A series of topics ranging from investment in power and water infrastructure development to wastewater management strategies and renewable energy technologies was discussed at the “Oman Power and Water Summit” that was held on May 22-25, 2011 at the Grand Hyatt Muscat. The Summit was under the patronage of the Omani Public Authority for Electricity and Water, and brought together senior representatives from ministries and public authorities, power and water generation, transmission and distribution companies, renewable energy experts, international and local contractors, developers, consultants and suppliers to discuss the future of Oman’s power and water sector.
Since the market restructuring in 2005, the electricity and water sectors in Oman have benefited from public and private sector investment with significant levels of foreign direct investment in power and water production facilities. The Omani government’s decision to move away from publicly owned generation and transmission systems results in a host of opportunities for the private sector to get involved in the extension of the Sultanate’s utilities industry for the years to come. Specifically, the government is engaged in an ambitious programme that encourages the private sector to contribute towards an estimated 7.8 billion dollars worth of investment needed to bolster the sultanate’s power and water systems. In addition to increasing capacity, upgrades and technological improvements are also necessary to maximize efficiency of power and water transmission and distribution.
In this context, with all major projects and exciting developments in this particular industry sector, the “Oman Power and Water Summit” offered an invaluable opportunity for policymakers, industry professionals and leading industry players to get together and to learn from each other as they all contribute to the continued growth of the industry.
Participants in the Summit had the chance to reviewpower and water demand forecast and upcoming projects, exploreprojects for future investment in Oman’s power and water sector, assesspower generation and desalination resources required to meet fast growing energy demand, evaluatethe privatisation process of generation, transmission and distribution networks, discuss the challenges in developing independent water and power projects, find out the latest developments and cost-effective technologies within the power and water industry, appraisethe potential of renewable energy sources as a solution to the sultanate’s growing energy needs, and learnabout best practices to improve environmental compliance of existing and new infrastructure.
The four-day Summit held two essential interactive workshops extended to ensure that attendees will get to the heart of the event’s most critical issues and uncover practical solutions that one can apply in his own company.
The first workshop entitled “Asset Management Capability Assessment and Roadmap for Implementation” examined the real benefits that asset management has brought to organisations worldwide, and presented effective strategies to maintain one’s assets in a fit-for-service condition, while also extending their life-cycle in the most reliable, safe and cost effective manner. During this interactive session, challenges, innovative solutions and best practices were discussed, and attendees undertook a mini asset management benchmarking exercise for their companies, which broadly assessed their competency level as measured against the key fundamental building blocks of best practice asset management. Attendees also discussed the preferred approach for organisations to undertake a full asset management review, and typical road maps for change, including time and resource management.
The second workshop entitled: "The scope of Further Liberalisation of Oman's Electricity and Related Water Sector and Development of the IPP/IWPP Models in GCC Electricity Markets" considered teh scope fro further market liberalisation.
The privatisation of power and water facilities remains a work in progress with a mixture of publicly owned and private companies operating under licenses granted by the industry regulator. The Sector Law that established the new electricity and related water sector market structure in 2005 includes provisions to facilitate further market liberalisation, including a liberalisation measure that would permit IPP/IWPPs to sell capacity and output to persons other than the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company.
Additionally, Oman’s vital power and water sector is entering a new phase in its aggressive development market by investments in world-class green-field power generation projects, by the potentials of waste-to-energy plants, the value of solar energy in oil production, and the status of pilot renewable energy projects that are currently being implemented in rural areas. During this interactive workshop, the implications and opportunities of further liberalisation for the IPP/IWPP market in Oman was discussed, and there was provision of the key requirements for the successful development of power generation and water desalination capacity.
Key speakers in “Oman Power and Water Summit” included the Chairman of the Omani Public Authority for Electricity and Water, Mohammed Abdullah Al-Mahrouqi, Chief Executive Officer of the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP), Bob Whitelaw, the General Manager of Majan Electricity Company, Ahmed Bin Saif Al-Mazrouy, the General Manager of Wadi Al Jizzi Power Company, Zahir Al Bahri, the Director General of Projects in the Public Authority for Electricity and Water Zaher Khaled Sulaiman Al-Sulaimani, and Head of Power Systems Operation and Maintenance of the Petroleum Development of Oman, Mohammed Aghbari. Major sponsors of the “Oman Power and Water Summit” were the companies of Siemens, Wärtsilä, Future Pipe Industries, HBK Contracting, DYK Inc, ABB, Khimji Ramdas LLC, SolarTotal, Greenergy and General Electric.
Sunday, September 11, 2011
THE ARAB SPRING:
A REGION IN TRANSITION**
" "Americans are Watching the Events with Curiosity"
"
INTERVIEW WITH Colonel (Ret) Normand L. St. Pierre
Conducted by Antonia Dimou
Q. A metaphor for the unrest spreading across the Arab world is an earthquake that is changing the ground underneath. Is there a common cause and what are the reasons of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?
A. While the impact of sudden change and chaos may resemble that of an earthquake, the similarities end there.The revolutions, changes, and upheavals have a human component and are not entirely inevitable.There are no non-reversible outcomes.On the other hand, in each of the North African and Gulf scenarios, there were a variety of social, political, economic, and even cultural decisions by leadership and the revolutionaries themselves that could have made the need for protests/unrest unnecessary.
For instance, in nearly all cases to date, leaders could have opted out for an acceptable replacement or elections.Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, etc. had those options.They chose not to believe they were vulnerable – but for years citizens wanted them out.Besides corruption, however, and their own increasing loss of control, it is probably safe to say that their countries, and others in the region, have recently suffered the whip end of the global recession resulting in the severe drop in expatriate earnings, increasing cost of imports, increasing cost of energy, obligatory rises in subsidies, etc.Although leadership changes came, there was also an expectation that economic improvements would soon follow – this was as large a driver as the push for democracy.
Q. The split in NATO over its Libya operation has brought into light the differences within the alliance over the terms and goals of the mission, and the inevitably limiting effect of the alliance's consensus-based decision-making, as initially France was reluctant to hand NATO control of the Libyan mission, while Germany and Turkey opposed any military intervention, sparking the most bitter debate since the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. As the situation stands today, do you think that NATO in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis needs to look into and undertake some form of mission and structural revision?
A. NATO is not organized for quick action nor pursuing common objectives, when there is no threat to the actual member states nor clear ends.For many of the NATO members, Libya had become a new “friend” or at the very least provided a new “near abroad” market for resources and investment.Even as we speak the mission remains unclear and creeping toward more complexity.The greatest gap is between those favoring “protection of the population” vis-à-vis “elimination of Qadhafi.”A review should be conducted frequently, consistent with the views of the UN. But, more important than reviews is the need for clarity of purpose – that’s what will gain popular support by participants and continue funding streams.
Q. The strategic goal of the NATO operation and the UN Security Council Resolution that authorized it is to stop the fighting in Libya, creating a cease-fire and enabling a political solution. Has the manner in which NATO pursued the mission been consistent with that goal?
A. I cannot say for sure whether pursuit of the mission has been consistent because to achieve the UN Security Council Resolution goals there will be several interpretations of what the centres of gravity might actually be.Some will want to press against the front lines, others will target logistics, and yet again some will aim at the leadership and its resources.
Q. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have triggered a domino effect of protests calling for democratic reforms across the Arab world. It looks like a wave in the making that might remake geopolitical and internal arrangements of politics within and across the Arab world. That said, do you share the view that we are witnessing the end of the old Middle East, and how should the US act to protect its vital regional interests without appearing to be a fair-weather ally or encouraging instability?
A.I do not believe that there has been a change in the old way of doing business.There is simply no deep and fundamental understanding of democracy beyond voting and the need to be able to change leaders occasionally.If Ben Ali had stepped aside, there would have been elections again in Tunisia, without a revolution.If Mubarak had called for elections, or even stated that he was not running for election (he had great opportunities to do so at least twice in 2010), there would have been no great uproar in Tahrir Square.
Middle Easterners still want a “sheikh of sheikhs”, a charismatic, powerful figure who will fairly disperse the spoils.How this individual comes to power is less important.In both Tunisia and Egypt, the population was seeing the pie poorly divided, with the top leaders (government, business and military) getting more than is tolerable.
The US has many regional interests, from military basing and access to trade and resourcing. But the US must hedge its bets - the revolutions are not complete, for e.g. in Egypt.If the military is unable to promote civilian rule quickly, or if the military is sufficiently weakened that a popular mish-mash takes over then the future will be difficult if not chaotic.
Q. According to regional experts, the massive wave of protests in Tunisia and Egypt in particular set off a chain reaction that has blown up the entire region, and has engulfed most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East, with spreading effects into countries like Syria. That said, how is what is happening in the Arab world being seen by the Americans at the moment and how is it affecting the US?
A. Americans are watching the events with curiosity and as usual are cheering the underdogs.But let’s be honest, none of the uprisings has been significant or meaningful.No strategy nor policy of note has been impacted.Even the rise in oil prices is seen as speculation-based and not the result of regional problems.
On the other hand, Syria is a very interesting case in that it touches directly on the core US issue of the “Israeli” question.What happens in Syria could affect that process, impact Iranian influence in the region and Lebanon, and affect Hizballah’s ability to cause mayhem.This is the show to watch.Disturbances in Saudi Arabia would be a close second.
Q. US policy is a major balancing act. The United States has several interests at stake in the Middle East, like fighting terrorism and guaranteeing Israel's security. On the issue of Israel’s security, recently some concerns surfaced with regards to whether the new president-to-be in Egypt will honour the peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979 or whether the treaty will be revised at best, or scrapped at worst. How do you think the US should deal with such a new policy challenge?
A. The arguments for who benefits from the peace treaty tend to offset each other.Both Israel and Egypt have done well.Assuming logic prevails, Egyptians will realize that abandoning the Treaty will be costly, including a loss in tourist and investment revenues in the Sinai, a need to beef up forces in order to move them into the Sinai, and a loss of the annual one billion dollars plus from the US - and possible loss of US cooperation in military co-production.
The US should be active in promoting continuity on the one stable front Israel has (even Jordan is a bit shaky these days). An outbreak of friction between Egypt and Israel would be extremely costly to the US in many ways – to include deployment costs, logistical support to one or the other, etc.
Q. Calls for Arab governments to embrace democracy have been central to US policy that took into account the conflicting socio-political pressures that have long divided Arab societies. The recent uprisings in the wider Middle East which called for democratic reforms have given rise to discussions as to whether Turkey's relative success at wedding democratic freedoms with radical Islam can serve as a model. What is your opinion on that?
A. Turkey is of course a fairly good example; however, the Turks have been working at it for some time to fine tune and their experience in Europe is broader.It is too early to tell whether the revolutions in the Middle East will all lead to democratization.To date I would see we have seen a recognition of “people power.”
There’s always the possibility that this will not so much translate into democracy as much as a tool with which to beat governments into submission.The question then will be who gets to wield that tool.
*Colonel (ret) Normand L. St. Pierre recently completed six years as the MFO Director General’s Representative in Cairo, Egypt and is now a private consultant on Middle East issues. His interest in the Middle East began in 1980, while still in the US Army.As a regional specialist, he was assigned twice to the US Embassy in Tunisia, served as an advisor to the Lebanese Army in the ‘80s, and was later the US Defense Attaché to Syria.
Prior to his retirement from the military Colonel St. Pierre was the Middle East Division Chief in the Strategic Policy Division of the Joint Staff and then Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs for the Middle East and Asia at JCS.He was subsequently the political military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State, Near East Affairs at the US State Department.Prior to his work with the MFO he was a Regional Manager for a major US firm in Algeria for four years.
Mr. St. Pierre is a graduate of Bentley University and received his Masters in International Relations from Boston University. He and his wife Pearl currently reside in Leeds, Maine.
"The Reason of the Protests in the Northern Part of Cyprus was not Lack of Democracy"
"
INTERVIEW WITH Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki
Conducted by Antonia Dimou
Q.We have witnessed protests and heavy clashes between protesters and governments in the region in recent months. Is there a common cause and what are the reasons of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?
A.It seems that there is indeed both a common cause and common reason of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. All the countries that have been affected -- or are on the verge of being affected -- by popular uprisings have had one thing in common: a very lax approach to democracy.Whether the leaders of those countries have been “self-imposed” or helped to rule by the foreign powers, both groups have tended to totalitarian rather than democratic practices.
All in all, they hardly have represented the real will of majority in respective countries. This, topped with the strained economic conditions and unemployment, resulted into a series of revolutions.
In fact, it is interesting to observe that the revolution did not get an immediate positive response from the Western democracies. People from the region were many times asked to start and support democratic reforms and were promised the help, including President Obama in his famous Cairo speech.
Q.The events in Libya and the international military intervention have provided a significant test but also an opportunity for Turkey's stated desire to create a foreign policy that combines realism with idealism. How has the Libyan situation highlighted Ankara’s stature as a more independent regional leader in the Middle East and its efforts to maintain its traditional alliances, taking into account the recent tensions between Turkey and NATO as well as some of its member countries, in particular France?
A.It seems that Turkey’s support for cease-fire is gaining firmer ground, also among other NATO’s member states. Also, it has been no secret that the influence of Turkey in the region is not only because of its ties with ruling elites but – or maybe particularly – with the peoples of region. In this light, Turkey, seeing it from its own perspective, would like to see the region ruled by democracy in peace, whoever is in charge. Just remember Prime Minister’s Erdogan speech in which he addressed former Egyptian President Mubarak.
When it comes to France, I think that part of the tension between these two countries is stemming also from the role both of them tend to play in the region. (Even though I believe that given historical and geographical terms, Turkey’s engagements make more sense). France, as we know, has been taking a leading role not only in designing the future Mediterranean, that includes also part of the region known as MENA, but has been trying to spread and strengthen its influence also in the Middle East.
Q.A number of initiatives to solve the Libyan conflict have been proposed by various governments. In this context, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erodganannounced a three-phase road map which provides for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Qaddafi's forces from the besieged cities, the need to set up security zones for humanitarian aid, and, most importantly, a comprehensive democratic transformation process that will take into account the legitimate interests of the Libyan people. That said, how do you evaluate the Turkish peace initiative and what are the motives for Turkey to establish itself as mediator?
A.As far as Libya is concerned, cease-fire between rebels and Gaddafi’s option in Libya still remains the best option and priority for Turkey. From the statements made by Turkey till now on this issue, it seems that Turkey is in favour of a democratically supported leadership in Libya but at the same time is trying to avoid any further bloodshed.
It seems that Turkey believes that with the prolongation of war between rebels and the still official Libyan government, the consolidation of the country is being put in jeopardy. I believe this approach is much in line with what Turkey has demonstrated many times in last years that is Turkey favours diplomacy, though with a slow progress, over a resort to the military force.
Q.The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have triggered a domino effect of protests calling for reform across the Arab world. On all fronts, Syria, a key regional player considered by certain regional circles as cornerstone of Turkey’s Middle East policy, is facing a wave of domestic protests. Realistically, Turkish-Syrian relations have flourished in recent years as Turkish-Israeli relations have waned and grown cold. The creation of an economic bloc of Turkey-Syria-Lebanon-Jordan, with the removal of visa requirements and the injection of Turkish investment and technological know-how, is an undoubted fact. That said what is your estimate on the possible impact that the prolongation of the domestic crisis in Syria could have on its multi-facet relationship with Turkey, and on the regional structure of power?
A.Continuity of instability in the region will have enormous consequences not only for Turkey but also for the rest of the world. We have already begun to pay huge prices for oil and gas and it seems to be only the beginning. On the other hand, for any regime to survive in this region, it should boost up its democratic credential and pursue an unabated reform process. If legitimate demands of the Syrian public are not addressed peacefully we are likely to see the spill over effects in that country too.
Just like the US was trying to manage the transition period in Egypt, Turkey through its good offices is trying to secure a peaceful and stabile transition in Syria. We should not forget that for having any transition to democracy, heads do not always have to fall down.
Q.The anti-regime protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere have given rise to discussions as to whether Turkey's relative success at wedding democratic freedoms with religion can serve as a model. The Turkish model is quite interesting because Turkey has managed to marry conservative Islam with forms of western democracy without giving up traditional social values, while keeping the social base and the political structure in some kind of harmony. Do you agree with the notion that Turkey could present a genuine alternative model to regional countries like Egypt which currently undergo a political transformation?
A.Not really. Turkey’s historical encounter with democracy has been totally different than those in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. But, of course, Turkey can serve as an inspiration.
Yet, here I would like to draw attention to the article written by President Gul and published in New York Times on April 21 in which he argues that democracies can hardly be established in the Muslim world without solving the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Unless the conflict is solved in an even-handed manner, there will be always radicals exploiting it for their own ends blurring legitimacy of democracy.
Q.In recent months a series of protests took place in the northern part of Cyprus targeting the economic protocol signed with Turkey as well as the latest economic-measures package concluded in late 2009 which includes the privatization of some public institutions and wage cuts. What is your estimate for the protests in the northern part of Cyprus? Do you think that they have been inspired and motivated by the regional protests in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere?
A.It is needless to say that even though Cyprus is also located in the region, political systems established there have hardly anything in common with the regional political systems in question. The fact that the political system in the north part of Cyprus is de jure not recognized by other states but Turkey does not mean that de facto there is no running democracy. Turkish Cypriots have had couple of decades old experience with free democratic elections and their results.
Moreover, they did not rise against their own government. They protested against the government of the country they financially depend on. Turkey allocates annually about $580 million from its own budget for northern Cyprus. Northern Cyprus, on the other hand, needs this financial support because it has no other means to generate a state income. Political decisions of other countries not to trade with the Turkish Cypriots put it effectively into isolation.
So, the reason of the protests in the northern part of Cyprus was not a lack of democracy but austerity measures proposed by a country – i.e. Turkey -- that has been till now a source of the financial injections for the Turkish Cypriot economy.
* Dr. Sylvia Tiryaki is the Deputy Director of the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT) and a Vice-Chair of the International Relations Department of Istanbul Kültür University where she teaches courses on international law and political thought. She completed her Masters and doctoral studies at Comenius University in Bratislava, at the Faculty of Law. Between 2003 and 2008 she worked as the Cyprus project coordinator and a senior research fellow at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Foreign Policy Program. A regular columnist at the Turkish Daily News, Dr. Tiryaki writes extensively for various national and international academic journals and newspapers. Her fields of expertise include Turkish foreign policy, Cyprus, the Middle East and North Africa, Armenia and the European Union.
**SOURCE: Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011
Saturday, August 20, 2011
THE ARAB SPRING:
A REGION IN TRANSITION** "
“Egypt will Honor its Peace Treaty with Israel”
"
INTERVIEW WITHAmbassador Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker
Conducted by Antonia Dimou
1. In your own opinion, what is the reason of the mass wave of protests and of the sectarian crisis which has suddenly emerged in Egypt, in an unprecedented manner?
It is a combination of factors. With regard to the mass wave of protests, groups of different professions and government employees asked for an increase in their salaries and privileges. These groups are taking advantage of the revolution to improve their lot. As to the sectarian crisis it was triggered, in my view, by an accusation to the Coptic Church that it has withheld a married Coptic lady who allegedly converted to Islam and without knowing her whereabouts. This case led to a number of attacks on Churches including an attack on 7th May against another church for similar reasons. There is an accumulation of other allegations such as that certain positions in the government are exclusively reserved for Muslims.
2. The pace of change in Egypt has been extraordinary, and a step-by-step transition to democracy and renewed stability has great public and regional appeal.Is Egypt ready for democratic reforms this quickly or is it your sense that this will be a decades’ long process?
Egypt is ready for democratic reforms after more than 30 years of President Mubarak’s era. It will be a quick process, and to give you an example, elections for legislative bodies will be conducted in September followed by presidential elections in November. These elections would require a new constitution that has to be worked out in the meantime and be put to a referendum. So as you can see, we are in a rush.
Some are advocating for a slower pace that would allow also the formation of new political parties with membership open to the youth who triggered the whole revolution. It is feared that if elections were to be held by the end of the year, the old political parties on the scene and the former members of the National Democratic Party which has been dissolved as well as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Muslims will all have the upper hand in these elections. Therefore, there are voices addressed to the Higher Council of the Armed Forces to remain in power a little bit longer to allow the political national mosaic to take shape.
3. According to regional experts, the massive wave of protests in Egypt set off a chain reaction that has blown up the entire region, and has engulfed most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East, with spreading effects into countries like Libya and Syria. That said, how is what is happening in the neighbourhood being seen by the Egyptians at the moment and how is it affecting Egypt?
In my view and without interfering in the internal policies of other Arab nations, what is happening around us in the Arab world is welcomed by Egyptians who are proud to see that their revolution had an impact on other sister nations. I must also admit that Tunisia was ahead of us. It may have not been a factor in our revolution but it was an indicator that time had come for drastic change in the region. Egyptians are satisfied that other Arab nations are moving ahead as well. It gives Egyptians a great sense of comfort and accomplishment.
4. On Sunday 20, 2011, Egyptians voted 77 per cent in favour for a swift return to civilian rule. Specifically, more than 14 million Egyptians approved the constitutional amendments intended to guide Egypt through new presidential and parliamentary elections within six months. Will these changes go far enough in overhauling the Mubarak-era charter, or is there need for additional changes to be introduced so that the Mubarak-era is completely rewritten?
The vote was a prelude and an appetizer for more to come as I have already indicated. The amendments of the constitution present just the beginning for a whole review of the constitution and the making of a new one.
5. Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Nowadays, there are concerns whether the new president-to-be in Egypt will honour the peace treaty with Israel or whether it needs to be revised at best, or scrapped at worst. What is your opinion?
I must assert here that one of the very first statements issued by the Higher Council of the Armed Forces was to assure the world community that Egypt will honor all the treaties it is party of. Therefore, this statement should be read as that Egypt will honor its peace treaty with Israel. In case there is need for change or amendments, it goes without saying that they will have to be agreed upon a mutual basis.
6. Egypt has traditionally played a major and catalytic role between Israel and the Palestinians towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this context, after years of dispute, rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah recently signed an Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation agreement in Cairo, which provides a timeframe for legislative and presidential elections and calls for the formation of an interim government. That said, how do you evaluate Egyptian mediation and what are the primary reasons behind the timing of the agreement along with the possibilities and challenges ahead on the regional and international levels?
The Egyptian mediation was critical in reaching the agreement between the Palestinian factions. Egypt was involved for years in negotiating a reconciliation agreement and I believe the revolution in Egypt has prompted the Palestinians to benefit from the new climate that has emerged as a result of this revolution. Palestinians, especially those living in Gaza, are encouraged by the reopening of the Rafah crossing which I believe has also contributed to this new atmosphere.
7. The Muslim Brotherhood, the popular Islamic movement long banned from politics by former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, recently announced that it has formed a political party that will put forward candidates in parliamentary elections scheduled for upcoming September, but it will refrain from participating in the presidential election, expected two months later. That said, is the chief political platform of the new party consistent with the agenda of democratization and reform and in what ways do you predict thatthe new party will become more actively involved in the emerging new state of politics and governance in Egypt?
Let me say at the outset that a significant dichotomy exists in the establishment of a party by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has existed for many years but not developed into an association according to Egyptian Law. Therefore, for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to form a new party it has to conform to national regulation. The new party will probably be active in Parliament. As promised, the party will run for 50% of the seats in Parliament and will be satisfied if it gets between 25% and 30% of the seats. It is not going to be the first time for the Muslim Brotherhood in Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood was in parliament for the 2005-2010 term, as independent. This time it will be represented as a party, and it will have to perform according to the constitution now in the making.
* Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Sawiris Foundation for Social Development, Chairman of the Board of the Regional Information Technology Institute and Vice-Chair of the Board of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.Dr. Mohamed Shaker held the position of Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Kingdom (1988-1997) and was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Court of St. James. He was Ambassador to Austria and member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna (1986-1988).
He also held a number of positions at the UN, including UN Deputy Permanent Representative (1984-1986), member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (1993 – 1998), Chair of the Advisory Board for 1995, and member of the UN Expert Group on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (2001-2002). He holds a degree in Law from Cairo University and a PhD in Political Science from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Geneva.
Reproduced by Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2 , March-June 2011
A wave of protests sweeping through parts of the Middle East and North Africa is largely organized by the youth with demands for economic and political reforms, and a higher standard of living. An overview of the revolutionary movement that spread into the wider region denotes that all first started in Tunisia.
In Tunisia, widespread protests in late 2010 sparked by the self-immolation of a street vendor Mohammad Bouazizi in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that was allegedly inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides. His act became the symbol of remonstrance and catalyst for the Tunisian revolutionary flow which became the most dramatic social and political unrest of the last three decades. Street demonstrations were precipitated by high unemployment, high prices in basic goods, corruptionlack of civil freedoms and poor living conditions and led to the oust of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali who ruled Tunisia since 1987. Tunisian demonstrations have been dubbed the Jasmine Revolution in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of "colour revolutions", a term that is widely used by the media to describe related movements that developed in several societies in the CIS (former USSR) and Balkan states during the early 2000s.
Next, inspired by the Tunisian revolutionary protests, was Algeria. Protests throughout Algeria from 28 December 2010 onwards sparked by sudden rises in staple food prices, and opposition parties, trade unions, and human rights organisations began to hold weekly demonstrations defying a governmental declaration of a state of emergency. Algerian protests have a common denominator with those in Tunisia, most prominently high unemployment, the lack of housing, widespread corruption, restrictions on freedom of speech and poor standard of living. Major riots broke out in several areas like the Bab El Oued neighbourhood of the capital Algiers and nearby suburbs, as well as the country’s second city, Oran, and other towns including Djelfa, Boumerdes, Annaba, and Tipaza. Within days the riots spread to twenty administrative areas, covering the north including the Kabylie region, several towns in the Sahara, like Ouargla and Bechar. Widespread unrest in Algeria could have implications for the world economy because it is a major oil and gas exporter, but many analysts say a Tunisian-style revolt is unlikely as the government can use its energy wealth to placate most grievances.
Next stop was Egypt, a country of eighty million and a natural leader of the Arab world, where the popular uprising began on 25 January 2011. But many of the grievances on the street are the same. The uprising was mainly a campaign of non-violent civil resistance, which featured a series of demonstrations, and labour strikes. Public demands focused on legal, economic and political issues including police brutality, the lack of free elections, unprecedented levels of corruption in public institutions,high rate of unemployment, food price inflation and low minimum wages. The most important however demand was the end of the Mubarak regime, the cease of the emergency law, and the restoration of civil liberties. The capital city of Cairo became a war zone with 840 deaths reported, and over 6,000 injuries. Protestors stared to gather in Cairo's Tahrir Square, even after a night-time curfew came into effect, and watch groups were organised by civilians to protect neighbourhoods. In an attempt to quell dissent, the 82-year-old Mubarak dissolved his government and named his intelligence chief and close confidant Omar Suleiman as his vice-president and former air force commander Ahmad Shafiq as Egypt's new prime minister, in an apparent step toward setting up a successor other than his son, Gamal.
This move did little to mollify pro-democracy groups, and on 11th February the Vice President announced that Mubarak stepped down as president and turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. On 13 April, the prosecutor ordered the former president and both his sons to be detained for 15 days of questioning about allegations of corruption and abuse of power and later on the former Egyptian President was ordered to stand trial on charges of premeditated murder of peaceful protestors and, if convicted, could face the death penalty.
Jordan fell next in the series of regional protests with demonstrators disapproving the rising of prices and demanding the dismissal of the Jordanian government, with no direct challenge to the King. Around 3,500 opposition activists from Jordan's main Islamist opposition group, trade unions and leftist organisations gathered in the capital on 28th January asking the government to control rising prices, inflation and unemployment. In an attempt to defuse tensions, on February 1, King Abdullah sacked the government and asked Marouf al-Bakhit, an ex-army general, to form a new cabinet, with the authority to take quick, concrete and practical steps to launch a genuine political reform process so that Jordan is placed on the path to strengthen democracy. On 15th March, a 53-member committee with government officials and opposition leaders was composed to draft new election and new political parties’ laws with a set of a three-month timetable for agreement on political reforms. It is noteworthy that Jordan’s economy continues to struggle, weighed down by a record deficit of $2 billion this year,an inflation rate of around 6.1%, and rampant unemployment and poverty estimated at 12% and 25% respectively.
Syria has been influenced by concurrent protests in the region and dozens of communities across the country erupted in demonstrations against the rule of President Assad. It all began on 26th January 2011, when Hasan Ali Akleh from Al-Hasakah set himself on fire following the example of the Tunisian youth to protest against the Syrian government. On 28th January 2011, an evening demonstration was held in Ar-Raqqah, to protest the killing of two soldiers of Kurdish descent.On 15th March protests escalated simultaneously in major cities across the country and the number of protesters estimated in hundreds of thousands, suggesting that Syria’s fragmented population reached new levels of coherence and organization. the city of Daraa became the focal point for the uprising. On 20th March, thousands took to the streets of Daraa that became the focal point of protests, with slogans against the country's 48-year emergency law, the release of all political prisoners, and an end to pervasive corruption.Security forces reportedly opened fire during protests and killed peaceful demonstrators, and increasingly, the crackdown against the protests became more violent. In the wake of the violent crackdown on anti-government dissent that has left some 900 people dead, the United States imposed sanctions on three top Syrian officials, Syria's intelligence agency and Iran's Revolutionary Guard.
The US sanctions freeze any assets the individuals have in US jurisdiction and bar Americans from doing business with them. According to a White House statement, the executive order signed by American President Obama “gives the US new tools to target individuals and entities determined to have engaged in human rights abuses in Syria, and also sends a message to the Syrian people that those responsible for the abuses must face consequences for their actions”. On a parallel track, the European Union imposed an arms embargo and sanctions against 13 Syrian officials deemed responsible for the regime's harsh crackdown on protesters. Specifically the EU Council adopted a regulation and a decision providing for an embargo on exports to Syria of arms and equipment that could be used for internal repression, as well as a visa ban and an assets freeze, holding off however sanctioning the Syrian President as the 27 member states were divided over the question.
Yemen has been the next stop of protests that occurred almost simultaneously with the Egyptian revolutionary events. In the early stages, protests in Yemen were against unemployment, corruption,and against the government's proposals to amend the country's constitution. Demands escalated with calls for Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign and mass defections from the military, and the government. Succumbing to public demands, the Yemeni President announced that he would not run for re-election in 2013 and also that he would not pass power to his son, Ahmed Saleh, who heads the elite presidential guard. In response, protesters gathered in a series of cities demanding the departure of the Yemeni President with the central slogan that it was "time for change". Protestors’ demands were driven by the unprecedented high levels of poverty among a growing young population and frustration with the lack of political freedoms, and by fears that Yemen is becoming a leading al-Qaeda haven. President Saleh, last re-elected in 2006, became leader of North Yemen in 1978, and has ruled the Republic of Yemen since the north and south merged in 1990.
Saudi Arabia fell next in the series of regional protests whose size remained quite small since demonstrations are not part of the Saudi culture. Shia nationals presented the majority in protests that occurred in the city of Qatif and smaller towns in the EasternProvince, like al-Awamiyah and Hofuf, and demanded the release of prisoners, the withdrawal of Peninsula Shield Force from neighbouring Bahrain, equal representation in key offices, and reforms of political institutions. But calls for political reform gradually started coming from different sections of Saudi society, Shia and Sunni, conservative and liberal alike. It is this that alarms the authorities. On 23th February, Saudi King Abdullah, on his return after three months abroad for health treatment, announced a series of benefits for citizens amounting to 10.7 billion dollars, that include funding to offset high inflation, the loans’ writing off, increase of state employees’ salariesper cent, and the funnelling of funds for housing loans. Notably, no reference was made for political reforms and only some prisoners indicted in financial crimes were pardoned.
Oman inspired by the regional events fell in flow of protests with demands for salary increases and lower costs of living. Omani protests termed as the Green March climaxed on 18th February, demanding an end to corruption, better distribution of oil revenue, and political reforms within the current governing system of Sultan Qaboos. Reportedly, protests were peaceful, well-organised and disciplined, while placards with protest slogans were translated into English, French and German for the international media. In response to protests, the Sultan On reshuffled his cabinet,the first time in 26thFebruary, and the second in 7th March, announced benefits for the students of the Higher College of Technology, decided to set up an independent authority for consumer protection in the country, pledged to create 50,000 government jobs, provide a monthly benefit of $390 to the unemployed and ordered a committee to draft proposals for boosting the power of an elected council that advises him in state affairs. The Sultan also issued eight royal decrees including Royal Decree No 38/2011 that abolishes the Ministry of National Economy and states that a committee shall be formed by the Council of Ministers to manage the distribution of its prerogatives, allocations, assets and employees. Notably, the ministry had been targeted by protesters for being corrupt and inefficient.
Bahrain was the next stop of regional protests whose major aim was the introduction of political reforms and equality for the majority Shia population that complains of receiving poor treatment in employment, housing, and infrastructure, compared to Sunnis who have preferential status. Tens of thousands from the Shia opposition marched through the capital of Manama, carrying Bahrain's red-and-white flag and circling the Manama's financial district which is symbol of the country's prosperity in recent decades. The escalation of unrest in Bahrain prompted the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) on March 14th at the request of the Bahraini government, to send troops of the Peninsula Shield Force to guard key facilities, such as oil and gas installations and financial institutions. Around 4000 Saudi Arabian troops were dispatched, along with by 500 police officers by the UAE police.Following the deployment of foreign forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Bahraini security forces launched a crackdown on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout and elsewhere, while the king declared a three-month state of emergency, authorising the nation's armed forces chief to take all measures to protect the safety of the country and its citizens. What has become clear is that though Gulf States may not expect to face full-scale revolts thanks to a golden bargain under which their rulers trade a share of their oil wealth for political quiescence, Bahrain is among the most vulnerable to popular pressure.
In Libya, widespread protests seeking for political reforms and democratic elections, upset at delays in the building of housing units and over political corruption, faced repress by the country’s security services. By 27th January, the government had responded to the housing unrest with a 24 billion dollar investment fund to provide housing and development. Nevertheless, protests erupted in earnest on 15th Februaryand a "Day of Rage" in Libya and by Libyans in exile spread in major cities like Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Darnah, Az Zintan, and Al Bayda.
As protests progressed, the Libyan government employed artillery, warplanes, anti-aircraft weaponry, and warships against demonstrations. Active resistance to the Gaddafi regime began in Benghazi on 18th February and covered the country’s Eastern province, while the Gaddafi regime launched a counteroffensive, trying to retake the control sending infantry and armour into cities. The high death toll urged the international community to take action and on 17th March, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace.As result of the UN resolution, the Libyan government declared an immediate ceasefire that lasted only for a few hours, prompting coalition operations to begin. Specifically, nineteen French Air Force fighter planes entered Libyan airspace to begin reconnaissance missions in 19th March, and flew over Benghazi to prevent any attacks on the rebel-controlled city, US and British naval vessels fired at least Tomahawk cruise missile at Libyan integrated air and ground defence systems and Coalition jets carried out airstrikes against Libyan military installations and targets.Additionally, twenty-five coalition ships, including three US submarines, began operating in the area.On 25th March, NATO announced that it was taking over the command of the no-fly-zone operations, after several days of heated debate over who should control operations in Libya, and after a while the organisation that the Libyan government's military capabilities were significantly degraded since the operation started. As consequence of the use of violent force against protesters, a number of senior Libyan government officials resigned from their positions like the former minister of Justice and former Minister of Interior, and also a significant number of senior military officials defected.
Several peace mediation efforts were undertaken for a way out to the crisis, with most prominent a proposal by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez who offered to negotiate a settlement between the opposition and the Libyan government, an offer by South African government which proposed an African Union led mediation effort to prevent civil war, and a proposal by Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan who was the 2010 winner of the al-Gaddafi prize for Human Rights, who offered the Libyan President the possibility to appoint a new President acceptable to all Libyans as means to overcome the prolonged crisis.
