Antonia Dimou

Emerging Structural Changes
in the Eastern Mediterranean:
The Greece-Israel-Cyprus Partnership

Antonia Dimou*

Working Paper, Burkle Center for International Relations, UCLA, December 2003

With the events of 11 September 2001 and the recent war on Iraq, international politics have undergone a fundamental transformation. The structures of power and influence in world affairs are altered. The rise of Islamic radicalism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the wider Middle East reflect major issues of the post-war Iraq era.

Due to the complex situations and competing political, strategic, and ideological interests that penetrate the region, Islamic radicalism and WMD present not only a dangerous escalation but also a major impediment to a comprehensive regional security settlement.

Changes in the regional security environment that have resulted from the war on Iraq seem also to have repercussions in the Mediterranean region. The debate over regional security is intensified. Increasingly, European security is linked to Mediterranean security and stability. Despite the diversity of the countries in the Mediterranean and the challenges they face, there is a clear connection between them, stemming mainly from their growing interdependence. In this context, a cooperative approach favoring dialogue seems to be a must in security matters.

That said, the objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of establishing a Greece-Israel-Cyprus relationship that may develop as a vital pillar of any security sub-system in the Eastern Mediterranean. One of the partnership’s main objectives could focus on keeping Islamic extremism and WMD proliferation restraint.

The background of Greece-Israel-Cyprus relations
Cyprus has had diplomatic relations with Israel since 1960, and an Israeli ambassador was resident in Nicosia. Cyprus resisted Arab pressures to sever relations with the state of Israel. For decades, the island provided the only window for Israel to the Western world.

Cyprus upgraded its relations with Israel by sending an ambassador in 1994. A number of economic and cultural agreements were signed in the mid-1990s, and Nicosia concluded several deals by purchasing military equipment from Tel Aviv.[1]

The history of their bilateral relations, however, has a dark chapter because of several incidents that raised Cypriot and Greek concerns over the partnership that Israel has developed with Turkey. For example, the Cyprus government captured two Israeli Mossad agents who were suspected of gathering intelligence on behalf of Turkey about the deployment of Russian S-300 missiles in Cyprus.[2] It was also revealed that Turkish pilots have been trained on a specially-designed Israeli training range in the Negev desert,[3] including how to attack the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile system that the Cyprus government had purchased from Moscow in September 1998.[4] The system’s deployment in the island was canceled under U.S. pressure.[5]

A warmer era in bilateral relations was marked by the first exchange of presidential visits. Israeli President Ezer Weiztman visited Cyprus in November 1998 and Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides reciprocated in March 2000.

In terms of Greek–Israeli relations, a military agreement was concluded as early as December 1994.[6] Both sides however, refrained from activating the agreement for a number of reasons. The most prominent was the Greek unwillingness to disturb the very good relations that Athens maintains with the majority of the Arab states and Iran. The Arab world has traditionally reciprocated on issues that Greece considers vital national interests, notably the problem of Cyprus.[7] Another, equally important factor was the postponement of scheduled joint naval maneuvers.[8] The Greek–Israeli military agreement of 1994 had provided for joint naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean, training in each other’s airspace, and cooperation between the military industries, arms sales, and intelligence exchanges.[9]

It should be pointed out that Israel had concluded its first military agreement with its neighbor Greece with the objective of breaking its isolation from the wider region. Israel wanted to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Athens, to sell high-tech weapons systems to the Hellenic Armed Forces, and to promote joint military industrial ventures in order to penetrate the European and Balkan markets and others elsewhere.

The Greek–Israeli rapprochement was highlighted when an Israeli rescue team participated in the search-and-rescue operations that were carried out after the Athens earthquake of September 1999.[10] The rapprochement was also marked by the Greek mediation efforts for the release of Israelis who were captured by pro-Iranian Islamic organizations as well as on behalf of the thirteen Israelis captured by the Iranian authorities on charges of conspiracy against Tehran.[11]

During the last decade, it has become clear that the geographic location of Greece at the crossroads of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Europe as well as its stable macroeconomic environment are important features, making necessary the cooperation of the Israeli and Greek defense industries. This cooperation aims at the promotion of weapons systems exports to the Balkans and the European market.[12]

Greek–Israeli relations have experienced an apparent reversal of their previous historic coolness. A security partnership to maintain regional stability is among the priorities of both states. In fact, both countries wish to participate in a new era of cooperation. Many past Greek suspicions about Israel’s ties with other states, notably Turkey, seem to have been replaced by an understanding of the motivations behind the partnerships. Similarly, Israel understands the special Greek relationship with the Arab states.[13]

In May 2000, the first Greek official presidential visit to Israel took place, and President Stefanopoulos expressed willingness for a boost in the military as well as the economic cooperation between the two states. Moreover, Foreign Minister Papandreou has not ruled out a possible strategic triangle among Greece, Israel, and Turkey.[14]

Motivations and regional implications
In the post-Iraq war era, the long-term interest of the West remains the strengthening of Western-oriented states in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Mediterranean
is today the place where many of the main challenges faced by the international community occur, notably security, peace and war, and the relationship between democracy and development. The situations in Cyprus and the Middle East receive particular attention in the context of resolving Mediterranean conflicts.

In this geopolitical framework, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece may become important blocks in any defense architecture. Additionally, the gradual harmonization of Greek–Turkish relations is significant and constitutes an important element in the security of Israel, a state surrounded by countries that only recently have come to terms with its existence.

The political enlargement of the European Union to Israel’s closest non-Arab neighbor, Cyprus,[15] could possibly pave the way for Israel to join the EU.[16] The EU-Israel Association Agreement entered into force on 1 June 2000 refers to regular political dialogue, with emphasis placed on peace, security, and regional cooperation as well as on the need to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region. The EU is also Israel’s major economic partner. Israel has repeatedly shown its willingness, in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, to upgrade its status.

Consequently, the extension of the EU’s domain to the Eastern Mediterranean will amount to a greater European commitment to security in a region very close to Israel. According to certain Israeli military circles, the ultimate goal of Israel is its entrance into a collective security arrangement; it could be the European one. The entrance of Israel into the European collective economic and security structures could undoubtedly serve Tel Aviv’s long-term national and regional interests.

In this context, Israel’s relations with Greece and Cyprus become important, since Greece is a member of both the EU and NATO. The consensual decision-making system in both organizations allows small states great influence.[17] The removal of the Cyprus issue from the international agenda, and from the Mediterranean agenda in particular, is a prerequisite for the emergence of any regional security subsystem.

Israel has traditionally refrained from taking sides on Cyprus since the 1974 Turkish invasion and has maintained a position of neutrality. Tel Aviv believes that the dispute should be solved by peaceful means, and past efforts of Honorary President of the AJC Ambassador Alfred Moses, who was the Clinton Administration’s envoy on Cyprus, were directed toward that end. Greece and Cyprus seem to posses an important place in the Israeli strategic rationale for the region since Athens and Nicosia are European countries at the crossroads of the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean as well as the wider Middle East. An end to the Cyprus problem can guarantee the long-term stability of the Mediterranean; in this context it serves Israeli interests.[18]

In fact, Israel supports a bi-communal bizonal federation for a number of important reasons. Partition is not deemed beneficial for either country in the region. The 1947 Indo- Pakistani partition is a good example. Though accepted by both sides, it was accompanied by an arms race that has ultimately turned into a nuclear rivalry. An similar, ongoing arms race in Cyprus would guarantee further instability in the wider region.

The Russian role in the Eastern Mediterranean is another factor that strengthens Israel’s interest in an end to the Cyprus dispute. Even during the post-Cold War era, long-term Israeli interests dictated the containment of Russia outside the Eastern Mediterranean. Russian attempts to penetrate the region are not conducive to the Israeli interests. The Israeli strategic perception was best depicted by the plans of Cyprus to purchase S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia and station them on the island, close to Israel’s airspace.

Israel sided with Turkey on that matter. Consequently, a bi-zonal federation for the Cyprus issue is viewed in the context of preventing Russia from capitalizing on local conflicts. The traditional Russian strategic goal has focused on access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who supports a more assertive approach toward Western interests, adopts this goal. The Russian navy has actually renewed its emphasis on force projection and plans to send its vessels further out from the country’s shores.[19]

Israel is also opposed to the possibility of the establishment of a radical Islamic state in northern Cyprus. In the case of partition, radicalization of Islamic elements in the Turkish part of Cyprus as a result of economic or political unrest is a possible development that runs contrary to Israeli national security.

Additionally, the possibility of the permanent division of the Cypriot capital will constitute a detrimental development for Tel Aviv, as the current status in Nicosia is similar to the pre-1967 partition of Jerusalem. The Cyprus partition would constitute a bad precedent for the Israeli claim over an undivided Jerusalem, which is one of the major issues to be tackled in any final Arab–Israeli peace agreement. A federal solution would unite Nicosia and could strengthen Israel’s case for a similar preferred position on the final status of Jerusalem. Though in a different context, a shared rule arrangement in Cyprus could also be the model for a broader regional structure between Israel and its closest neighbors, namely the Palestinians and Jordan.

In conclusion, it would be useful if more U.S. and European diplomacy were directed toward the Cyprus issue. An agreement on the political future of the island will undoubtedly have positive spill-over effects for the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider region.

Bringing Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and possibly Turkey together would constitute a significant contribution to Western interests and Western security in general.

The tripartite partnership in the post-Iraq war regional environment
A new post-Iraq war reconfiguration of pro-Western states in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on collective security and economic cooperation, could become the fulcrum through which a wider balance of power could be preserved. A system based on multinational task forces, joint military exercises among Greece, Israel, Cyprus, and possibly Turkey, expanded regional trade, and democratic reform can provide guarantees for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The tripartite partnership may find its prominent place in the emerging Mediterranean security structures. The partnership can serve as a means to provide a wider security subsystem that will limit drastically the role of states such as Russia as security guarantors of this critical area. Upon this basis, the partnership can commit itself to help bring the Mediterranean neighbors closer to the European democratic model. Creating a network of democratic countries in the region will have positive repercussions throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. In this context, Greece has taken the initiative to bring about a rapprochement with Turkey.

Interestingly, by cementing relations with Cyprus and Greece, Israel hopes to strengthen its friendly ties with two European states, one of them “shares its borders” (220 miles to its west) and also to effect the evolution of relations between Israel and the EU. An EU–Israeli enhancement in relations, however, seems to remain dependent on substantial progress in the Arab–Israeli peace process. It is widely acknowledged that the Arab–Israeli peace process that was accelerated with the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 made Israel a “less problematic” strategic partner.

Additionally, the three states hope to affect the evolution of relations between Cyprus and Turkey and especially preempt any development that can have a negative impact on regional stability. Cyprus could become a showcase, living proof of how different races and religions can live together in harmony.

Behind the emerging tripartite partnership is the concept of constructive participation as opposed to the passive re-activism so that regional promotion of democratic institutions and economic development take place, meaning the Mediterranean and the broader region.

Upon this logic, informal talks between warring parties in dispute such as the Middle East could provide a forum of dispassionate discussions on pivotal matters of mutual concern. For example, Greece, as a cultural and economic bridge between Europe and Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, has aimed to play a constructive role by hosting the Athens Dialogue, a series of meetings between Israelis and Palestinians. This sort of dialogue is part of a broader framework of diplomatic initiatives aimed at strengthening ties among neighbors and developing the strategic community of interests that would prevent crises and defuse tensions.

It is also in everyone’s interest, certainly in the interest of Greece and Cyprus, that Turkey is integrated into Europe, an area of stability. In fact, the Westernization of Turkey and its integration into the Western value and stability system was the main vision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of modern Turkey.

Consequently, the enhancement of Greece-Israel-Cyprus relations may create their own regional dynamics that can transform into a cooperative and complementary one to other regional partnerships, most prominently the Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian one that is embodied in the wider regional security subsystem.

To sum up, Greece, Israel, and Cyprus can serve as pillars of stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the wider Middle East. Working from this collective strength, they can pursue their regional policies. A joint program of action between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus can include the coordination of policies, strengthening of relations between Israel and the EU, as well as establishment of a structural dialogue on security issues. Along these lines, Greek-Israeli-Cypriot security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, with the involvement of other regional countries, can materialize.

Notes
1. Israeli official policy is not to sell Cyprus “shooting equipment.” Israeli companies
have sold Cypriots a variety of security equipment, such as a Coast Guard ship, communications
and night vision equipment, and battle suits. Experts from Israel give advise
to the civil defense system of the island.
2. The head of the Mossad at that time, Efraim Halevy, visited Nicosia and informed the
Cypriot authorities that the two agents belonged to a unit of the surveillance division
of Mossad that is identified as “Neviot.” Their mission was to tap police and national
guard networks, in order to warn other operational Mossad units that followed Hezbollah
or Iranian intelligence agents. “Compensation Is On the Way,” Ha’aretz, 14
September 1999.
3. Marios Leonidas, “Israel and Turkey: An Eye-Popping Relationship,” The Greek
American, 25 July 25 1998.
4. According to a NATO source referred to the Texas-based Global Intelligence Update
of 20 September 1998, the Israeli air force was training Turkish pilots to strike at Cyprus.
They used a mock-up of the area where the S-300 system was likely to be deployed
and Israeli reconnaissance photos of Cyprus. Obviously, Israeli combat experience
against Soviet-made weapons systems with which countries in the region
such as Syria are equipped made the training of critical importance to Turkey’s military.
5. M. Evriviades, “Israel, Turkey, and Greece,” Cyprus Weekly, 18–24 Sept. 1998; and
S. Rodan, “Cyprus, Russia Ask Israel to Keep Out of S-300 Deal,” Defense News, 23
Feb.–1 Mar. 1998.
6. The agreement was signed by Greek Defense Minister Gerasimos Arsenis and Israeli
Defense and Prime Minister, the late Yizhak Rabin.
7. Z. Mihas, “Lefkosia Wants a New Strengthen of Ties Between Greece and Israel,”
Imerisia, 19–20 August 2000.
Dimou 7
8. The reason for the postponement was that the Greek navy was busy preventing infiltrations
from Albania and could not spare a frigate for the exercises. See J. Nomikos,
“Greek-Israel Relations,” the Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE),
the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE), 1998.
9. Y. Melman, “Like Sirtki: One Step Forward and Two On the Side,” Ha’aretz, 5 October
1997.
10. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, web site at http://www.mfa.co.il.
11. The mediating role was demonstrated after a relevant request was submitted to Greek
Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos by U.S. officials during his September 1999
visit to Washington. D. Apokis, “Greek Opening to Israel,” To Vima (Greek daily), 26
September 1999.
12. Z. Mihas, “American–Israeli Marriage for the F-16’s Warfare Electronic System,”
Imerisia, 16–17 December 2000.
13. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post during his official visit to Tel Aviv in October
1999, Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos stated that Greek worries
about a sinister dimension to Turkish–Israeli ties have been replaced by a better understanding
of the motivations behind this relationship.
14. Ha’aretz, 15 May 2000.
15. Cyprus is one of the ten countries that signed the Accession Treaty in Athens on 16
April 2003. Following the completion of the required ratification procedures, they
will become full members as of 1 May 2004. From the conclusions of the EU, it is
evident that until a solution to the political problem is achieved, the implementation
of the acquis communautaire will be suspended in the northern part of the island. In
the past, Turkey threatened to annex the northern part of Cyprus in response to the
accession of Cyprus to the EU. The arguments put forward by the Turkish side are
both political and legal. Poltically, admitting only one part of the island would allegedly
further deepen the division between the two communities. Legally, accession is
considered to be a breach of the relevant provision of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee
which stipulates that the Republic of Cyprus “undertakes not to participate in, in
whole or in part, any political or economic union with any State whatsoever, it accordingly
declares as prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly,
either union with any other state or partition of the island” (Article 1).
16. This Israeli perspective was initially presented by Dr. Efraim Inbar and Dr. Shmuel
Sandler in the context of a study carried out in 1999 under the Manatos and Manatos
Consulting Company, Public Relations firm in Washington, D.C.
17. Ibid.
18. E. Inbar and S. Sandler, Israel in the Region (Israel: BESA, 2001).
19. “Reviving Russia’s Navy: Putin’s New Doctrine,” Strategic Comments, July 2000.

*Antonia Dimou, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan