A divided UN Security Council on June 9, 2010, imposed a fourth round of financial and commercial sanctions on Iran.
Resolution 1929 reinforces a range of economic, high-technology and military sanctions against Iran, and imposes an asset freeze and travel ban on the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Javad Rahiqi, and 40 entities linked to the nation's military elite. The sanctions also target 15 companies linked to the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, which was involved in the construction of the secret Qom facility. Sanctions are also imposed on 22 firms, including the First East Export Bank, involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic weapons program, and on three entities controlled by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, which is accused of transporting illicit military goods to Iran.
The 15-nation Council adopted Resolution 1929 by vote of 12 in favour to 2 against and 1 abstention. Brazil and Turkey voted against citing concerns that key sponsors of the Resolution did not exhaust diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff with Tehran, while Lebanon abstained.
In voting against the resolution, Turkey and Brazil said that they shared US concerns about Iran's nuclear program but they would vote against the text because it ran contrary to their efforts to bring about a negotiated solution through the Tehran Declaration of May 17, 2010, which provided a new opportunity for diplomacy. In fact, Turkey and Brazil supported that they had negotiated constructively with Iran, reaching a nuclear fuel agreement they believed could serve as a basis for a more comprehensive dialogue with the 5+1 Powers.
Specifically, Brazil opposed the resolution on the basis that it would delay rather than accelerate progress, and maintained that the adoption of sanctions by the Council was like following one of two tracks to solving the question, and in its opinion, the choice was made on the wrong track.
Turkey, for its part, supported that it sees no viable alternative to diplomacy and supported that the Tehran Declaration, signed between Turkey, Brazil and Iran, which aimed to provide nuclear fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor, has created “a new reality” with respect to Iran’s nuclear programme since it was designed as a confidence-building measure, which, if implemented, would contribute to the resolution of thorny issues related to the nuclear programme.
Lebanon maintained that Iran has right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and an obligation to adhere to the safeguards regime, and supported that the fuel swap deal Tehran negotiated with Brazil and Turkey provided the framework to resolve the problems emanating from Iran’s nuclear program. The sanctions regime, on the other hand, represented the absolute failure of diplomatic efforts.
After the vote, the UN five major powers of the Council issued a joint statement calling on Iran to restart talks on its nuclear program. The US, Britain, France, China and Russia - plus Germany called their strategy a combination of diplomacy and pressure, aimed at convincing Iran that it is heading in the wrong direction. They also pledged to engage Iran in talks on a deal to swap Iranian low-enriched uranium for a supply of more purified form of uranium to be used for a medical research reactor in Tehran.
It is noteworthy that the US administration succeeded in securing support for sanctions from the Council's permanent members, including China and Russia. Ever since Iran’s controversial nuclear program became public, Russia and China as permanent members of the Security Council have played a critical role on this issue. Iran has over the past years exerted its utmost efforts to evade from sanctions and benefit from Russian and Chinese leverage. Despite a number of lucrative deals offered by Iran to Russia and China, thus far American influence has proved to be prevailing in the diplomatic game. In other words, Iran did not manage to divide the 5+1 Powers and gain the support of both Russia and China in its nuclear program.
The immediate remarks by US President Obama on Resolution 1929 as released by the White House on June 9, 2010, focused on that “these sanctions show the united view of the international community that a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is in nobody’s interest, and that nations must be held accountable for challenging the global non-proliferation regime. The Iranian government must understand that true security will not come through the pursuit of nuclear weapons. True security will come through adherence to International Law and the demonstration of its peaceful intent.” And concluded, “We recognize Iran’s rights. But with those rights come responsibilities. And time and again, the Iranian government has failed to meet those responsibilities. Iran concealed a nuclear enrichment facility in Qom that raised serious questions about the nature of its program”.
Iran's official reaction to the UN Security Council Resolution 1929 as issued by its Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on June 18, 2010, was that the Islamic Republic has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, while special reference was made on the last report by the Director General of the IAEA, published only a day before the Resolution, which reiterated for the 22nd time that Iran’s activities have not diverted from their peaceful objectives.
Additionally, the Iranian parliament, in response to the new UN sanctions Resolution, voted overwhelmingly on June 16, 2010 to study a bill that if approved would allow a reciprocal inspection of foreign ships and also bar inspection of the Iranian nuclear sites beyond the NPT requirements. Of the 197 MPs present in the parliament, 180 voted to study the proposed bill, 4 voted against, and 4 abstained. Since Resolution 1929 allows inspection of Iranian ships, Iran appears ready to exert reciprocal inspection of foreign ships in the Strait of Hormuz if any Iranian ship is inspected.
Also, Iran has publicly welcomed US companies to invest in the country’s economic projects with no limitations. At the same time, Tehran expressed its satisfaction over the recent position taken by the US National Foreign Trade Council rebuffing economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic, while at the same time Iran announced its aim to establish a joint trade committee with three North American countries in a bid to create an opportunity to exchange information between Iranian firms and companies in the three North American states, as confirmed by the chairman of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mine, Mohammad Nahavandian.
At the same time, Iran appears determined to review its cooperation with Russia within a long-term framework, as reaction to the position adopted by Russia in the UN Security Council vote and to the Russian delay for the delivery of the S-300 anti-missile system. Reports leaked from the French capital disclose that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, during talks with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on June 11, 2010, stated that Russia decided to "freeze the delivery of the S-300 missiles". According to the Iranian position, Russia is in flagrant breach of its contractual obligations towards Iran since Moscow has so far abstained to deliver the system on the promised date while it has been prepaid for the deal. The S-300 system, is a vital air defence project for Iran as it can track targets and fire at aircraft 120 kilometers (75 miles) away, feature high jamming immunity, and it is capable to simultaneously engage up to 100 targets.
On a final flashpoint background note as related to Iran’s nuclear program, it is important to stress that it was the administration of President Gerald Ford in the 1970s that convinced Iran to pursue nuclear energy as sustainable alternative to hydrocarbon based production. Before the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran did actually receive US assistance under the Atoms for Peace program to build a nuclear research reactor in Tehran (TRR). For more than 30 years the TRR has produced medical isotopes for the treatment of some 800.000 cancer patients. That research reactor is now running out of fuel.
During the early 2000s, in a gesture of goodwill, Iran’s reformist government at that time temporarily suspended its entire nuclear enrichment program and, in December 2003, signed and implemented the IAEA Additional Protocol that provides for more intrusive inspections than those required under the NPT. However, Iran resumed its enrichment program and dropped its Additional Protocol cooperation.
In the Fall of 2009, the US proposed that Iran swap, in a third country, 1.200 kilograms (2.646 pounds) of its low-enriched uranium (LED) for the higher-enriched uranium needed to fuel the TRR. Iran accepted this offer, in principle, but demanded guarantees to ensure it would actually receive the needed fuel. On May 17, 2010, Turkey, Brazil and Iran signed a third-country swap agreement that was the same deal earlier offered by the US, except for a clause that provided for the return of Iran’s LED in the event the enriched fuel was not delivered within a year.
Note: Resolution 1929 imposes restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities, its ballistic missile program, and for the first time, its conventional military, It creates a new framework to crack down Iranian banks and financial transactions. It targets entities, individuals and institutions including those associated with the Revolutionary Guard. Resolution 1929 aims to present the most comprehensive sanctions faced by Iran.
Following are excerpts of Resolution 1929 (2010).
The Security Council,
Notingwith serious concern that Iran has constructed an enrichment facility at Qom in breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities, ……and noting that Iran has enriched uranium to 20 per cent, and did so without notifying the IAEA with sufficient time for it to adjust the existing safeguards procedures,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes and noting in this regard the efforts of Turkey and Brazil towards an agreement with Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor that could serve as a confidence-building measure,
Reaffirms that, in accordance with Iran’s obligations under previous resolutions to suspend all reprocessing, heavy water-related and enrichment-related activities, Iran shall not begin construction on any new uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility and shall discontinue any ongoing construction of any uranium-enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related facility; (Article 6)
Decides that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran, from or through their territories or by their nationals or individuals subject to their jurisdiction, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, or related materiel, including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) (“the Committee”), decides further that all States shall prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms and related materiel, and, in this context, calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufacture and use of all other arms and related materiel; (Article 8)
Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the individuals and entities listed in Annex I of this resolution and to any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and to any individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated individuals or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) or this resolution; (Article 11)
Notes that States, consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea, may request inspections of vessels on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, and calls upon all States to cooperate in such inspections if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions; (article 15)
Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
Commends the Director General of the IAEA for his 21 October 2009 proposal of a draft Agreement between the IAEA and the Governments of the Republic of France, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor, regrets that Iran has not responded constructively to the 21 October 2009 proposal, and encourages the IAEA to continue exploring such measures to build confidence consistent with and in furtherance of the Council’s resolutions;
No comments:
Post a Comment