SECURITY JAM REPORT (2015): Reappraising Global Security

Photo from: http://www.friendsofeurope.org

Reproduced by RIEAS, 6 March 2015

The Security Jam Report was officially launched on March 4, 2015 at a debate with General Philip Breedlove, NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Ambassador Alain Le Roy, incoming Secretary General of the European External Action Service. RIEAS has been coalition partner and Antonia Dimou's, senior RIEAS adviser, recommendations were included in the final report. 

The report comes at a time of heightened tension including Russia's confrontation with the West over Ukraine and the new threat posed by the so-called Islamic State. European Union and NATO leaders must act urgently to set up a security organisation in the Middle East, create an EU consensus on immigration, asylum and human trafficking, and open up jobs for women in intelligence operations, according to the 2,300-strong Jam community. The experts also urged the creation of an international ‘Cyberpol’ agency. 

Read more at:
http://www.friendsofeurope.org/media/uploads/2015/02/SecurityJamReport2014-finalLR.pdf

THE DAY AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN GREECE: EMERGING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

By Antonia Dimou 

Senior Advisor, Research institute for European and American Studies, Greece, and Associate at the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

Photo from Deviant Art Magazine 

Copyright: Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, Nicosia, Cyprus

The national parliamentary elections in Greece highlighted the victory for the first time ever of left-wing Syriza party which gained 36.3 percent of the voter turnout securing 149 seats out of 300, short of an absolute majority. The election outcome prompted the formation of a coalition government with The Independent Greeks far-right party that supports an end to austerity. On the other side of the political spectrum, until recently ruling conservative New Democracy lost 2.1 percent of its vote share as compared to the 2012 national elections, a percentage that when converted into numbers represents a loss of 53 seats. Social democratic party Pasok continued to shrink and became the last political force that surpassed the 3 percent threshold with seats being reduced to merely 13 from 33 in 2012. 

The ruling party managed to attract moderate voters with the adoption of a dual strategy of citizen-central and anti-austerity dimensions. In a country where citizens are perpetually squeezed in the middle of depression and the economy is in freefall with a loss of a quarter of Greek GDP from 2008 to 2014 and a phenomenal high public debt of approximately 175 percent of GDP, Syriza pledged to ditch austerity, deal with the evolving humanitarian crisis, proceed with structural reforms, disengage from the IMF-EU memoranda, and proceed with debt renegotiation either in the form of direct haircut or restructuring. 

Concrete declared coalition government policies include the increase of the minimum wage to €751; the reintroduction of a bonus pension for those who receive less than €700 per month; the provision of free medical care for unemployed; the abolition of the annual levy on private property introduced initially in 2011 as an emergency measure; the promotion of household debt restructuring; the connection of the public debt’s repayment not to the Greek budget but to economic growth; and, the inclusion of the country in the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program of the European Central Bank that will purchase Greek sovereign bonds valued €60bn on secondary markets as means to defeat deflation and strengthen investment without new government debt. 

Red lines between Greece and its creditors as evidenced in the first days of Syriza’s governance have centered on the rejection of pursuing extra talks with the Troika of lenders’ inspectors, notably unpopular in Greece, and disallowance of the bailout’s protraction that has become politically and economically toxic, by alternatively proposing the forging of a newagreement with all major creditors. As estimated, the first Greek red line is expected to be respected given that the European Commission has already been involved in a process of searching substitutes to Troika in accordance with the 14th January 2015 verdict by Advocate General Cruz Villalón of the European Union Court of Justice on “the European Central Bank’s OMT program”, which explicitly declares that the European Central Bank has to refrain from any direct involvement in the monitoring of financial assistance programmes that apply to States concerned. That is to say, the European Central Bank is evidently prohibited by the European Court of Justice’s Advocate General to remain member of the Troika. 

When it comes to the second Greek red line, a chicken game, a situation where there is competition for a shared resource and the contestants can choose either conciliation or conflict, seems to currently evolve between Greece and Northern European creditor governments headed by Germany. The ruling party of Syriza has opted for a strategy which scopes to transform it into a political force initiating a European debate for the inception of a coalition that struggles against austerity and longs for growth plans. The recent tours of the Greek Prime Minister and the Finance Minister in certain European capitals fall in the context of forming a new European wide likeminded block that opposes the prevailing austerity orthodoxy. Emerging questions related to a series of challenges are recorded as follows: Given the Greek repudiation of the logic of austerity, what are the Greek intentions and how much room is there for stratagem? Does Greece opt for a direct debt haircut or restructuring? Is a Greek exit from the eurozone possible and what is the most likely scenario? 

The Greek economy has ameliorated since 2012 given that a persisting recession ended in 2014, public finances improved, and in the third quarter of 2014 a growth of 0.7 percent has placed the country among the best performers in the Eurozone. Despite progress, the Greek economy remains delicate due to large-scale bank withdrawals amounting to €15 billion since December 2014 according to data released by the Bank of Greece with institutional inverstors and individuals being the first to heave deposits. Additionally, the pressing liquidity conditions, as consequence of the growing outflow of deposits and the issue of treasury bills (T-bills) imposed by the State, have driven the country’s systemic banks to request cash from the Bank of Greece through the emergency liquidity system (ELA). It is no secret that the country’s payment obligations in 2015 amount to €22.5 billion including the repayment of €6.7 billion to the European Central Bank in July and August for sovereign bonds purchased after Greece’s first bail-out in 2010. This reality pressurizes Greece to reach a new agreement with its creditors containing components of growth and goals that focus on a combination of primary budget surplus and a reform agenda to tackle chronic fundamental problems, such as tax evasion, bureaucracy and corruption. 

Growth plans however are directly linked to debt relief that can happen in the form of either a direct write-off widely known as direct haircut, or restructuring. It is appreciated that outright debt forgiveness, a direct haircut, is not an option for creditors for multiple reasons with most prevailing the domestic pressures that Eurozone countries such as Germany undergoes on the matter. In particular, Germany holds approximately €50 billion in Greek debt and decisively rejects a direct haircut because of domestic politics and public positions. According to an opinion poll conducted recently for public service broadcaster ZDF, 76 percent of the German public opposes any direct Greek debt reduction. Concurrently, across the German political spectrum the challenges for the ruling Christian Democratic Union are multifold in the sense that on the one side, the Left party with provenance from East Germany perceives Greek Syriza as an ideological ally and thus any concession would be viewed as a defeat of German hegemony over economic policies in the 19- country currency block. On the other side, populist far right the “Alternative for Germany” party, which supports the dissolution of the euro, yearns for the failure of any Greek debt negotiations hoping for a Grexit. 

The option of debt restructuring is considered appealing in the context of Greek debt negotiations given that it provides reallocation of resources or change in the terms of loan extension that enable the debtor repay the loan to creditors. Debt restructuring is essentially an adjustment of both the debtor and the creditor to normalize troubles in the manner of loan repayment. That said, in conformity with the eurozone procedures, a Greek debt restructuring can occur by means of extending maturities and reducing interest rates, a process equaling to a cut that would permit Greece rebound to a rational debt to GDP ratio, thus favoring the execution of a public spending program to boost gross domestic product. Greek debt restructuring can also transpire with the swap technique, as means of easing the Greek debt burden, which foresees the issue of a complex mix of two types of new bonds. The first type, indexed to nominal economic growth, would replace European rescue loans, while the second type presents perpetual bonds that would replace sovereign Greek bonds owned by the European Central Bank. Dept swap, as part of smart debt engineering, conduces to debt reduction thus paving the way for the implementation of a growth strategy that perforce needs to advance hand in hand with fiscal prudence and structural reforms. 

When it comes to the possibility of a Greek exit from the eurozone, the challenges that may accrue can prove multifold. Although a Greek exit will not be a systemic event causing a simultaneous breakdown in global confidence and trade as evidenced in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the travails of Europe will unquestionably impact the global stock markets and will send waves of shock to countries and investors owing to the breach of the principle that euro membership is irrevocable. Equal important, the risk of contagion will increase, despite the various rescue mechanisms, and European policy makers will have to “circle the wagons” around the other periphery countries to cease occurrence. Concurrently, the consequences for Greece would be acutely distressing for the reason that domestic assets and liabilities will be converted into a national currency which will forthwith depreciate. Currency depreciation will automatically preserve at unsustainable levels the country’s foreign debts which will continue unchanged in euro, a fact that would make Greece default and lock it out of global capital markets for long time. In other words, the likelihood of a Greek euro exit could create a massive shock for financial markets, force Greece default and result in contagion because financial investors would unquestionably try to test other Eurozone countries. 

No doubt that a propulsive synthesis of negotiating tools can bring Greece and its European partners close with an eye on a fast-track growth agenda as envisaged by the EU Commission’s pan-European investment plan which can burst the bubbles around economies and whole societies. The ruling party of Greece is offered a golden opportunity to constructively contribute to a new contract in the context of an enigmatic, composite and rapidly changing European landscape. Because in essence, the lure of the distant and the difficult can prove deceptive, but the grasp of small opportunities can signal the beginning of a great enterprise, that is the European enterprise. 

First Published on February 11, 2015
http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=435&Itemid=435

Greece at the National Elections’ Crossroads: A Step Towards Left or Right?

By

Antonia Dimou

RIEAS Senior advisor based in Athens, Greece and Associate at the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

John Nomikos

Director of the Research Institute for European and American Studies based in Athens, Greece
Copyright: Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC); http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=5136#top
First Published: 23 January 2015

Photo: Michael Kappeler / picture alliance / dpa /Vostock Photo

A supporter of Alexis Tsipras, leader ofthe Greek radical left main opposition partySYRIZA, displays a poster reading "ChangeGreece - Change Europe" during the lastpreelection rally of the party in Athens,22 January 2015

The upcoming January 25, 2015 national elections in Greece highlight a major challenge as they present a struggle between anger against austerity and fear of euro exit. The apparent reason that led to early national elections is the failure of the coalition government to obtain a parliamentary majority to appoint a candidate as president of the Republic [1] . The hidden motive behind the declaration of early elections however was the volatile political landscape that made strenuous coalition government’s compliance with the Troika’s tough agenda thus postponing structural policy reforms by fear of the social effects that could be translated into high political cost. The Greek Prime Minister was between Scylla and Charybdis in terms of sustaining the coalition government and meeting Troika’s demands for unimpeded economic support.

The majority of polls show that SYRIZA, the main opposition party that has engulfed supporters from radical leftists to socialists in an effort to broaden its electoral base, will maintain a clear lead with percentages ranging from 28 to 31, while the ruling New Democracy’s performance ranges from 23 to 28 % [2]. The coalition partner PASOK continues to shrink from the 2009 voter turnout of 43.92 % to 12.28 % in the 2012 national elections. A progressive shrinkage is recorded for center-left DIMAR, formerly coalition partner, with limited chances to enter parliament because of the alibi it offered to the coalition government’s strict austerity policies [3]. Polls also suggest that the Communist party of KKE, the liberal party of The River, and the nationalist Golden Dawn are certain to enter parliament.

The formation of a majority government is a spinous matter because of the partisan fragmentation and the existent electoral law which although awards a 50 bonus seat to the winning party, it simultaneously conditions the ability to form a majority on the voter turnout of political parties that remain outside parliament [4]. In case that no party forms a majority government, the Greek President will have to give order to the winning party’s leader to form a coalition within three days, and if he fails the same process will be followed with the second and third parties’ leaders. In the event of a failure, a second round of elections has to be held within a month [5].

The prospect of political instability has generated a cataract of reactions that have directly affected the country’s economy with most prominent investors’ selling Greek bonds and stocks. Greek stocks have fallen 24 % since early December 2014 when national elections were declared for early 2015 instead of 2016 as originally scheduled. The Athens Stock Exchange slipped on January 5, 2015 to its lowest level since November 2012. Greek bonds have lost 7.4 % over the same period presenting the worst performance of 34 sovereign securities tracked by Bloomberg's World Bond Index [6].

instamun.org/greeces-political-crisis-might-
force-it-out-of-the-euro
Greek elections results and opinion polls,
Jan 2, 2015

Election campaigns’ intensity to affect voting intention differs significantly from one another and differences are meant to have far-reaching consequences for the cognitive strategies used by Greek voters. Throughout the election campaign, the essence is that the ruling party centers on a “roadmap” of measures for a “post-bailout Greece” concurrently using fear factors such as default and euro exit, while the major opposition relies on anti-austerity whilst unfolding a citizen-centric tactics.

The ruling party highlights that Greece has emerged from a six-year recession with the achievement of primary surplus and that the focus has already shifted on a growth plan for post-crisis which entails gradual tax reduction across middle-class households, support of the shipping, energy, pharmaceuticals and technology sectors, introduction of additional reforms to restrict bureaucracy and of an investment incentives’ package that foresees reduction of production costs and social security contributions. At the same time, the ruling party bases its campaign on fear factors with the aim to moderate austerity-produced public anger, with most protrusive an argument that Greece would be led to default and exit from the European single currency by the declared policies of the major opposition.

A chain reaction was almost instantly triggered in the form of large-scale bank withdrawals amounting to €7 billion since December 2014 ahead of the January 25, 2015 elections according to data published by the Bank of Greece with large companies and individuals being the first to heave deposits [7]. The pressing liquidity conditions, as consequence of the growing outflow of deposits and the issue of treasury bills (T-bills) imposed by the State, have driven the country’s systemic banks to request cash from the Bank of Greece through the emergency liquidity system (ELA) [8].

Reuters
Prime Minister of Greece and leader of New
Democracy Antonis Samaras

SYRIZA for its part attempts to display a strategy of image normalization prescribing a political program advertised as a viable alternative without endangering euro membership, in a country where unemployment has reached almost 1.5 million of a labor force of 4.5 million, incomes have declined to an approximate average of 50 %, hospitals are understaffed with lack of nurses and medical doctors, and working conditions are governed not only by three or five month temporary contracts but also by rented employees who receive freelancing rather than regular payments. The major opposition’s political proposals revolve around debt renegotiation aiming at partial debt relief, the fight against austerity with the gradual reintroduction of the minimum wage of €751 [9] , income redistribution through a radical tax system, debt restructuring for the most vulnerable households, and restoration of market liquidity by means of state control of the banking system. In a calculated attempt to broaden its electoral base, the major opposition has appealed to reluctant conservative social groups and devout Christians with the conduct of its leader’s visit to Mount Athos in summer 2014 and his participation in the public ritual of Epiphany in early January 2015 [10].

At a time when Southern European countries and France oppose the German-led austerity orthodoxy, a series of questions emerge and are related to the next Greek government’s strategy vis-à-vis Troika to secure ''trade-offs'' among issues that currently appear to be uncompromised with most prevailing the following: Does Greece really need debt relief? Is a euro exit possible? Can the vicious cycle of deflation that Greece faces be defeated and how?

There is little doubt that the country’s debt-servicing bill declined because private financial investors have been replaced by Eurozone countries which currently own 60 % of Greece’s €322 billion government debt that equals to 179% of GDP [11]. The concluded extension of the country’s repayments to 2054 and the cut in interest payments is considered by many as equivalent to a haircut. Scepticism, however, seems to prevail when it comes to the feasibility of the country’s debt, in accordance with the official Eurozone projection, to fall as share of its GDP below 124 % in coming years [12] for three main reasons: First, growth forecasts are considered overly optimistic given that they predict nominal GDP growth of approximately 5 % annually from 2016 till 2020. Second, the hypothesis that Greece will achieve annual primary budget surplus equivalent to 4 % of the GDP is viewed as unrealized. Third, the crisis has migrated to the real economy in the form of deflation that makes Greece unsustainable given that, in 2014 alone, real interest rates exceeded 3 % due to the prices’ fall by 2.6 %[13].

Statista.com

That said, any debt restructuring process needs to maximize benefits based on a mutual agreement between Greece, the EU and the IMF so that a new deal renders Greece sustainable thus creating a precedent for sorting out Eurozone’s problems. The Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB) endorsed recently by the European Court [14] , which provides the purchase of hundreds of billions of Eurozone countries’ sovereign bonds on secondary markets, presents an enhancement in the bargaining power of any new elected Greek government and also advances the ECB’s plans for significant quantitative easing against the forces of deflation [15]. Specifically, the OMT program is appropriate to reduce interest rates on government bonds restoring significantly financial normality to states concerned, thus permitting the ECB to exert monetary policies in an environment of greater stability [16]. When it comes to the possibility of a Greek exit from the Eurozone, the challenges that may accrue can prove multifold. Although a Greek exit will not be a systemic event causing a simultaneous breakdown in global confidence and trade as evidenced in the wake of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the travails of Europe will unquestionably impact the global stock markets and will send waves of shock to global confidence. Equally important, the risk of contagion will increase, despite the various rescue mechanisms, and European policy makers will have to “circle the wagons” around the other periphery countries to cease occurrence. In other words, Greece could create a massive shock for financial markets and despite the fact that an exit from the eurozone is complicated technically, it could result in contagion because financial investors would try to test other Eurozone countries.

A way out of the crisis, which has penetrated the European foundations, entails a debate on the kind of Europe that all member states envision. Greece and its new-to-be-elected government could play a vital role in shaping the European debate away from populist slogans by fostering partnerships for a universally beneficial deal that could make European countries and their economies sustainable. In essence, at the end of the day, Europe is offered the chance to “write her injuries in dust, but her benefits in marble” [17].

References:

1. Stavros Dimas was appointed as presidential candidate and attracted the support of 168 MPs out of the 300, short of the 180 required votes. In accordance with the Greek constitution, the parliament was dissolved and January 25, 2015 was set as date for the conduct of national elections.

2. “Seven Party Parliament with No Majority”, Proto Thema (Daily) , 19 January 2015

3. F. Chatzistavrou and S. Michalaki, “Reshaping Politics of the Left and Centre in Greece after the 2014 EP Election”, EPIN Commentary, No.21, 110 September 2014.

4. Paris Ayiomamitis, “Greek Election Math and Scenarios: A Handy Guide”, The Press Project, 8 January 2015

5. Ibid. The Greek president will have to appoint the head of the Supreme Court as prime minister, the parliament will dissolve and a caretaker government will be established so that the second round of elections takes place.

6. Jonathan Stearns and Nikos Chrysoloras. “Samaras Faces Greek Voters Skeptical of His Euro-Exit Warnings”, Washington Post (Daily), January 5, 2015

7. “Seven Billion Euro in Outflows after the Declaration of Elections”, Proto Thema (Daily), January 19, 2015

8. The repeated issue of T-bills has caused a major blow to the Greek banking system’s liquidity as it is evidenced by the State raise of €2.7 billion in November 2014, the secure of €3.2 billion in December 2014 and the reserve of €2.7 billion in January 2015. Yiannis Papadoyiannis, “Greek Banks Make Requests for ELA Funding”, Kathimerini (Daily), January 16, 2015.

9. “Syriza’s First Act in Office: Raise Minimum Wage”, The Times of Change (News and Media Network), January 16, 2015

10. “Epiphany for the Greek Left: Spreading His Wings”, The Economist, January 6, 2015.

11. Dimitra Defotis, “Greek Victor: Debt Relief”, Barron’s (Magazine Weekly Edition), January 17, 2015.

12. Stephen Fidler, “Politics Risk Tripping Up Greece on Debt Relief”, Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2015

13. Ibid.

14. Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 2/15 Luxembourg, 14 January 2015.

15. Jana Randow, “Europe’s QE Quandary”, Bloomberg, December 30, 2015.

16. Yanis Varoufakis, “On the ECB’s Latest Contradiction (And How It Helps Greece)”, January 15, 2015. Accessed at: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/01/15/on-the-ecbs-great-contradiction-and-how-it-helps-greece/

17. Paraphrase of a quote by Benjamin Franklin.

The Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict: A Catalyst for East Mediterranean Security and Cooperation

By:

Antonia DimouRIEAS Senior advisor based in Athens, Greece and Associate at the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

John NomikosDirector of the Research Institute for European and American Studies based in Athens, Greec

Copyright: Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)*

First Publication: 17 October, 2014

The East Mediterranean is on the frontlines of a struggle for peace and economic development where Cyprus holds a central position of geographical and functional importance in terms of security, including energy security. The role of Cyprus in regional security as a host of military operations, including Afghanistan and Kuwait, and as the holder of the British sovereign bases have turned it into an indispensable partner of the West. The island has large expatriate populations from mainland Greece, Russia and the UK, maintains vital economic interests in the wider Middle East, but remains partially occupied by Turkey which has dispatched thousands of soldiers for the protection of an increasing expatriate population of Turkish nationals on the northern part of the island.

Photo: REUTERS/Neil Hall

A watchtower stands along the United Nations

buffer zone in the district of Famagusta, northern Cyprus

The resolution of the Cyprus conflict poses a major challenge given that it is at core not only of solving regional disputes but most importantly of western security strategies. These strategies are outlined in the post-Arab spring era in light of the Syrian conflict, the collapse of Turkey’s foreign policy of “zero-problems-with neighbours”, and the emergence of radical organisations like ISIS that have become powerful in the East Mediterranean. It is in this context that an unprecedented engagement with the Cyprus issue is witnessed throughout 2014 and includes the first time visit in 52 years of an incumbent American vice-president as well as other EU and US high-level visits.

The game changer in resolving the conflict is that Cyprus has the potential to serve as a major energy supplier for Europe and Asia as well as can set the pattern for resolving the Palestinian-Israeli dispute which climaxed this summer with the Gaza war.

 Photo: wikipedia.org 

The gas proven discoveries in Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) can definitely contribute to the reduction of the island’s dependence on foreign energy and create prospects for economic advantages given that natural gas is the major source of direct income to the state treasury due to royalties and taxes paid by gas suppliers. International companies like Noble Energy, ENI and KOGAS hold prospecting concessions on offshore blocks 12, 2, 3 and 9 of the Cyprus EEZ. Besides, major oilfield services companies like Halliburton and Schlumberger have based operations for the East Mediterranean in Cyprus, thus providing a vote of confidence regarding the island’s regional energy standing.

Cyprus, however, faces challenges concerning monetizing natural gas resources that are associated with regional export options, such as the pipeline project that would connect regional fields with the Turkish coast. This export option presupposes the resolution of the Cyprus conflict since any pipeline would have to cross Cyprus’s EEZ. Even in the absence of resolution on the Cyprus long-standing conflict, without the existence of mutually agreed maritime boundaries, any possibility of regional development of offshore energy resources becomes difficult. This reality coupled with Turkey’s attempt to capitalize on its conventional military superiority to force energy issues by military action, along with its adoption of a controversial policy when it comes to the delimitation of maritime boundaries, have motivated the search of a breakthrough in the strategic impasse over the island still divided between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.

Note that Ankara’s energy policies are affected by the situation in the Aegean, where Turkish-Greek negotiations on maritime border demarcation based on the median line principle would deprive it of access to extensive continental shelf rights throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. It is for this reason that Turkey prefers the principle of equity when it comes to the East Mediterranean delimitation of maritime boundaries, but has adopted the principle of median line in the Black Sea.

When it comes to geopolitical reasons for supporting the Cyprus conflict solution which could also serve as the basis for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, the most relevant are as follows:

First, a Cyprus partition is not deemed beneficial for either country in the region. The 1947 Indo-Pakistani partition is a good example. Though accepted by both sides, it was accompanied by an arms race that has ultimately turned into a nuclear rivalry. Having this model in mind, it is not difficult to understand that the ongoing arms race in Cyprus would guarantee further instability in the wider region.

Photo: community.eldis.org

Another major concern is the possibility of the emergence of fundamental Islamic tides in Northern Cyprus. In case of partition, radicalization of Islamic elements in Northern Cyprus as a result of economic or political unrest is a possible development that runs contrary to the regional security.

Additionally, the possibility of the permanent division of the Cypriot capital will constitute a detrimental development for Israel and the Palestinians, as the current status in Nicosia is similar to the pre-1967 partition of Jerusalem. The Cyprus partition would constitute a bad precedent for the Israeli and Palestinian claims over an undivided Jerusalem, which is one of the major issues to be tackled in any final Arab–Israeli peace agreement. On the contrary, a federal solution would unite Nicosia and could strengthen Israel's and the Palestinians' case for a similar preferred position on the final status of Jerusalem.

Though in a different context, a shared rule arrangement in Cyprus could also be the model for a broader regional structure between Israel and its closest neighbours, namely the Palestinians and Jordan.

Obviously, intensified Western diplomacy that is directed towards resolving the Cyprus issue for an agreement on the political future of the island, will undoubtedly have positive spill-over effects on strategies that can bring the benefits of security and economic gains in the East Mediterranean. With no doubt, time is of essence…

*The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) is a non-profit academic and diplomatic think tank that was founded by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science in 2010.

** The article in also available in the Russian language at: http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=4626#top 

ΟΡΓΑΝΙΣΜΟΣ ΙΣΛΑΜΙΚΗΣ ΔΙΑΣΚΕΨΗΣ: ΕΝΙΣΧΥΣΗ ΝΕΟΘΩΜΑΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΘΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ

της Αντωνίας Δήμου
(Σύμβουλος στο Ινστιτούτο Ευρωπαϊκών και Αμερικανικών Σπουδών (RIEAS) και εταίρος στο Κέντρο για την Ανάπτυξη στη Μέση Ανατολή του Πανεπιστημίου της Καλιφόρνια, Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες)

Copyright: Research Institute for European and American Studies (www.rieas.gr) Publication Date: 8 September 2014

Η 41η Διάσκεψη των ΥΠΕΞ του Οργανισμού Ισλαμικής Διάσκεψης (ΟΙΔ) που πραγματοποιήθηκε στη Τζέντα της Σαουδικής Αραβίας από τις 18 έως τις 19 Ιουνίου 2014 εξέδωσε δύο αποφάσεις που λήφθηκαν από την ολομέ-λεια του Οργανισμού, οι οποίες εγγίζουν άμεσα την Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο. Η πρώτη απόφαση φέρει τίτλο «η Κατάσταση στην Κύπρο» (Res. No19/41 POL), και η δεύτερη τιτλοπορείται ως: «η Κατάσταση της Τουρκο-μουσουλμανικής Μειονότητας στη Δυτική Θράκη και του Μουσουλμανικού Πληθυσμού της Δωδεκανήσου» (Res. No 3/41-MM)..... Read more

NATIONAL SECURITY & ANALYSIS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION - RIEAS

The Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) organized the 1st Executive Security Training Seminar entitled: "National Security and Intelligence Analysis in the Mediterranean Region". The training seminar, which took place in an Athenian hotel on 7th-10th July 2014, is part of the activities that are planned, implemented and supported organizationally by the Research Institute for European and American Studies... Read more

Conference Proceedings; 
Edited by Antonia Dimou 
                      & 
Antonia Chatzopoulou

PREFACE

The Mediterranean is a geopolitically significant region which is, however, overwhelmed by security problems considered as vital ranging from interstate conflicts, intrastate crises and transnational threats with most prominent the proliferation of conventional and mass destruction weapons, cyber-warfare and terrorism. A comprehensive approach to security in the Mediterranean, including hard security-soft security integration and civil-military-private sector coordination is the key to stability.  

If the imperative for concord over instability prevails, then the dividents that will accrue in the entire Mediterranean will be multifold.  What some of the threats to stability present, the level of their complexities and whether they can be coped  efficiently under the current regional exigencies as evidenced in Syria and Libya, have led to the formation of the agenda of the 1^st training executive seminar of the Research  Institute for European and American Studies.

An underlying theme of the seminar has been security as a prerequisite for foreign direct investment that can help overcome the legacies, psychological and otherwise that have burdened the Greek and other regional economies for so long. As it is widely acknowledged, issues of national security related to poor governance affect international economic transactions and have become more complicated after September 11^th, 2001 when the term was expanded to include human security in the context of international trade.

Equally primary topic has been the presentation of the challenges related to CBRN risks and the illegal export of sensitive military technology as well as the outline of a series of effective strategies to mitigate risks through coordination of different national agencies like the intelligence communities, and cooperation between regional countries and international organizations. 

In articulating their presentations, instructors made no pretense to providing answers to complex issues addressed. As the chairman of the executive seminar noted in his concluding remarks, “instructors treated their topics with sincerity and clarity, and thus increased our understanding of the complex issues involved”.

This precisely has been the goal of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS). In the context of its training activities, RIEAS sustains keen interest in the affairs of the Mediterranean region and supports a holistic approach to security encouraging cooperation and dialogue to identify contemporary risks and provide solutions.

The current publication of the summary of the conference proceedings serves as guide to the instructors’ information sharing and presentations with focus on the multi-dimensional challenges facing the Mediterranean.

Be that as it may, challenges still lie ahead…

Antonia Dimou,                                                                                                               Editor                                                                                                                          
August 2014

INTELLIGENCE AND BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY IN JORDAN

By Antonia Dimou
(RIEAS Senior Advisor and Associate at the CSS, University of Jordan)

Reproduced by the Research Institute for European and American Studies (www.rieas.gr) Publication Date: 27 August 2014)

The relationship between democracy and the character of secret intelligence presents a composite two-sided puzzle. On the one side, the very concept of democracy demands that an intelligence agency serves democratic interests by providing one country's security and preparedness against potential threats both internal and external. The core notion is that a stronger country can turn itself into a heaven where democracy can continue to be practiced. On the other side, intelligence investigative methods in many countries occur outside the context of democratic control and oversight mechanisms, thus surfacing an inherent conflict.

That said the role of intelligence in the building of democracy and political stability in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is crucial. Jordan, strategically located in the Middle East, presents a long-run import-export relationship. On the one hand, Jordan, a country of few natural resources, imports oil products and natural gas to meet its energy needs. On the other hand, Jordan exports a valuable resource which is security in terms of intelligence, geographic security, and stability...... Read more

Antonia Dimou: "Jordan and the Security Challenges of the Arab Spring"

*Speech delivered in the context of the 2013 Annual IIHA Conference that was organised in Athens, 21-23 June 2013.  

Interview excerpts

Interview excerpts of Antonia Dimou, Associate at the CSS-University of Jordan, with Ana Blazevic for Nova TV in Croatia.

Hoćemo li raditi do 67 godine života?
Prijedlozi MMF-a za Hrvatsku nisu nimalo popularni. Zato smo pričali s radnicima, sindikalistima, ekonomskim stručnjacima, ali i stanovnicima Zambije i Jordana.

(Translation) Are we going to work up to 67 years of age?
IMF suggestions for Croatia are not at all popular. So we talked with workers, unions, economic experts, but also residents of Zambia and Jordan.

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ENRICHING THE MIDDLE EAST’S ECONOMIC FUTURE CONFERENCE 14TH DOHA FORUM (MAY 12-14, 2014), QATAR

Copyright: Research Institute for European and American Studies,  Athens, Greece Dr. John Nomikos, Director of RIEAS and Ms Antonia Dimou, senior RIEAS  advisor participated in the 14th Doha Forum and Enriching the Middle East's Economic future conference which wrapped up ceremonies on  the 14th of May, concluding two days of talks which focused on the  year’s international economic developments.  Held at Ritz Carlton-Doha, the Forum co-sponsored by the Center for  Middle East Development of the UCLA attracted 700 high-profile  delegates from around the world including a number of business  leaders.  Doha Forum and Enriching the Middle East's Economic future conference  convened a workshop at Al Mukhtasar-1 titled "Eastern Mediterranean  Energy Discoveries: Opportunities and Challenges" moderated by  Ms Dimou and with Dr. Nomikos being one of the major speakers.   Photo No 1: Workshop on East Med energy - Family speakers photo:  From R to L: John Gauci-Maistre, Chairman, GM Corporate and Fiduciary  Services, Saadet Gülden Ayman, Chair, International Relations  Department, University of Istanbul, Antonia Dimou, senior RIEAS advisor,   Antoine Haddad, Director, Dar al-Tanmiya Ltd., Yiorghos Leventis,  Director, International Security Forum. Photo No 2: Workshop on East Med energy - Speakers Panel:  From R to L: Dr. John Nomikos, RIEAS Director, Saadet Gülden Ayman,  Chair, International Relations Department, University of Istanbul,  Antonia Dimou, senior RIEAS advisor, Yiorghos Leventis, Director,  International Security Forum, Antoine Haddad, Director,  Dar al-Tanmiya Ltd., John Gauci-Maistre, Chairman, GM Corporate and Fiduciary Services.