative group of regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, will face challenges and dangers. Alternatively, however, unprecedented opportunities may be introduced to the moderate group of regional countries that includes Jordan.

Saudi Arabia
The regime change in Iraq may affect Saudi Arabia directly. The Saudi kingdom is expected to gradually lose its importance in U.S. strategic rationale for the Middle East.[34] Total oil reserves in Iraq could exceed Saudi Arabia’s and daily production could reach 10 million barrels, making it the world’s largest producer. In that sense, Iraq might be viewed as a second Saudi Arabia.

The second challenge posed by Iraq to Saudi Arabia is democracy. A secular, democratic Iraq is expected to expose Saudi Arabia’s underdevelopment and corruption. This trend was actually pre-declared and reinforced by certain events such as the al-Khobar bombings and the September 11 attacks.[35]

Saudi Arabia is one of the countries that are currently undergoing severe tests as a consequence of September 11 and the Iraq crisis. Pressure is being exerted on the regime to control the religious establishment and reform, though the religious authorities are in practical terms stronger than the House of the Saud. Modern Saudi Arabia was the product of an alliance struck between a local ruler (Mohammed Ibn Saud) and a religious reformer (Mohammed Abd al-Wahhab).[36] If the Saud political establishment fails to meet the proposed requirements and introduce reforms, the future of the kingdom does not look too bright in political terms.[37]

Additionally, in case Iraqi democratization is enhanced and U.S.-Iranian rapprochement gradually takes place, Saudi Arabia might lose its regional significance to such a degree that a “Balkanization” process starts. According to certain political circles in the region, Saudi Arabia may be split into easily controlled sheikhdoms.[38]

Having said that, one should look at the long-term effects on the region that may lead to the gradual change of the strategic map of the wider Middle East. In the golden fifties, the regional security system supervised by the United States had three distinct pillars: Turkey, Israel, and Iran. The Islamic Revolution contributed to the collapse of this security arrangement. Since then, Saudi Arabia has functioned as the third pillar, replacing Iran.

Despite all that, it seems that the United States has never become completely comfortable with the idea of losing Iran. Nowadays in Iran there is a widespread internal movement that asks for reforms, part of which seem to be accepted and promoted by the Iranian theocratic regime.[39] Besides, Tehran is the sole democracy of the region. Iran possesses a strategic location and by itself constitutes a regional power in military as well as in geopolitical terms that can stabilize the U.S. allies in the region. Given the fact that Saudi Arabia does not comparatively possess the same strengths as Iran, although it has functioned as the third leg of the aforementioned regional security architecture since 1979, the Islamic Republic may get its old position back.


Jordan
Jordan has advocated that a piecemeal approach not be adopted toward Iraq. The main achievement of the Kingdom of Jordan has been its ability to preserve neutrality and avoid violation of the Arab League Charter during the Iraq crisis.[40] Actually, a reorientation and a redefinition of Jordanian neutrality have taken place in almost the same way the Iranian policy of active neutrality has been expressed. Jordan permitted the use of its airspace as well as one of its northern military bases by U.S. forces that had been in the Kingdom to train Jordanian troops on the use of the Patriot missile systems as well as on other logistical affairs.[41]

A direct, negative consequence of the Iraq crisis on Jordan’s economy has been the loss of Iraqi oil. Amman was dependent on Iraqi oil, sold to it at preferential prices. This exclusive, sole source is currently unavailable. In the long term, however, Jordan is expected to extricate its economy from a prolonged slump by providing its products to a huge Iraqi market. Additionally, if relations improve between Iraq and Israel, capital movement is also expected to take place among Jordan, Iraq, and the state of Israel.

According to Jordanian political circles, Jordan’s very survival has been a major trade-off gained by the US administration during the diplomatic and military preparations against Iraq.[42]

Based on existent scenarios relating to the establishment of a post-Saddam ruling system, a constitutional monarchy, either as an umbrella for any newly formed government or as an independent institution, presents a significant option. In this context, and despite the existence of conflicting views,[43] the Hashemite option seems to be an attractive way out. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that monarchy in Iraq, in historic terms, has not been a unifying experience.

The Hashemite option seems viable only if a constitutional monarchy is to be established in Iraq. According to one of the Bush’s advisors, “everything is a matter of priorities after all.” The restoration of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq could undoubtedly work for the long-term benefit of Jordan, since a Hashemite Iraq, along with a Hashemite Jordan, could be unified in economic terms.[44] To move one step further, in case post-Saddam Iraq restores relations with Israel as a first step, and Iran and Syria re-enter the regional economic and security system at a latter stage, the aforementioned unified economic area could extend from Iran to Israel.



Notes
1. This power can be demonstrated in two ways: a) The United States calls the shots and dictates its needs; b) Washington strikes Arab targets (i.e., Iraq) in order to eliminate future problems in the region. Roundtable Discussion, presentation by Edward Walker, Director of the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs under the Clinton administration and former U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, 30 October 2001.
2. Secretary Powell clarified that the United States has no war plans for regime change in any other country, while President Bush has reportedly rejected a contingency plan for an attack on Syria. Moreover, Powell stated that the situation in Syria is not identical to that in Iraq due to the fact that there are diplomatic relations and continued contacts. Al-Nahar (Lebanese daily), 18 April 2003.
3. The act was introduced by Reps. Eliot Engel and Ileana Ros Lehtinen in April 2003.
4. The White House intervened to block the bill last year.
5. President Bush accused Syria of possessing weapons of mass destruction without specifying whether they are developed in Syria or received from Iraq as alleged by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
6. U.S. exports and investments are banned, with the exception of foodstuffs and medicine.
7. U.S. congressmen have differentiated their stance toward Hezbollah by saying that the organization’s humanitarian and governmental actions are legal and that any other Lebanese group has the right to resist the occupation of its territory in line with UN resolutions. The four-member U.S. Congressional delegation toured the Middle East in 2001 and comprised Darrell Issa (R-California), John Cooksey (RLouisiana), Brian Kerns (R-Indiana), and Nick Rahall (D-West Virginia). See “Arab-American Congressman: Hezbollah Legitimate,” Tehran Times, 19
November 2001.
8. Statements made by Jordanian Minister of State Saleh Qallab. Moreover, the U.S. request to freeze assets of these organizations is not applicable to Jordan because neither group maintains bank accounts in Jordanian financial institutions.
9. Washington Post, 20 April 2003, and Al-Rai (Jordanian daily), 20 April 2003.
10. Jim Lobe, “Calls to Attack Syria Come from a Familiar Choir of Hawks,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 16 April 2003. Available at http://www.fpif.org.
11. Jerusalem Post, “Editorial: The Turkish Treatment,” 16 April 2003.
12. Amir Taheri, “Who’s Next? No One and Everyone,” Arab News, 11 April 2003.
13. U.S. officials announced that the oil pipeline from Basra to Syria was cut, ending the flow of 150 thousand barrels per day at a price of $5 a barrel. Moreover, trade between Syria and Iraq reached 5 billion dollars the period 1998–2000.
14. Al-Hayat (international Arabic daily), 20 April 2003.
15. Al-Rai, 21 April 2003.
16. Alon Ben-Meir, “The Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace,” Middle East Policy 3, No.1 (1994).
17. Military equipment is transferred to Hezbollah from Iran through Syria.
18. Ali Shukri, “The Syrian Factor,” 17 April 2003. Available at http:///www.opendemocracy.net.
19. Iran News Agency (IRNA), 25 January 2001.
20. Akiva Eldar, “Who Really Stopped Ron Lauder?” Ha’aretz (Israeli daily), 20 January 2000.
21. The reassurance came unofficially from senior Iraqi politician Tareq Aziz. Foreign Report, “Watch Iraq,” 14 December 1999.
22. This lobby includes Labor party politicians Moshe Shahal and Eliahu (Fuad) Bin Eliezer. Ibid.
23. Interview conducted in Jordan, December 2002.
24. At the same time, Iran’s supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei advised the United States against a full-scale war in Afghanistan. “Iran Argues for UN-led Coalition Against Terror,” Reuters, 18 September 2001.
25. Iran Press Service, 10 December 2002.
26. Agence France Presse, 15 October 2002.
27. Iran Press Service, 16 March 2003.
28. The newspaper quoted Hojjatoleslam Qorbanali Dorri Najafabadi, the head of the Supreme Court of Administrative Justice, who said that the practice of stoning has been abolished.
29. Thomas M. Ricks, “Power Politics and Political Culture: U.S.-Iran Relations,” in Samih Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhni, Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran, 1992), 254.
30. The leader has the power to dismiss the president but he will not do so as long as his position is not threatened. The leader’s right is included in the Iranian Constitution.
31. The extremist and moderate as well as the pragmatic and doctrinaire trends have tended to coalesce. All have realized that highly sensitive ideological politics have proven detrimental to the interests of the state. Consequently, all concurred that in order to survive they must opt for a balanced political course and provide tangible benefits for their constituencies. The new leadership faced a dilemma on how to reconcile the ideas of Khomeini with their own vision. The relationship between the two ideological doctrines and state interests is complex. A first step in approaching this delicate relationship was made with the 1988 decrees that set up a Council for
Maintaining and Protecting the Interests of the System (Shura Ta’amiin va Hifz Manafe Sistam), the Council for Discussing Plan Priorities (Shura Tashkhiis Maslehate Nidham) and the Council to Review the Constitution in 1989 (Shura Baaznigari Qanoun Assasi). Manochehr Dorraj, “Populism and Corporatism in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Political Culture,” in Farsoun and Mashayekhni, op.cit., 150–51.
32. “Possible Washington-Tehran Dialogue?” Cosmos 2, No. 4, (Nov/Dec 1997), newsletter, Institute of International Relations, Athens. Moreover, former Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy revealed in an interview with Yediot Aharonot the establishment of a secret forum of dialogue between Iran and Israel in the late 1990s. The aim was to explore ways to decrease tension in bilateral relations as well as to use the influence of the powerful Israeli lobby in Washington so that a gradual lifting of the sanctions (ILSA) imposed on Iran takes place.
33. “Reassessing the Iranian Revolution, 1979–1999,” Cosmos 2, No.10 (Nov/Dec 1998), newsletter, Institute of International Relations, Athens.
34. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
35. James Joghby, “A Non-Story and the U.S.-Saudi Relationship,” Jordan Times, 3 December 2002.
36. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (Beirut: Libraire du Liban, 1968), 39.
37. Interview conducted in Syria, December 2002.
38. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
39. Op. cit., n. 6.
40. All Arab countries are signatories to the Arab League Defense Policy that is similar to NATO.
41. Interview of King Abdalalh II of Jordan with CNN’s Larry King, “Live on Iraq,” 27 March 2003.
42. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.
43. The Hashemite option is supported by the Pentagon, while the State Department sustains a more conservative approach. Interview conducted in Jordan, November 2002.
44. Interview conducted in Jordan, January 2003.

Wednesday, November 28, 2007



ANATOLIAN EAGLE

Τουρκικός «αετός» στην υπηρεσία της υπερδύναμης…

της Αντωνίας Δήμου,

Περιοδικό Στρατηγική, Τεύχος Οκτωβρίου 2007


Η τρέχουσα κρίση στις σχέσεις του Ιράν με τις ΗΠΑ και τη Δύση γενικότερα, με αφορμή τις πυρηνικές φιλοδοξίες της Τεχεράνης, σε συνδυασμό με την επιτυχή εκτόξευση του ιρανικού βαλλιστικού πυραύλου Shahab-3 εμβέλειας 1.300 χλμ. ικανού να πλήξει το Ισραήλ, το Αφγανιστάν, το Πακιστάν, την Ανατολική Τουρκία και τα αμερικανικά στρατεύματα στην Σαουδική Αραβία, προσδίδει στην άσκηση «Αετός της Ανατολίας» κεντρικό ρόλο. Η διεξαγωγή της καταδεικνύει την αξία της Άγκυρας για την στρατηγική της Ουάσιγκτον, παρά τις τριβές στις διμερείς σχέσεις ΗΠΑ-Τουρκίας.

Η αεροπορική συνεκπαίδευση με την ονομασία «Αετός της Ανατολίας» (Anatolian Eagle) είναι πολυεθνική άσκηση αέρος-εδάφους και αέρος-αέρος η οποία κατά κύριο λόγο διεξάγεται στο πεδίο βολής του Ικονίου στη Νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία. Το πεδίο βολής του Ικονίου διαθέτει συνολική έκταση 20.000 τ.μ. και βρίσκεται σε κοντινή απόσταση από την 3η κύρια ομώνυμη αεροπορική βάση.

Η πρόσφατη Anatolian Eagle που πραγματοποιήθηκε τον περασμένο Ιούνιο (2007) και ήταν ανοικτή στις αεροπορικές δυνάμεις των χωρών-μελών του ΝΑΤΟ, περιλάμβανε Τούρκους αεροπόρους και αεροσκάφη έγκαιρης προειδοποίησης και ελέγχου του ΝΑΤΟ καθώς και αεροσκάφη εναέριου ανεφοδιασμού που επαυξάνουν το επιχειρησιακό βεληνεκές των μαχητικών αεροσκαφών. Ταυτόχρονα, περιλήφθηκε η χρησιμοποίηση των Συστημάτων Σχεδιασμού Αερομαχιών (ACME). Πρόκειται για ισραηλινά συστήματα που αποκτήθηκαν σχετικά πρόσφατα από την τουρκική αεροπορία, τα οποία διαθέτουν την δυνατότητα ταυτόχρονης μεταφοράς εναέριων εικόνων από τα μαχητικά αεροσκάφη στα κέντρα επιχειρήσεων. Συγκεκριμένα, η 12ήμερη άσκηση προέβλεπε καθημερινές αποστολές 50 περίπου αεροσκαφών από την βάση του Ικονίου. Προσέφερε στους χειριστές των χωρών που μετείχαν στην άσκηση τη δυνατότητα διεξαγωγής αεροπορικών παιγνίων όπου σύμφωνα με Δελτίο Τύπου της τουρκικής Αεροπορίας (THK), οι Τούρκοι χειριστές που είχαν αναλάβει το ρόλο του «εχθρού» που υποδύονταν ότι πετούσαν με ρωσικής κατασκευής MiG-29 Fulcrums και Sukhoi Su-27 Flankers καθώς επίσης επεχείρησαν επιθέσεις αέρος-εδάφους και έβαλαν ενάντια σε αντιαεροπορικά συστήματα. Οι λοιπές χώρες που μετείχαν ήταν οι ΗΠΑ με 120 άνδρες, η Ιορδανία και το Πακιστάν. Αντικειμενικός σκοπός ήταν η διεξαγωγή και εκτέλεση δύο συνδυασμένων αεροπορικών επιχειρήσεων (Combined Air Operations - COMAO) ανά ημέρα. Η Γαλλία μετείχε με πέντε Mirage F1 CT από την μοίρα μαχητικών «Normandie-Niémen».

Η Ουάσιγκτον επιθυμεί τη συνεργασία της Τουρκίας αφενός για τον έλεγχο των ενεργειακών αποθεμάτων της ευρύτερης περιοχής, και αφετέρου για την προστασία των αμερικανικών στρατευμάτων που είναι ανεπτυγμένα στην Μέση Ανατολή, αλλά εμμέσως και του Ισραήλ.

Η πολυεθνής αεροπορική άσκηση «Αετός της Ανατολίας» διεξάγεται στα πρότυπα των -υψηλού επιπέδου- αμερικανικών συνεκπαιδεύσεων (ασκήσεων ετοιμότητας) με την επωνυμία «Ερυθρή Σημαία» (Red Flag) που πραγματοποιούνται στην έρημο της Νεβάδας. Οι Τούρκοι φιλοδοξούν το πεδίο βολής του Ικονίου να αναδειχθεί σε διεθνές εκπαιδευτικό κέντρο, το τρίτο μεγαλύτερο στον κόσμο έπειτα από το πεδίο Goosebay του Καναδά και αυτό της Νεβάδας στις ΗΠΑ. Η συγκεκριμένη τοποθεσία έχει προεπιλεγεί ως πεδίο διεξαγωγής αεροπορικών ασκήσεων, αλλά και ως εικονικό πεδίο μάχης το οποίο έχει ήδη τεθεί σε πλήρη επιχειρησιακή λειτουργία από το 2004, οπότε και ολοκληρώθηκαν η εγκατάσταση αντιαεροπορικών συστημάτων, συστημάτων έγκαιρης προειδοποίησης, καθώς και η κατασκευή των πεδίων βολής. Ο τουρκικός στρατιωτικός μηχανισμός έχει εντάξει και μια «επιχειρηματική» διάσταση στο σχεδιασμό της αξιοποίησής του: επιδιώκει την απόσπαση οικονομικού οφέλους συνολικού ύψους 40 εκατ. δολαρίων, σε κάθε άσκηση, ως αντίτιμο για την εκπαίδευση των χειριστών μαχητικών αεροσκαφών από χώρες-μέλη του ΝΑΤΟ αλλά και φιλικά περιφερειακά κράτη.

Στη διάρκεια των ασκήσεων, κέντρο επιχειρήσεων που δημιουργείται ad hoc στο πεδίο του Ικονίου κατευθύνει τις επιχειρήσεις μέσω ηλεκτρονικών υπολογιστών. Μεταξύ άλλων, το κέντρο επιχειρήσεων αποστέλλει απροειδοποίητα εικονικά σήματα εκτόξευσης βαλλιστικών πυραύλων, ώστε να καταστεί εφικτός ο έλεγχος των συστημάτων εντοπισμού της απειλής σε πραγματικό χρόνο και να τεθεί σε λειτουργία η αντιβαλλιστική άμυνα. Θα μπορούσε να υποστηριχτεί ότι η συνολική λειτουργία του κέντρου επιχειρήσεων κατορθώνει να διατηρεί και τους χειριστές των αεροσκαφών των κρατών που μετέχουν στην άσκηση σε συνεχή μαχητική ετοιμότητα.

Στα αεροπορικά παίγνια συμπεριλαμβάνονται ασκήσεις βομβαρδισμού και αντιμετώπιση εχθρικών δυνάμεων με εικονικούς πυραύλους εδάφους-αέρος. Τα σενάρια της άσκησης προβλέπουν την εκτόξευση πυραύλων από κράτη όπως η Συρία, το Ιράκ και το Ιράν, οι οποίοι εντοπίζονται από ραντάρ και στη συνέχεια αναχαιτίζονται και καταστρέφονται εικονικά από αντιπυραυλικά συστήματα όπως το Arrrow ΙΙ, κατά την αρχική φάση εκτόξευσης (boost phase). Πρόκειται ουσιαστικά για την απτή εφαρμογή του αμερικανικού προγράμματος της αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας (NMD-National Missile Defense). Οι αεροπορικές εμπλοκές που διεξάγονται καταγράφονται σε μαγνητική ταινία ώστε μετά το πέρας των ασκήσεων οι χειριστές των αεροσκαφών αφενός να εντοπίσουν τα επιχειρησιακά τους σφάλματα, και αφετέρου να μελετήσουν τους υφιστάμενους και να προτείνουν νέους τακτικούς ελιγμούς, οι οποίοι σε πραγματικές συνθήκες πολέμου μπορούν να αυξήσουν την επιβιωσιμότητα (surveivability) των μαχητικών αεροσκαφών σε τέτοιου είδους επιχειρήσεις.

Αντιπυραυλική άμυνα (NMD)

Η αεροπορική άσκηση «Αετός της Ανατολίας» αποτελεί την επεξεργασία και επαλήθευση του θεωρητικού μοντέλου στο οποίο βασίζεται η υλοποίηση του αμερικανικού προγράμματος της αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας (NMD). Ο πυρήνας του δόγματος της αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας επικεντρώνεται στην ύπαρξη νέου στρατηγικού περιβάλλοντος το οποίο επιτάσσει την συνδυασμένη έρευνα και ανάπτυξη συστημάτων αναχαίτισης βαλλιστικών πυραύλων μεγάλου βεληνεκούς, με σκοπό το δραστικό περιορισμό της απειλής που συνιστά η ύπαρξη όπλων μαζικής καταστροφής (WMD) στη νατοϊκή περιφέρεια.

Η αντιπυραυλική άμυνα έχει ήδη προσλάβει περιφερειακή διάσταση στο πλαίσιο της οποίας ενσωματώνονται το Ισραήλ, η Τουρκία, ΝΑΤΟϊκά και μουσουλμανικά περιφερειακά κράτη, υπό την εποπτεία της Ουάσιγκτον. Η πολυεθνής συνεργασία στο αντιπυραυλικό πρόγραμμα αποτυπώνεται σε μία σειρά γεγονότων όπως στη συγκατάθεση του τουρκικού στρατιωτικού μηχανισμού να τοποθετηθούν οι «απαραίτητες» εγκαταστάσεις στο έδαφος της Τουρκίας, και την ενίσχυση της τουρκικής αεράμυνας με συστήματα Patriot (PAC-3) που διαθέτει αντιβαλλιστικές δυνατότητες. Ταυτόχρονα, επανέρχεται στο προσκήνιο το ζήτημα απόκτησης από την Άγκυρα του αντιβαλλιστικού συστήματος Arrow ΙΙ με τη μεσολάβηση του Ισραήλ, καθώς το εν λόγω σύστημα, προϊόν αμερικανοϊσραηλινής συμπαραγωγής, υπόκειται στις αμερικανικές περιοριστικές διατάξεις που απαγορεύουν τη μεταφορά τεχνολογίας και τεχνογνωσίας σε τρίτες χώρες. Το συγκεκριμένο θέμα αποτελεί προτεραιότητα στην ατζέντα των περιοδικών συνομιλιών των στρατιωτικών μηχανισμών Τουρκίας-Ισραήλ και στο πλαίσιο αυτό εξετάζεται η δημιουργία κοινής αντιπυραυλικής ομπρέλας με έδρα την τουρκική επικράτεια, η οποία προτείνεται να ενσωματώσει το αντιβαλλιστικό σύστημα Arrow ΙΙ, επωφελούμενη από το ισχυρό ραντάρ του συστήματος, το Green Pine.

Η περιφερειακή διάσταση

Η σπουδαιότητα που αποδίδεται στις αεροπορικές συνεκπαιδεύσεις «Αετός της Ανατολίας» αποκτά ιδιαίτερη βαρύτητα λόγω της διατυπωμένης πρόθεσης ίδρυσης Περιφερειακού Κέντρου Επιχειρησιακής Ετοιμότητας στην Νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία, το οποίο μπορεί να συνδράμει στην υλοποίηση ποικίλων αμερικανικών σχεδιασμών που αφορούν στην περιοχή. Ειδικότερα, η αεροπορική βάση του Ικονίου εκτιμάται ότι καταλαμβάνει κομβικό ρόλο τους σχεδιασμούς του αμερικανικού Πενταγώνου, καθώς μπορεί δυνητικά να χρησιμοποιηθεί παράλληλα με την αντίστοιχη βάση στο Ιντσιρλίκ ως βάση για μελλοντικές αεροπορικές επιχειρήσεις σε κράτη, όπως το Ιράν. Όλα αυτά ωστόσο τελούν υπό την αίρεση της εκάστοτε πολιτικής-διπλωματικής συγκυρίας, η οποία σήμερα διαφέρει κατά πολύ από την αντίστοιχη του 2001 και του 2002.

Η συγκεκριμένη άσκηση έχει ήδη διασπάσει τη «εκτεταμένη Μέση Ανατολή» (από τις ακτές της Βόρειας Αφρικής μέχρι το Πακιστάν) σε δύο μέτωπα: η πρώτη «σκληροπυρηνική» ομάδα κρατών αποτελείται από το Ιράν και τη Ρωσία, ενώ η δεύτερη θεωρούμενη ως «μετριοπαθής» ομάδα περιλαμβάνει χώρες όπως η Ιορδανία και το Πακιστάν (μετριοπαθές ως προς την αντιμετώπιση των σχέσεων με την Ουάσιγκτον). Από την σκληροπυρηνική ομάδα, η Ρωσία ως καθοριστικός συντελεστής της εξίσωσης ασφαλείας στην ευρύτερη περιοχή της Κεντρικής Ασίας και του Καυκάσου προσεγγίζει την προοπτική οικοδόμησης περιφερειακού συστήματος αντιβαλλιστικής άμυνας με ιδιαίτερο σκεπτικισμό, καθόσον η γεωγραφική εγγύτητα της Μόσχας με την Άγκυρα απειλεί να θέσει την πρώτη υπό τον «έλεγχο» της Τουρκίας και των ΗΠΑ. Ο ρωσικός παράγοντας επεδίωκε, αλλά δεν πέτυχε, την ενσωμάτωση του ζητήματος της αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας στο πλαίσιο του Δομικού Μηχανισμού Διαβουλεύσεων (SCM), η σύσταση του οποίου αποφασίστηκε στην διάρκεια της επίσκεψης του τότε Ρώσου ΥΠΕΞ Ιγκόρ Ιβάνοφ που πραγματοποιήθηκε στην Άγκυρα τον Ιούνιο 2001. Η ρωσική πλευρά αποσκοπούσε ουσιαστικά στην προσέγγιση του θέματος της αντιβαλλιστικής άμυνας ως του τμήματς ενός ευρύτερου διαλόγου που θα συμπεριλάμβανε ζητήματα περιφερειακού ενδιαφέροντος με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση στην περιοχή της Κεντρικής Ασίας και της ευρύτερης Μέσης Ανατολής. Η προώθηση του αμερικανικού προγράμματος αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας άνευ ουσιαστικών διαβουλεύσεων με τη ρωσική πλευρά έχει προκαλέσει αναπόφευκτα την αντίδραση της Μόσχας που επανακάμπτει στο διεθνές προσκήνιο κάνοντας ιδιαίτερα αισθητή την παρουσία της και στην περιοχή της Μέσης Ανατολής.

Από την μετριοπαθή πτέρυγα, η Ιορδανία συνιστά την «αραβική προέκταση» της περιφερειακής σύμπραξης Τουρκίας-ΗΠΑ. Η στάση του Αμάν στο ζήτημα της ανάπτυξης του αμερικανικού προγράμματος αντιπυραυλικής άμυνας και της διεξαγωγής της πολυεθνικής αεροπορικής άσκησης εμφανίζεται ιδιαίτερα θετική. Και τούτο διότι η Ιορδανία αποτελεί ενεργό μέλος της ευρύτερης πολιτικής «security for peace» που εφαρμόστηκε η οποία προβλέπει, μεταξύ άλλων, την ενεργό στήριξη της Ουάσιγκτον για την απόκτηση αεροσκαφών F-16, συστημάτων αντιαεροπορικής άμυνας καθώς και εξοπλισμού χημικής και βιολογικής προστασίας, χωρίς βεβαίως να παραγνωρίζεται η προσφορά του Τελ Αβίβ για την αεροπορική κάλυψη του Αμάν με το προηγμένο αντιβαλλιστικό σύστημα Arrow II που διαθέτει.

Η ιστορία της άσκησης

Η άσκηση πραγματοποιήθηκε για πρώτη φορά την περίοδο 16-29 Ιουνίου 2001 με τη συμμετοχή της Τουρκίας, του Ισραήλ και των ΗΠΑ. Στη διάρκεια των συνεκπαιδεύσεων «Αετός της Ανατολίας Ι», η αμερικανική παρουσία αποτυπώθηκε με τη συμμετοχή αεροσκαφών F-16 τα οποία εδρεύουν στην τουρκική βάση του Ιντσιρλίκ (Incirlik), αεροσκαφών F-16CJs της 22ης Πολεμικής Αεροπορικής Μοίρας, αξιωματούχων της 37ης Μοίρας Αερομεταφορών καθώς και του Πεδίου Πολυγωνικού Ηλεκτρονικού Πολέμου (Polygon Electronic Warfare Range) με έδρα την βάση Ραμστάιν (Ramstein) στη Γερμανία, αλλά και της 4ης Ομάδας Υποστήριξης Αεροπορικών Επιχειρήσεων που εδρεύει στην Χαϊδελβέργη της ίδιας χώρας.

Αρχικά, η άσκηση διεξαγόταν μία φορά το χρόνο. Τα κίνητρα της τριμερούς τότε αεροπορικής συνεκπαίδευσης, μερικά εκ των οποίων εξακολουθούν να ισχύουν και σήμερα, συνοψίζονται:
1. Στην οικοδόμηση συστήματος ασφάλειας το οποίο επιδιωκόταν να θέσει την περιοχή της Κεντρικής Ασίας και του Καυκάσου υπό την σφαίρα επιρροής της Τουρκίας, του Ισραήλ και των ΗΠΑ με σκοπό την γεωπολιτική κυριαρχία, περιορίζοντας δραστικά τον ρόλο της Ρωσίας και του Ιράν σε αυτή.
2. Στην ανάδειξη της Άγκυρας σε περιφερειακό κέντρο για την αποτροπή της εκτόξευσης ή την αντιμετώπιση βαλλιστικών πυραύλων μακρού βεληνεκούς, καθόσον στο πλαίσιο της αμερικανικής «αντιπυραυλικής στρατηγικής», η Τουρκία αποτελεί το ανατολικό άκρο της βορειοατλαντικής συμμαχίας (ΝΑΤΟ) στο σταυροδρόμι της Μέσης Ανατολής, της Κεντρικής Ασίας και του Καυκάσου.
3. Στην ισραηλινή πρόσκτηση στρατηγικού βάθους, καθώς ο τουρκικός εναέριος χώρος εκλαμβάνεται ως η ανύπαρκτη ενδοχώρα του Τελ Αβίβ με δυνατότητα χρήσης των αεροπορικών βάσεων Ικονίου και Ιντσιρλίκ. Χαρακτηριστική είναι η αποστολή και συμμετοχή ισραηλινών αεροσκαφών F-15 και F-16 σε μηνιαίες εκπαιδευτικές ασκήσεις που πραγματοποιούνται στις προαναφερθείσες βάσεις.
4. Στην προώθηση της εμπορικής στρατηγικής των ΗΠΑ για την προμήθεια αμερικανικών οπλικών συστημάτων με τη μεσολάβηση του Ισραήλ, την ανταλλαγή στρατιωτικών πληροφοριών καθώς και τη συνεκμετάλλευση προηγμένων συστημάτων ηλεκτρονικής κατασκοπείας.
5. Στην αποστολή μηνύματος με αποδέκτες περιφερειακά αραβικά κράτη όπως ο Λίβανος και η Ιορδανία είτε για τη σταδιακή είτε για την πλήρη ενσωμάτωσή τους στον τριεθνή «συνεταιρισμό», ο οποίος προβάλλονταν επικοινωνιακά και ως πολυεπίπεδη σχέση του Ισραήλ, με ένα μη-αραβικό αλλά σε κάθε περίπτωση μουσουλμανικό κράτος, δηλαδή την Τουρκία.

Από το 2002 και εντεύθεν, η αεροπορική άσκηση «Αετός της Ανατολίας» άλλαξε τον τριεθνή της χαρακτήρα εντασσόμενη στον εκπαιδευτικό προγραμματισμό του ΝΑΤΟ, και πραγματοποιείται δύο φορές ετησίως και σε κομβικές για την ευρύτερη περιοχή περιόδους, χωρίς μάλιστα κάποιες φορές την ενεργό συμμετοχή του Ισραήλ. Ενδεικτική είναι η άσκηση «Αετός της Ανατολίας ΙΙΙ» που διεξήχθη το διάστημα 7-28 Οκτωβρίου 2002 με τη συμμετοχή της Βρετανίας και των Ηνωμένων Αραβικών Εμιράτων (ΗΑΕ) και εντάχθηκε στο πλαίσιο των τότε αμερικανικών στρατιωτικών προετοιμασιών για την εισβολή στο Ιράκ.

Το «ανεπιθύμητο» Ισραήλ

Ο αποκλεισμός του Τελ Αβίβ αποδίδεται στις έντονες πιέσεις που δέχθηκαν και εξακολουθούν να δέχονται οι ΗΠΑ και η Τουρκία τόσο από κράτη της Μέσης Ανατολής όσο και από το εσωτερικό τους μέτωπο. Δε θα μπορούσε να είναι διαφορετικά σε μία περίοδο κατά την οποία το ισραηλινο-παλαιστινιακό αδιέξοδο έχει κορυφωθεί. Η συγκεκριμένη αλλαγή μάλιστα στον χαρακτήρα της άσκησης, όπου το Ισραήλ παρότι δεν μετέχει ενεργά συνήθως συμμετέχει με το καθεστώς του παρατηρητή, αποτέλεσε απόσταγμα των θέσεων τόσο του τουρκικού Επιτελείου Στρατού όσο και του υπουργείου Εξωτερικών (ΥΠΕΞ). Το τουρκικό ΥΠΕΞ εξαρχής θεωρούσε ότι η ένταξη της Άγκυρας στο αντιπυραυλικό πρόγραμμα θα έπρεπε να προχωρήσει στο πλαίσιο του ΝΑΤΟ απορρίπτοντας την ισραηλινή πρόταση για τη δημιουργία κοινής τριεθνούς αντιβαλλιστικής ομπρέλας. Η θέση του τουρκικού ΥΠΕΞ καθορίστηκε με γνώμονα τη συνεχή βελτίωση στις διμερείς σχέσεις της Άγκυρας με γειτονικά κράτη όπως η Συρία, τα οποία αντιλαμβάνονταν το πρόγραμμα ως ανοικτή πρόκληση και εν δυνάμει απειλή που στρέφονταν ενάντια στα εθνικά τους συμφέροντα.

Ταυτόχρονα, το τουρκικό Γενικό Επιτελείο θεωρούσε αναπόφευκτη όσο και απαραίτητη την ενεργό σύμπραξη της Άγκυρας τόσο με το Τελ Αβίβ όσο και με περιφερειακές μουσουλμανικές χώρες, παράλληλα με τη συνεργασία με τις Συμμαχικές χώρες, καθόσον θεωρεί ότι περιβάλλεται από εν δυνάμει εχθρικά κράτη όπως το Ιράν το οποίο βρίσκεται στο στάδιο της παραγωγής πυραύλων Shahab-3 με δυνατότητα εξέλιξής τους σε διηπειρωτικούς πυραύλους, καθώς και στο στάδιο της έρευνας και ανάπτυξης η οποία μπορεί να οδηγήσει την Τεχεράνη στην παραγωγή μη συμβατικών όπλων το αμέσως προσεχές χρονικό διάστημα.

Tuesday, November 27, 2007


Emerging Structural Changes
in the Eastern Mediterranean:
The Greece-Israel-Cyprus Partnership



Antonia Dimou*

Working Paper, Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA, December 2003


With the events of 11 September 2001 and the recent war on Iraq, international politics have undergone a fundamental transformation. The structures of power and influence in world affairs are altered. The rise of Islamic radicalism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the wider Middle East reflect major issues of the post-war Iraq era.


Due to the complex situations and competing political, strategic, and ideological interests that penetrate the region, Islamic radicalism and WMD present not only a dangerous escalation but also a major impediment to a comprehensive regional security settlement.


Changes in the regional security environment that have resulted from the war on Iraq seem also to have repercussions in the Mediterranean region. The debate over regional security is intensified. Increasingly, European security is linked to Mediterranean security and stability. Despite the diversity of the countries in the Mediterranean and the challenges they face, there is a clear connection between them, stemming mainly from their growing interdependence. In this context, a cooperative approach favoring dialogue seems to be a must in security matters.


That said, the objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of establishing a Greece-Israel-Cyprus relationship that may develop as a vital pillar of any security sub-system in the Eastern Mediterranean. One of the partnership’s main objectives could focus on keeping Islamic extremism and WMD proliferation restraint.



The background of Greece-Israel-Cyprus relations
Cyprus has had diplomatic relations with Israel since 1960, and an Israeli ambassador was resident in Nicosia. Cyprus resisted Arab pressures to sever relations with the state of Israel. For decades, the island provided the only window for Israel to the Western world.


Cyprus upgraded its relations with Israel by sending an ambassador in 1994. A number of economic and cultural agreements were signed in the mid-1990s, and Nicosia concluded several deals by purchasing military equipment from Tel Aviv.[1]

The history of their bilateral relations, however, has a dark chapter because of several incidents that raised Cypriot and Greek concerns over the partnership that Israel has developed with Turkey. For example, the Cyprus government captured two Israeli Mossad agents who were suspected of gathering intelligence on behalf of Turkey about the deployment of Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus.[2] It was also revealed that Turkish pilots have been trained on a specially-designed Israeli training range in the Negev desert,[3] including how to attack the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system that the Cyprus government had purchased from Moscow in September 1998.[4] The system’s deployment in the island was canceled under U.S. pressure.[5]


A warmer era in bilateral relations was marked by the first exchange of presidential visits. Israeli President Ezer Weiztman visited Cyprus in November 1998 and Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides reciprocated in March 2000.

In terms of Greek–Israeli relations, a military agreement was concluded as early as December 1994.[6] Both sides however, refrained from activating the agreement for a number of reasons. The most prominent was the Greek unwillingness to disturb the very good relations that Athens maintains with the majority of the Arab states and Iran. The Arab world has traditionally reciprocated on issues that Greece considers vital national interests, notably the problem of Cyprus.[7] Another, equally important factor was the postponement of scheduled joint naval maneuvers.[8] The Greek–Israeli military agreement of 1994 had provided for joint naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, training in each other’s airspace, and cooperation between the military industries, arms sales, and intelligence exchanges.[9]


It should be pointed out that Israel had concluded its first military agreement with its neighbor Greece with the objective of breaking its isolation from the wider region. Israel wanted to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Athens, to sell high-tech weapons systems to the Hellenic Armed Forces, and to promote joint military industrial ventures in order to penetrate the European and Balkan markets and others elsewhere.


The Greek–Israeli rapprochement was highlighted when an Israeli rescue team participated in the search-and-rescue operations that were carried out after the Athens earthquake of September 1999.[10] The rapprochement was also marked by the Greek mediation efforts for the release of Israelis who were captured by pro-Iranian Islamic organizations as well as on behalf of the thirteen Israelis captured by the Iranian authorities on charges of conspiracy against Tehran.[11]


During the last decade, it has become clear that the geographic location of Greece at the crossroads of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Europe as well as its stable macroeconomic environment are important features, making necessary the cooperation of the Israeli and Greek defense industries. This cooperation aims at the promotion of weapons systems exports to the Balkans and the European market.[12]


Greek–Israeli relations have experienced an apparent reversal of their previous historic coolness. A security partnership to maintain regional stability is among the priorities of both states. In fact, both countries wish to participate in a new era of cooperation. Many past Greek suspicions about Israel’s ties with other states, notably Turkey, seem to have been replaced by an understanding of the motivations behind the partnerships. Similarly, Israel understands the special Greek relationship with the Arab states.[13]


In May 2000, the first Greek official presidential visit to Israel took place, and President Stefanopoulos expressed willingness for a boost in the military as well as the economic cooperation between the two states. Moreover, Foreign Minister Papandreou has not ruled out a possible strategic triangle among Greece, Israel, and Turkey.[14]



Motivations and regional implications
In the post-Iraq war era, the long-term interest of the West remains the strengthening of Western-oriented states in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Mediterranean
is today the place where many of the main challenges faced by the international community occur, notably security, peace and war, and the relationship between democracy and development. The situations in Cyprus and the Middle East receive particular attention in the context of resolving Mediterranean conflicts.


In this geopolitical framework, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece may become important blocks in any defense architecture. Additionally, the gradual harmonization of Greek–Turkish relations is significant and constitutes an important element in the security of Israel, a state surrounded by countries that only recently have come to terms with its existence.


The political enlargement of the European Union to Israel’s closest non-Arab neighbor, Cyprus,[15] could possibly pave the way for Israel to join the EU.[16] The EU-Israel Association Agreement entered into force on 1 June 2000 refers to regular political dialogue, with emphasis placed on peace, security, and regional cooperation as well as on the need to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region. The EU is also Israel’s major economic partner. Israel has repeatedly shown its willingness, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, to upgrade its status.


Consequently, the extension of the EU’s domain to the Eastern Mediterranean will amount to a greater European commitment to security in a region very close to Israel. According to certain Israeli military circles, the ultimate goal of Israel is its entrance into a collective security arrangement; it could be the European one. The entrance of Israel into the European collective economic and security structures could undoubtedly serve Tel Aviv’s long-term national and regional interests.


In this context, Israel’s relations with Greece and Cyprus become important, since Greece is a member of both the EU and NATO. The consensual decision-making system in both organizations allows small states great influence.[17] The removal of the Cyprus issue from the international agenda, and from the Mediterranean agenda in particular, is a prerequisite for the emergence of any regional security subsystem.


Israel has traditionally refrained from taking sides on Cyprus since the 1974 Turkish invasion and has maintained a position of neutrality. Tel Aviv believes that the dispute should be solved by peaceful means, and past efforts of Honorary President of the AJC Ambassador Alfred Moses, who was the Clinton Administration’s envoy on Cyprus, were directed toward that end. Greece and Cyprus seem to posses an important place in the Israeli strategic rationale for the region since Athens and Nicosia are European countries at the crossroads of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the wider Middle East. An end to the Cyprus problem can guarantee the long-term stability of the Mediterranean; in this context it serves Israeli interests.[18]


In fact, Israel supports a bi-communal bizonal federation for a number of important reasons. Partition is not deemed beneficial for either country in the region. The 1947 Indo- Pakistani partition is a good example. Though accepted by both sides, it was accompanied by an arms race that has ultimately turned into a nuclear rivalry. An similar, ongoing arms race in Cyprus would guarantee further instability in the wider region.


The Russian role in the Eastern Mediterranean is another factor that strengthens Israel’s interest in an end to the Cyprus dispute. Even during the post-Cold War era, long-term Israeli interests dictated the containment of Russia outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Russian attempts to penetrate the region are not conducive to the Israeli interests. The Israeli strategic perception was best depicted by the plans of Cyprus to purchase S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia and station them on the island, close to Israel’s airspace.


Israel sided with Turkey on that matter. Consequently, a bi-zonal federation for the Cyprus issue is viewed in the context of preventing Russia from capitalizing on local conflicts. The traditional Russian strategic goal has focused on access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who supports a more assertive approach toward Western interests, adopts this goal. The Russian navy has actually renewed its emphasis on force projection and plans to send its vessels further out from the country’s shores.[19]


Israel is also opposed to the possibility of the establishment of a radical Islamic state in northern Cyprus. In the case of partition, radicalization of Islamic elements in the Turkish part of Cyprus as a result of economic or political unrest is a possible development that runs contrary to Israeli national security.


Additionally, the possibility of the permanent division of the Cypriot capital will constitute a detrimental development for Tel Aviv, as the current status in Nicosia is similar to the pre-1967 partition of Jerusalem. The Cyprus partition would constitute a bad precedent for the Israeli claim over an undivided Jerusalem, which is one of the major issues to be tackled in any final Arab–Israeli peace agreement. A federal solution would unite Nicosia and could strengthen Israel’s case for a similar preferred position on the final status of Jerusalem. Though in a different context, a shared rule arrangement in Cyprus could also be the model for a broader regional structure between Israel and its closest neighbors, namely the Palestinians and Jordan.


In conclusion, it would be useful if more U.S. and European diplomacy were directed toward the Cyprus issue. An agreement on the political future of the island will undoubtedly have positive spill-over effects for the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider region.

Bringing Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and possibly Turkey together would constitute a significant contribution to Western interests and Western security in general.



The tripartite partnership in the post-Iraq war regional environment
A new post-Iraq war reconfiguration of pro-Western states in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on collective security and economic cooperation, could become the fulcrum through which a wider balance of power could be preserved. A system based on multinational task forces, joint military exercises among Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and possibly Turkey, expanded regional trade, and democratic reform can provide guarantees for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.


The tripartite partnership may find its prominent place in the emerging Mediterranean security structures. The partnership can serve as a means to provide a wider security subsystem that will limit drastically the role of states such as Russia as security guarantors of this critical area. Upon this basis, the partnership can commit itself to help bring the Mediterranean neighbors closer to the European democratic model. Creating a network of democratic countries in the region will have positive repercussions throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. In this context, Greece has taken the initiative to bring about a rapprochement with Turkey.


Interestingly, by cementing relations with Cyprus and Greece, Israel hopes to strengthen its friendly ties with two European states, one of them “shares its borders” (220 miles to its west) and also to effect the evolution of relations between Israel and the EU. An EU–Israeli enhancement in relations, however, seems to remain dependent on substantial progress in the Arab–Israeli peace process. It is widely acknowledged that the Arab–Israeli peace process that was accelerated with the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 made Israel a “less problematic” strategic partner.


Additionally, the three states hope to affect the evolution of relations between Cyprus and Turkey and especially preempt any development that can have a negative impact on regional stability. Cyprus could become a showcase, living proof of how different races and religions can live together in harmony.


Behind the emerging tripartite partnership is the concept of constructive participation as opposed to the passive re-activism so that regional promotion of democratic institutions and economic development take place, meaning the Mediterranean and the broader region.

Upon this logic, informal talks between warring parties in dispute such as the Middle East could provide a forum of dispassionate discussions on pivotal matters of mutual concern. For example, Greece, as a cultural and economic bridge between Europe and Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, has aimed to play a constructive role by hosting the Athens Dialogue, a series of meetings between Israelis and Palestinians. This sort of dialogue is part of a broader framework of diplomatic initiatives aimed at strengthening ties among neighbors and developing the strategic community of interests that would prevent crises and defuse tensions.


It is also in everyone’s interest, certainly in the interest of Greece and Cyprus, that Turkey is integrated into Europe, an area of stability. In fact, the Westernization of Turkey and its integration into the Western value and stability system was the main vision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of modern Turkey.


Consequently, the enhancement of Greece-Israel-Cyprus relations may create their own regional dynamics that can transform into a cooperative and complementary one to other regional partnerships, most prominently the Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian one that is embodied in the wider regional security subsystem.

To sum up, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus can serve as pillars of stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the wider Middle East. Working from this collective strength, they can pursue their regional policies. A joint program of action between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus can include the coordination of policies, strengthening of relations between Israel and the EU, as well as establishment of a structural dialogue on security issues. Along these lines, Greek-Israeli-Cypriot security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the involvement of other regional countries, can materialize.




Notes
1. Israeli official policy is not to sell Cyprus “shooting equipment.” Israeli companies
have sold Cypriots a variety of security equipment, such as a Coast Guard ship, communications
and night vision equipment, and battle suits. Experts from Israel give advise
to the civil defense system of the island.
2. The head of the Mossad at that time, Efraim Halevy, visited Nicosia and informed the
Cypriot authorities that the two agents belonged to a unit of the surveillance division
of Mossad that is identified as “Neviot.” Their mission was to tap police and national
guard networks, in order to warn other operational Mossad units that followed Hezbollah
or Iranian intelligence agents. “Compensation Is On the Way,” Ha’aretz, 14
September 1999.
3. Marios Leonidas, “Israel and Turkey: An Eye-Popping Relationship,” The Greek
American, 25 July 25 1998.
4. According to a NATO source referred to the Texas-based Global Intelligence Update
of 20 September 1998, the Israeli air force was training Turkish pilots to strike at Cyprus.
They used a mock-up of the area where the S-300 system was likely to be deployed
and Israeli reconnaissance photos of Cyprus. Obviously, Israeli combat experience
against Soviet-made weapons systems with which countries in the region
such as Syria are equipped made the training of critical importance to Turkey’s military.
5. M. Evriviades, “Israel, Turkey, and Greece,” Cyprus Weekly, 18–24 Sept. 1998; and
S. Rodan, “Cyprus, Russia Ask Israel to Keep Out of S-300 Deal,” Defense News, 23
Feb.–1 Mar. 1998.
6. The agreement was signed by Greek Defense Minister Gerasimos Arsenis and Israeli
Defense and Prime Minister, the late Yizhak Rabin.
7. Z. Mihas, “Lefkosia Wants a New Strengthen of Ties Between Greece and Israel,”
Imerisia, 19–20 August 2000.
Dimou 7
8. The reason for the postponement was that the Greek navy was busy preventing infiltrations
from Albania and could not spare a frigate for the exercises. See J. Nomikos,
“Greek-Israel Relations,” the Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE),
the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE), 1998.
9. Y. Melman, “Like Sirtki: One Step Forward and Two On the Side,” Ha’aretz, 5 October
1997.
10. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, web site at http://www.mfa.co.il.
11. The mediating role was demonstrated after a relevant request was submitted to Greek
Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos by U.S. officials during his September 1999
visit to Washington. D. Apokis, “Greek Opening to Israel,” To Vima (Greek daily), 26
September 1999.
12. Z. Mihas, “American–Israeli Marriage for the F-16’s Warfare Electronic System,”
Imerisia, 16–17 December 2000.
13. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post during his official visit to Tel Aviv in October
1999, Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos stated that Greek worries
about a sinister dimension to Turkish–Israeli ties have been replaced by a better understanding
of the motivations behind this relationship.
14. Ha’aretz, 15 May 2000.
15. Cyprus is one of the ten countries that signed the Accession Treaty in Athens on 16
April 2003. Following the completion of the required ratification procedures, they
will become full members as of 1 May 2004. From the conclusions of the EU, it is
evident that until a solution to the political problem is achieved, the implementation
of the acquis communautaire will be suspended in the northern part of the island. In
the past, Turkey threatened to annex the northern part of Cyprus in response to the
accession of Cyprus to the EU. The arguments put forward by the Turkish side are
both political and legal. Poltically, admitting only one part of the island would allegedly
further deepen the division between the two communities. Legally, accession is
considered to be a breach of the relevant provision of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee
which stipulates that the Republic of Cyprus “undertakes not to participate in, in
whole or in part, any political or economic union with any State whatsoever, it accordingly
declares as prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly,
either union with any other state or partition of the island” (Article 1).
16. This Israeli perspective was initially presented by Dr. Efraim Inbar and Dr. Shmuel
Sandler in the context of a study carried out in 1999 under the Manatos and Manatos
Consulting Company, Public Relations firm in Washington, D.C.
17. Ibid.
18. E. Inbar and S. Sandler, Israel in the Region (Israel: BESA, 2001).
19. “Reviving Russia’s Navy: Putin’s New Doctrine,” Strategic Comments, July 2000
.

*Antonia Dimou, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan