Iran’s Nuclear Program at the Crossroads: Greece May Walk the Line of Mediation

(Photo from Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

By Antonia Dimou

The international talks on Iran's nuclear program that got under way in Geneva in early December amid Iranian claims that the first consignment of locally produced raw uranium has been delivered to its enrichment facility in the central province of Isfahan have produced poor results and agreed to be resumed on January 2011. Talks between Iran and the five-plus-one UN powers namely the US, Russia, China, France and Britain plus Germany were stalled 14 months ago, while on June 2010 a divided UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of financial and commercial sanctions on Iran. Resolution 1929 has reinforced a range of economic, high-technology and military sanctions against Iran, and targeted 40 entities linked to the nation's military elite.

On current developments with regards to the Iranian nuclear program, including the impact of new sanctions on Iran, few experts express optimism that the fourth round of UN sanctions has the potential to put real economic pressure on Iran, suggesting the effects are still nebulous and that Iran will readily adapt to the new circumstances. There are also additional concerns that insistence on enrichment suspension is a non-starter because it is politically untenable for any Iranian politician to accept foreign-imposed conditionality on its decision-making.

Thus, the main conclusion produced by the recent talks with regards to Iran’s nuclear program is that dialogue and mediation have to be given an additional chance. Of the various countries that have often mediated, Greece can be a sobering alternative. Greece is well-located at the crossroads of Europe, the Islamic world, the Balkans and the Mediterranean, hospitable, and acceptable to all sides.

But for any mediation to be successful, it is essential to understand Iran’s current Foreign and Security Policy Choices. Tehran continues to design its foreign policy initiatives on the following central strategies: improve ties with Europe, China, and India to counter US threats, criticize US regional policies and initiatives but align with the US agenda in Iraq, and consolidate Iran’s central role in the region through enhanced economic cooperation and technical superiority. Iranians see American refusal to recognize their natural leadership role in the Persian Gulf as a key point of tension. This desire for international legitimacy and respect from the international community drives Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear options. To better understand Iran’s motives, it is essential to provide answers to a set of critical questions.

First, why does Iran need nuclear technology if it has so much oil and gas? The pursuit of technology does not always have to make economic sense, and the economics of producing oil for domestic consumption versus export and use of nuclear power for domestic energy is more complicated than the public debate suggests. The real issue is to find the common ground between Iranian needs and Western demands: there is agreement that Iran can have a nuclear power plant, there is overwhelming logic to avoid confrontation, however, there is estrangement of views over Iranian uranium enrichment activities.

Second, why does Iran want to have nukes? The Iranian argument is that nuclear capability would bring Iran domestic legitimacy, international acceptance, and regional influence.

Third, who can Iran trust to help it acquire nuclear technology? The right to acquire nuclear technology is one issue that unites the whole Iranian political spectrum. Some Iranians, however, criticize the Islamic regime for relying too much on Russia. It is estimated that at the end of the day, Moscow will drop Iran to preserve its relationship with the United States, but Iran seems not to see another attractive alternative to Russian assistance in acquiring nuclear technology.

There is widespread belief of the Iranian public that a nuclear weapon would reflect Iran’s power, prestige, and regional prominence, but it would not resolve issues with the US, could encourage a regional arms race, and could increase the dependence of smaller regional powers on Washington. There are even fears that a group like al-Qaeda could have access to weapons resulting in nuclear terrorism.

Iran has a very young society; the majority of its population is under the age of 30, with an unemployment rate of nearly 20 percent. According to recent polls, the Iranian public shares a very open desire for the re-establishment of relations with the US, but on an equal footing. Despite that Iran continues to remain high on the US list of states sponsoring terrorism, the Obama presidency has made some open gestures for dialogue with Tehran over its arms build-up, financial support for Islamic militant groups such as Hamas and Hizbolalh, and implacable opposition to Israel and the Middle East peace process.

The US seems to view Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a major challenge, not because a nuclear-armed Iran would necessarily ever use a nuclear weapon, but because it sees Iran as a major challenge in the Middle East and it is worried about what countries around Iran might do, in terms of also deciding to pursue nuclear weapons, or at least a nuclear weapons capability. As it is evident, nuclear arms race in the Middle East is an unwelcome development not only for Washington but also for the EU.

In this political framework, Athens can offer milestone mediation. Greece may be a small country, but diplomacy is about understanding codes and the symbols of the language. And in this sense, Athens is better trained as it was through war or peace she had a lot more contact with the Iranians.

The critical role of Greece was explicitly stressed by former Iranian foreign minister Mottaki during his December 6th official visit to Athens during which he stated: “Greece is a very important country in the European family and can play a very important role in developing and strengthening EU foreign policy. In the past, Greece has supported the Tehran declaration with regard to exchange of nuclear fuel and this is of particular value to us”. Also, “The mutual trust shared by our two countries and peoples is the best capital for developing relations. Over the past 30 years, our two countries have always had constructive cooperation, whether bilaterally or trilaterally, on various regional issues”.

In fact, Greece has an excellent record of mediation between Iran and the West. It was the only country in then 15-member European Union not to recall its ambassador from Tehran due to a German court verdict related with the Mykonos case in 1997, which revealed a connection between the Iranian government and the assassination of political opponents to the Iranian regime in Germany. The verdict ended the EU-Iran “Critical Dialogue” aimed to moderate Iran through negotiations on issues such as its nuclear programme, human rights record and terrorism. Greece was the only EU country at the time that disagreed with the policy of isolating Iran and maintained its embassy in the Iranian capital representing EU interests.

Undoubtedly, Greece repeatedly brought Iran in from the cold. The first European Union Defense Minister to visit Iran since the Islamic revolution in 1979 was then Greek Defense Minister Tsohatzopoulos. The purpose of the four-day official visit of June 1999 was to exchange views on issues of mutual interest and to exploit opportunities to develop bilateral cooperation in the defense sector. At that time, Iran perceived Greece as intermediary to strengthen its ties with other NATO countries.

Also, the importance given by Iran to the role of Greece, as an EU member-state, to mediate with the EU towards attracting investors was evident and credible. During the 1999 official visit of then Greek President Stephanopoulos who inaugurated the Greek-Iranian economic forum, the Iranian leadership asked the help of Greece to deliver to the EU Tehran's credibility concerning its international accords, and stressed the need to promote private initiative. Additionally, the Greek government successfully mediated and contributed to the release of 13 Iranians of Jewish origin accused of conspiracy against Iran in 2000. The trial was heard in a Revolutionary Court, the branch of Iran's legal system that deals with political and moral crimes, and crimes involving national security.

More than any other country in the West, EU-member Greece was also the conduit for Iran to voice its views on Afghanistan, where it exerts significant influence through the country's Shiite Muslim minority. In fact, the Greek leadership delivered messages during the US-led military campaign against Afghanistan in 2001. The visit by George Papandreou, then foreign minister, to Tehran at the behest of then US Secretary of State Colin Powell was important. What came out from the visit was not only that Iran was intent on playing a full role in a post-Taliban Afghanistan, but also, Tehran agreed to allow Afghanistan-bound US food and aid to be distributed through its ports.

By being a bridge between Iran and the European Union, Greece can help smooth the way for closer relations between Washington and Tehran. Greece can urge dialogue between Iran and the West; a consensus, however, on modalities of timing, level (special representative, ambassadorial, or Track 2 diplomacy), or approach (grand bargain with all issues on the table or limited topics with the emphasis on first dealing with simpler issues to build confidence) is a major prerequisite.

The benefits of mediation for Athens can be multi-fold. Mediation can establish Greece as the critical player in this process. The contacts emerging from official diplomatic and political on the upper echelons or unofficial track-II meetings can be translated into practical measures when necessities of state demand.

Not least, the attitude of several governments toward Greece can be deeply affected by a successful mediation and the relationships developed from them. The way that such the US, Israel, Iran, Iraq, the EU and other governments can deal with Athens as if it were the hub of the Middle East, is critical so that Greece can re-emerge as a major geopolitical player in the entire region.

UN Security Council Approved New Iran Sanctions

(Photo from: http://www.payvand.com/news/10/apr/1105.html)

A divided UN Security Council on June 9, 2010, imposed a fourth round of financial and commercial sanctions on Iran.

Resolution 1929 reinforces a range of economic, high-technology and military sanctions against Iran, and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Javad Rahiqi, and 40 entities linked to the nation's military elite. The sanctions also target 15 companies linked to the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which was involved in the construction of the secret Qom facility. Sanctions are also imposed on 22 firms, including the First East Export Bank, involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic weapons program, and on three entities controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, which is accused of transporting illicit military goods to Iran.

The 15-nation Council adopted Resolution 1929 by vote of 12 in favour to 2 against and 1 abstention. Brazil and Turkey voted against citing concerns that key sponsors of the Resolution did not exhaust diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff with Tehran, while Lebanon abstained.

In voting against the resolution, Turkey and Brazil said that they shared US concerns about Iran's nuclear program but they would vote against the text because it ran contrary to their efforts to bring about a negotiated solution through the Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010, which provided a new opportunity for diplomacy. In fact, Turkey and Brazil supported that they had negotiated constructively with Iran, reaching a nuclear fuel agreement they believed could serve as a basis for a more comprehensive dialogue with the 5+1 Powers.

Specifically, Brazil opposed the resolution on the basis that it would delay rather than accelerate progress, and maintained that the adoption of sanctions by the Council was like following one of two tracks to solving the question, and in its opinion, the choice was made on the wrong track.

Turkey, for its part, supported that it sees no viable alternative to diplomacy and supported that the Tehran Declaration, signed between Turkey, Brazil and Iran, which aimed to provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor, has created “a new reality” with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme since it was designed as a confidence-building measure, which, if implemented, would contribute to the resolution of thorny issues related to the nuclear programme.

Lebanon maintained that Iran has right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, and supported that the fuel swap deal Tehran negotiated with Brazil and Turkey provided the framework to resolve the problems emanating from Iran’s nuclear program. The sanctions regime, on the other hand, represented the absolute failure of diplomatic efforts.

After the vote, the UN five major powers of the Council issued a joint statement calling on Iran to restart talks on its nuclear program. The US, Britain, France, China and Russia - plus Germany called their strategy a combination of diplomacy and pressure, aimed at convincing Iran that it is heading in the wrong direction. They also pledged to engage Iran in talks on a deal to swap Iranian low-enriched uranium for a supply of more purified form of uranium to be used for a medical research reactor in Tehran.

It is noteworthy that the US administration succeeded in securing support for sanctions from the Council's permanent members, including China and Russia. Ever since Iran’s controversial nuclear program became public, Russia and China as permanent members of the Security Council have played a critical role on this issue. Iran has over the past years exerted its utmost efforts to evade from sanctions and benefit from Russian and Chinese leverage. Despite a number of lucrative deals offered by Iran to Russia and China, thus far American influence has proved to be prevailing in the diplomatic game. In other words, Iran did not manage to divide the 5+1 Powers and gain the support of both Russia and China in its nuclear program.

The immediate remarks by US President Obama on Resolution 1929 as released by the White House on June 9, 2010, focused on that “these sanctions show the united view of the international community that a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is in nobody’s interest, and that nations must be held accountable for challenging the global non-proliferation regime. The Iranian government must understand that true security will not come through the pursuit of nuclear weapons. True security will come through adherence to International Law and the demonstration of its peaceful intent.” And concluded, “We recognize Iran’s rights. But with those rights come responsibilities. And time and again, the Iranian government has failed to meet those responsibilities. Iran concealed a nuclear enrichment facility in Qom that raised serious questions about the nature of its program”.

Iran's official reaction to the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 as issued by its Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on June 18, 2010, was that the Islamic Republic has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while special reference was made on the last report by the Director General of the IAEA, published only a day before the Resolution, which reiterated for the 22nd time that Iran’s activities have not diverted from their peaceful objectives.

Additionally, the Iranian parliament, in response to the new UN sanctions Resolution, voted overwhelmingly on June 16, 2010 to study a bill that if approved would allow a reciprocal inspection of foreign ships and also bar inspection of the Iranian nuclear sites beyond the NPT requirements. Of the 197 MPs present in the parliament, 180 voted to study the proposed bill, 4 voted against, and 4 abstained. Since Resolution 1929 allows inspection of Iranian ships, Iran appears ready to exert reciprocal inspection of foreign ships in the Strait of Hormuz if any Iranian ship is inspected.

Also, Iran has publicly welcomed US companies to invest in the country’s economic projects with no limitations. At the same time, Tehran expressed its satisfaction over the recent position taken by the US National Foreign Trade Council rebuffing economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic, while at the same time Iran announced its aim to establish a joint trade committee with three North American countries in a bid to create an opportunity to exchange information between Iranian firms and companies in the three North American states, as confirmed by the chairman of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mine, Mohammad Nahavandian.

At the same time, Iran appears determined to review its cooperation with Russia within a long-term framework, as reaction to the position adopted by Russia in the UN Security Council vote and to the Russian delay for the delivery of the S-300 anti-missile system. Reports leaked from the French capital disclose that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, during talks with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on June 11, 2010, stated that Russia decided to "freeze the delivery of the S-300 missiles". According to the Iranian position, Russia is in flagrant breach of its contractual obligations towards Iran since Moscow has so far abstained to deliver the system on the promised date while it has been prepaid for the deal. The S-300 system, is a vital air defence project for Iran as it can track targets and fire at aircraft 120 kilometers (75 miles) away, feature high jamming immunity, and it is capable to simultaneously engage up to 100 targets.

On a final flashpoint background note as related to Iran’s nuclear program, it is important to stress that it was the administration of President Gerald Ford in the 1970s that convinced Iran to pursue nuclear energy as sustainable alternative to hydrocarbon based production. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran did actually receive US assistance under the Atoms for Peace program to build a nuclear research reactor in Tehran (TRR). For more than 30 years the TRR has produced medical isotopes for the treatment of some 800.000 cancer patients. That research reactor is now running out of fuel.

During the early 2000s, in a gesture of goodwill, Iran’s reformist government at that time temporarily suspended its entire nuclear enrichment program and, in December 2003, signed and implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol that provides for more intrusive inspections than those required under the NPT. However, Iran resumed its enrichment program and dropped its Additional Protocol cooperation.

In the Fall of 2009, the US proposed that Iran swap, in a third country, 1.200 kilograms (2.646 pounds) of its low-enriched uranium (LED) for the higher-enriched uranium needed to fuel the TRR. Iran accepted this offer, in principle, but demanded guarantees to ensure it would actually receive the needed fuel. On May 17, 2010, Turkey, Brazil and Iran signed a third-country swap agreement that was the same deal earlier offered by the US, except for a clause that provided for the return of Iran’s LED in the event the enriched fuel was not delivered within a year.

Resolution 1929 (2010), Security Council, 6335^th Meeting,

New York, June 9, 2010

(Photo from: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june10/iran_06-09.html)

Note: Resolution 1929 imposes restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, its ballistic missile program, and for the first time, its conventional military, It creates a new framework to crack down Iranian banks and financial transactions. It targets entities, individuals and institutions including those associated with the Revolutionary Guard. Resolution 1929 aims to present the most comprehensive sanctions faced by Iran.

Following are excerpts of Resolution 1929 (2010).

The Security Council,

Noting with serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, ……and noting that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,

Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,

Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility; (Article 6)

Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel; (Article 8)

Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution; (Article 11)

Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions; (article 15)

Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;

** First published in MEO, June-August 2010.

FREEDOM FLOTILLA: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS- LESSONS LEARNED**

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"Turkey Taking Sides Ends Its Regional Role"
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"INTERVIEW WITH General (R.) Dr. Ephraim Sneh

Conducted by Antonia Dimou


1. The Free Gaza movement says it intended to deliver aid to Gaza to get around the Israeli blockade and to pressure the international community to review its sanctions policy and end its support for continued Israeli occupation. Do you agree with this public statement and what do you believe was the aim of the Gaza-bound flotilla?

At first, let's remind the true facts. On September 9th, 2005, Israel evacuated its last soldier from Gaza Strip. Not a shred of Israeli presence was left there. 8.000 Israeli settlers were evacuated as well. From this day and on, the Palestinians could turn Gaza to a Mediterranean Dubai. To bring investors, to start development projects, the entire world was ready to help. Instead, Hamas, the Palestinian version of Taliban, turned Gaza, with the massive help of Iran, to a base of terrorism, launching rockets and missiles to Israeli civilian towns and villages. In mid-June 2007, Hamas took full control of Gaza through a brutal coup-detat, slaughtering Abu-Mazen's supporters and enforcing the extremist version of Islam. Yes, Gaza should be freed, from Hamas brutal, medieval regime.




2. Why did Israel want to stop the flotilla and what is the view of Israel for the Free Gaza Movement, an umbrella organisation of groups like the Turkish IHH?

They don’t want to free Gaza. They want to support the military regime of Hamas in Gaza. To allow the flotilla, means to allow naval route of supply to the terrorist base of Hamas and Iran.



3. What is the objective of the Israeli blockade on Gaza imposed in 2007 and what has been its impact until today?

The Hamas take over in June 2007 created a new situation. Till then, 750 trucks used to cross the border with Israel daily. In that time, I was the Deputy Minister of Defense and I was in charge of it. But when you have terrorists on the other side of the border, it is impossible to maintain cross-border movements as it was before. Recently, the Government of Israel, allowed most goods to be imported to Gaza, but the security conditions do not allow trade as it used to be. I support the idea of handing the control over check-points to Fayyad's government but Hamas will not allow it to happen.



4. There is mounting criticism that Israel breached international standards and human rights law through its use of armed force. There are even questions being raised about the violation of international maritime law by Israel. Can you comment on that, and according to your view was the Israeli action legal?

No other democratic nation could act differently. Do you imagine what the Turks would do if a flotilla was moving to support the PKK?


5. Do you believe that the recent Gaza-bound flotilla has become a precedent that may inspire other countries and/or organisations to adopt similar efforts in the name of Gaza?

There are a lot of organizations which sympathize with Hamas. Part of them out of solidarity with the extreme Islamist movement, like IHH. Part of them because they think that to hate Israel is the current bon-ton of some ultra-liberal circles and anarchists in Europe. So it will continue. Not only organizations. States like Libya and Iran may send their provocative flotillas.


6. What are the likely political repercussions and the lessons learnt from the recent events?

I can tell you what the lesson is for us, the Israelis: to be better prepared. To act in a more sophisticated way. Not to enter to traps.


7. Let’s come to the recent situation between Turkey and Israel. How much do you think will the recent tension affect the strategic nature of the Israeli-Turkish relationship? And what is your view of the new Turkish foreign policy as promoted by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, particularly in regards to Turkish-Israeli relations?

I strongly believe that two regional strong democracies – Israel and Turkey, should be in good relations. Once we used to be strategic allies. Once I toyed with the idea of an alliance of the three big democracies of the East-Mediterranean: Greece, Turkey and Israel. We share some basic interests. To remind you, till 2008 we accepted Turkey as an honest broker between us and Syria. But I am afraid now that the new Turkish policy went too far. I told my Turkish colleagues: "I have no problems about your new policy. But there is one red-line that you can't cross - taking side with the mortal enemies of Israel - Iran and Hamas".

The Turkish flotilla and Turkey’s vote against Iran sanctions in the UN Security Council – all this means that Turkey takes side. Beside the damage to our bilateral relations which I cherish very much, if Turkey sides with the fanatic Islam, it can't pursue the constructive regional role that it wants to play.


* General (R.) Dr. Ephraim Sneh is Chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at Netanya Academic College and President of the Silver Bullet Ltd. He was Member of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in 1992-2008, and Chairman of the Knesset sub-committee on Defense Planning and Policy in 2003-2006. He also served twice as Deputy Minister of Defense in 2006-2007 and in 1999-2001, Minister of Transportation in 2001-2002, and Minister of Health in 1994-1996. General (R.) Dr. Ephraim Sneh led the first secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO in 1988-1989. He is the author of two books "Responsibility" [1996], and "Navigating Perilous Waters": Israel Strategy for Peace and Security [2002].

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"Lift the Siege on Gaza as soon as Possible"

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INTERVIEW WITH Ambassador Marwan Abdelhamid

Conducted by Antonia Dimou



1. Critics have accused Free Gaza movement of deliberately provoking a confrontation with Israel and argued that the attempt to break the siege was political and not just a humanitarian relief operation. Do you agree with this view and what do you believe was the aim of the Gaza-bound flotilla?

Israel attacked the Freedom flotilla in international waters, killing nine Turkish nationals, in a process of piracy in the daytime; it has proved that the fleet was carrying humanitarian aid to the three-year besieged people of Gaza.

Against Israeli allegations, as known to the whole world, there was no weapon on the ships. Instead, one Israeli soldier was killed, nine Turks were killed, and more than forty passengers of these ships were wounded.
The whole world no longer accepts the Israeli siege imposed on over a million and half Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.


2. In the days after the flotilla event and in response to critics, Israel has claimed that it has the legal argument to enforce a naval blockade on Gaza in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho agreement of May 1994. Under the agreement between the PNA and Israel, the latter reserves the right to patrol 20 nautical miles of those waters "without limitations" and to take "any measures necessary against vessels suspected of being used for terrorist activities... or for any other illegal activity". Can you comment on that?

Was a fleet of freedom to help the people of Gaza, a terrorist act?! Note that the crime of piracy took place in international waters, what is the relationship of this aggression, with the Oslo agreements?! Were the Representatives and the citizens of Europe, America and the world terrorists?! Was the cargo of the Freedom flotilla loaded with weapons and explosives, or with foodstuff and medical supplies to prevent Israel's blockade on the people of Gaza?


3. Following Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in August 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the territory was no longer occupied. However, since September 2007, Israel has declared Hamas-ruled Gaza a "hostile entity" and blockaded the Strip. What has been the objective of the Israeli blockade on Gaza and what has been its real impact up-today?

Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza since the signing of the Oslo agreements in 1994, and a separation between Gaza and the West bank, because Tel Aviv does not long for the establishment of an independent Palestine state in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem., Note that the Oslo agreements provide for the geographical unity and for unity in all political and legal aspects of these areas. The world must know that Israel is preventing Gaza students from studying at universities in the West Bank, and patients from receiving medical treatment at hospitals in the West Bank. Israel also discourages the economic unity and prevents the movement of goods and people between the West Bank and Gaza. The announcement by Israel of Gaza as hostile entity after the Hamas takeover was in fact in line with the Israeli policies since Oslo.


4. In a recent interview with an Egyptian television channel, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said that the state of the Palestinian cause was like that of a hijacked airplane and added that the decision on the Palestinian reconciliation was in Iran's hands, because Hamas obeyed Iran, and thus was thwarting the reconciliation. Do you believe that the recent Gaza-bound flotilla has become a precedent that may inspire other countries and/or organisations to adopt similar efforts exploiting the “Gaza card”?

There is regional interference, this is no secret, in the Palestinian internal affairs. It's not just Iran alone; there are Arab countries which prevent the restoration of Palestinian unity. Liberty Fleet had a pure humanitarian goal, and not the goal of recruitment in Gaza.
Intensifying international pressure on Israel to lift the unjust siege on our people in the Gaza Strip is urgent, whether by sending ships or in any other way. The lift of the siege on Gaza must happen as soon as possible.


5. The Palestinian camp seems to be deeply divided. How can reconciliation be possible between the secular outlook of Fatah movement and the Islamist worldview of Hamas? Could Marwan Barghuti, the leading figure of the second Intifada who is imprisoned in Israel, bring about reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas?

These political forces are all for one people. The democratic choice of people and the principle of evolution to power are the foundations for the protection of the internal unity of the Palestinians. Suspension of external interference in Palestinian affairs is urgent.


6. Israeli Premier’s predecessor Ehud Olmert made an offer, the establishment of a Palestinian state on far more than 90 percent of the West Bank, a division of Jerusalem and the return of a few thousand refugees to Israel. Was this offer genuine and can such an offer serve as a genuine basis for the creation of a viable and sovereign Palestinian state?


We have heard in the media this proposal by Olmert. But the Palestinian people insist that Israel withdraws from all occupied lands of 1967, implements the resolutions of International Law including resolution 194, accepts the right of Palestinian refugees to return and ends settlement activity. As it is evident, there can be no peace under occupation and with the expansion of illegal settlements.


7. Before the flotilla intercept operation, Hamas seemed to be on the defensive domestically in the West Bank and Gaza and was blamed for prolonging the 3-year split with Fatah. In the day after the flotilla event, what do you believe is the standing of Hamas and what are the likely political repercussions and the lessons learnt?

We are not interested in determining the goals of Hamas, we are interested in lifting the siege that is imposed on our people in Gaza. This is the basis.


* Amb. Marwan Abdelhamid is member of the Central Council of the PLO, President of the General Union of Palestinian Engineers (GUPE), Vice President of the World Federation of Engineering Organization (WFEO). He was advisor to the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and served as Ambassador of Palestine to Greece.


** SOURCE: SPECIAL EDITION OF MIDDLE EAST OBSERVER, Issue #3, Vol. 1, June-August 2010