What is your assessment on the developments of the military operations against Libya? Do you think that the West intends to proceed with land operations?
First, I would like to underline that the situation in Libya today is a major challenge for the international coalition, especially after the imposition of the no-fly zone over the Arab country. Specifically, the major challenge is related to the strategy that the international coalition headed by France, the UK and the US, needs to implement towards Libya. Realistically, there are three distinctive strategic choices: The first choice revolves around the marginalization of the international coalition, the second focuses on land military operations and the third on finding a political solution.
In case the West decides to marginalize its presence, this would mean a tacit recognition of the authority of the Qaddafi regime and consequently the suppression of the rebels.
If the West decides to intervene actively in the military field with the conduct of operations via land on Libya, then it will precisely get itself involved in the middle of hostilities, perhaps for a long period of time and with potentially significant casualties among the civilian population. Moreover, the possibility of land operations by the West can potentially provide the basis upon which Islamist organizations such as al-Qaida may carry out holy war around the world (global jihad), whatever that means. It is not mere coincidence that al-Qaeda has in recent weeks issued a number of statements about the events in Libya arguing that the transitional government in Benghazi and the international air strikes are part of a wider conspiracy against Islam while denouncing the Western air operations as "modern crusade".
Thus, a Western operation via land on Libya runs the risk of becoming a military Waterloo for Western countries since there is possibility for long-time involvement on their part in military operations that may lead to casualties, as evidenced in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, a land operation on Libya will undoubtedly serve the interests of Islamist groups like al-Qaida, which sees military presence of the West in Libya as an opportunity to position itself as an attractive alternative to the Qaddafi regime, and to the pro-Western democracy proposed by the transitional government in Benghazi.
The third choice relates to the definition of an exit strategy and a near-term withdrawal. And this because the experience of the West with no-fly zones over countries such as Iraq has shown that such measures in the absence of any political solution can complicate the situation. The case of Iraq is indicative, where the imposition of a no-fly zone over the Kurdish areas in northern Iraq and the Shiite regions in the south of the country, without a prior mandate from the UN Security Council, has enjoyed limited success between 1991 and 2003. Under the protection of US forces, that destroyed the anti-aircraft defence of Iraq and the military bases on the ground, the Kurds established de facto autonomy in northern Iraq - at this moment this development favours the plans of the West. At the same time, the southern part of the country continues to be under a state of complete lack of security and daily armed clashes, taking for granted the entry of militants of Islamist organizations such as al-Qaeda.
My personal estimate is that finding a political solution to the case of Libya is a strategic choice for any withdrawal of the West to happen. On the contrary, the prolongation of the current situation with regards to the no-fly zone, let alone the conduct of land operations will in no case serve the interests of the West not only in Libya, but in the whole region.
What are the intentions of the Qadhafi’s regime? Is it possible to return to the monarchy and what is the position of the West on this prospect?
The Qaddafi regime is estimated that it heads towards finding a political solution that will lead to the crisis defuse. In this context, the yesterday's visit to Athens of Libyan acting Foreign Minister and former Minister of State responsible for European Affairs, Abdul Ati al-Obeidi as Qadaffi’s envoy took place. Athens is perceived as an honest broker by the regime in Libya which apparently is one of the two sides that should come into terms in finding any political solution.
According to an article published in The New York Times yesterday evening, the regime in Libya appears willing to cooperate with the transitional government in Benghazi for an interim period of time so that a new system of governance emerges, the system of constitutional monarchy.
The diplomatic activity of the Libyan regime is felicitous and aims to meet one of the main demands of the citizens of eastern Libya. Firm demand of the citizens in eastern Libya is the establishment of a constitutional rather than a presidential system of governance which in many aspects resembles with the constitutional monarchy of Idris Sanusi that existed the period before 1969. The demand envisions the acquisition of a great degree of autonomy within, however, the existent geographic national boundaries.
In this sense, it is not mere coincidence that the 11-member transitional government in Benghazi includes – among others - a relative of the exiled monarch. It is also not coincidence that the heir of the royal family Seyed Idris al-Sanusi, who was born in Benghazi, is the head of the Sanusi movement which enjoys the support of the majority of the tribes in Libya. It is worth noting that in 2003 during the war in Iraq, Libyan colonel Qadhafi proposed to Seyed Idris the position of the prime minister of Libya acknowledging on the one hand the popular support of the royal heir and attempting on the other hand to strengthen the legitimacy of his regime. Coming to the turbulent and violent situation of today, Seyed Idris made his presence clear and issued a statement according to which “he is ready to return to Libya”.
It is clear that at this point of time all options are open in finding a political and diplomatic solution that will provide the western coalition a dignified exit from Libya.
We have witnessed protests and heavy clashes between protesters and police in Syria in recent days. The bloody protests in Yemen also continue. Is there a common cause of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula? What is the reason for them?
It is indeed clear that a revolutionary movement is spreading across the Arab world from North Africa to the Persian Gulf and is attributed to two major factors. One factor is the global financial crisis which increased the level of poverty and the second factor is the demand for political reforms reinforced by the use of Internet and the Arab satellite TV stations. Protestors in the riots demand the introduction of political reforms, the fight of economic corruption, the respect of human rights and the promotion of the freedom of the press.
The protests in Libya, Syria and Yemen have a common denominator, but also important differences. For example, the regime in Syria has a separate structure from the others in the Arab-Muslim world. Also it is a fact that the political outlook of Syrian President Assad considers as first priority the establishment of peace and the fight against terrorism rather than any popular demands for political reforms. The official position of the Syrian President acknowledges the fact that the Syrian society like the majority of societies in the region, are experiencing a shift in political alignment to conservatism. Upon this basis, the process of political reforms according to Assad’s perception is becoming difficult as evidenced by the cases of countries like Lebanon and Algeria. Specifically, countries like Lebanon and Algeria that had strived for rapid reforms had only set the stage for conflict and social unrest. In the case of Algeria during the 1980s, Islamist groups sought to exploit the political opening of the government to gain power and this had undermined the internal stability and had sparked conflict lasting decades. In Lebanon respectively, the process of political reforms and the elections of May 29th, 2005 had been the cause of the subsequent sectarian violence.
What is the role of Islamists in the events? Can we talk about strengthening of the activities of the armed groups?
The role and the degree of the Islamists’ influence on the masses differ from country-to-country. In Libya, for example, the Islamist threat is becoming more obvious than ever and any security risks may come from al-Qaida and from freelance salafist militants. Specifically, al-Qaida maintains long-term strategic interests in Libya, and seeks to capitalize on the riots in North Africa so that it serves its very own interests. At the same time, it seeks to exploit religious the international air operations to unify the citizens of Libya against the West. It is undoubted fact that the organization traditionally sees the establishment of an active wing in Libya as a basic pillar of its peripheral strategy. Libya is not considered as an end in the influence and activities of al-Qaida, but as a "safe" area from which to spread into neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Algeria, which have larger populations.
Moreover, a significant number of freelance salafist fighters have emerged in Libya during the last decade. The city of Deraa in eastern Libya is well-known as centre for recruiting militants to carry out holy war (jihad) in Libya as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The main reason for the increase in numbers of freelance salafist militants is the economic misery which has favoured the growing belief in part of Libyan citizens mainly in Eastern Libya that they have nothing to lose by participating in Islamist groups and by resorting to violence at home and outside like in Iraq. The prospect of lifetime economic compensation of members of their economically weak families in case they practice self-sacrifice in the name of religion in Iraq or elsewhere has proved to be a strong motive in eastern Libya, where the majority of the youths aged between 18 and 35 are unemployed. There are also certain reports according to which Islamist networks offered as motive to young people in order to practice self-sacrifice a monthly compensation for their families which amounts to 150 to 200 dinars, when the average salary in the country amounts to 250 to 330 dinars.
On the contrary, in countries like Syria and Bahrain, the role of Islamists in the events differs.
What are the possible consequences of the riots in the Arab world and in what direction will the alignments change?
It is indeed too early to produce clear conclusions with regards to the change of regional alignments, as we witness an ongoing wave of popular protests. However, it is feasible to make some assessments based on the existing geopolitical situation. For example, the riots in Bahrain have made urgent the restoration of the socio-political stability in the country because a possible escalation of the domestic unrest could have a decisive impact on the geopolitical position of Bahrain, thus endangering the vital US interests, and causing a domino effect in the neighbourhood.
As it is known, Bahrain hosts the Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NSA Bahrain) and the US Navy 5th fleet headquarters. Literally located in the heart of the Gulf, the naval base and the headquarters are a key strategic asset for the US presence in the wider Middle East, as they permit the overlooking of the oil installations and trade routes, the support of the US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the fight against naval piracy in the Red and the Arabian Seas.
Moreover, the overthrow of the monarchy in Bahrain due to internal unrest could cause a chain reaction on neighbouring Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that neighbouring Iran is closely monitoring the events and is eager to take political and religious advantage of this new dynamic developing, which is related to the internal destabilization of regimes in order to play a leading role in the Arab - Muslim affairs. In this case, a possible overthrow of the monarchy in Bahrain could serve as springboard for Iranian ambitions that perceive Bahrain as the 14thprovince of Iran particularly due to the Shiite religious link. Actually, over 70 percent of Bahrain’s population is Shiite.
What is certain is that the regimes in the region are awaken and are invited to "flirt" with the popular demands for political and economic reforms. At the same time, they have to recognize that the popular demands for reforms combined with the strong influence of Islam on the masses are denominators not only for the preservation of their popularity, but also of their very survival.
