"Americans are Watching the Events
with Curiosity"
"
Conducted by Antonia Dimou
Q. A metaphor for the unrest spreading across the Arab world is an earthquake that is changing the ground underneath. Is there a common cause and what are the reasons of unrest in the countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula?
A. While the impact of sudden change and chaos may resemble that of an earthquake, the similarities end there. The revolutions, changes, and upheavals have a human component and are not entirely inevitable. There are no non-reversible outcomes. On the other hand, in each of the North African and Gulf scenarios, there were a variety of social, political, economic, and even cultural decisions by leadership and the revolutionaries themselves that could have made the need for protests/unrest unnecessary.
For instance, in nearly all cases to date, leaders could have opted out for an acceptable replacement or elections. Ben Ali, Mubarak, Saleh, etc. had those options. They chose not to believe they were vulnerable – but for years citizens wanted them out. Besides corruption, however, and their own increasing loss of control, it is probably safe to say that their countries, and others in the region, have recently suffered the whip end of the global recession resulting in the severe drop in expatriate earnings, increasing cost of imports, increasing cost of energy, obligatory rises in subsidies, etc. Although leadership changes came, there was also an expectation that economic improvements would soon follow – this was as large a driver as the push for democracy.
Q. The split in NATO over its Libya operation has brought into light the differences within the alliance over the terms and goals of the mission, and the inevitably limiting effect of the alliance's consensus-based decision-making, as initially France was reluctant to hand NATO control of the Libyan mission, while Germany and Turkey opposed any military intervention, sparking the most bitter debate since the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. As the situation stands today, do you think that NATO in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis needs to look into and undertake some form of mission and structural revision?
A. NATO is not organized for quick action nor pursuing common objectives, when there is no threat to the actual member states nor clear ends. For many of the NATO members, Libya had become a new “friend” or at the very least provided a new “near abroad” market for resources and investment. Even as we speak the mission remains unclear and creeping toward more complexity. The greatest gap is between those favoring “protection of the population” vis-à-vis “elimination of Qadhafi.” A review should be conducted frequently, consistent with the views of the UN. But, more important than reviews is the need for clarity of purpose – that’s what will gain popular support by participants and continue funding streams.
Q. The strategic goal of the NATO operation and the UN Security Council Resolution that authorized it is to stop the fighting in Libya, creating a cease-fire and enabling a political solution. Has the manner in which NATO pursued the mission been consistent with that goal?
A. I cannot say for sure whether pursuit of the mission has been consistent because to achieve the UN Security Council Resolution goals there will be several interpretations of what the centres of gravity might actually be. Some will want to press against the front lines, others will target logistics, and yet again some will aim at the leadership and its resources.
Q. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have triggered a domino effect of protests calling for democratic reforms across the Arab world. It looks like a wave in the making that might remake geopolitical and internal arrangements of politics within and across the Arab world. That said, do you share the view that we are witnessing the end of the old Middle East, and how should the US act to protect its vital regional interests without appearing to be a fair-weather ally or encouraging instability?
A. I do not believe that there has been a change in the old way of doing business. There is simply no deep and fundamental understanding of democracy beyond voting and the need to be able to change leaders occasionally. If Ben Ali had stepped aside, there would have been elections again in Tunisia, without a revolution. If Mubarak had called for elections, or even stated that he was not running for election (he had great opportunities to do so at least twice in 2010), there would have been no great uproar in Tahrir Square.
Middle Easterners still want a “sheikh of sheikhs”, a charismatic, powerful figure who will fairly disperse the spoils. How this individual comes to power is less important. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the population was seeing the pie poorly divided, with the top leaders (government, business and military) getting more than is tolerable.
The US has many regional interests, from military basing and access to trade and resourcing. But the US must hedge its bets - the revolutions are not complete, for e.g. in Egypt. If the military is unable to promote civilian rule quickly, or if the military is sufficiently weakened that a popular mish-mash takes over then the future will be difficult if not chaotic.
Q. According to regional experts, the massive wave of protests in Tunisia and Egypt in particular set off a chain reaction that has blown up the entire region, and has engulfed most of the states of North Africa and the Middle East, with spreading effects into countries like Syria. That said, how is what is happening in the Arab world being seen by the Americans at the moment and how is it affecting the US?
A. Americans are watching the events with curiosity and as usual are cheering the underdogs. But let’s be honest, none of the uprisings has been significant or meaningful. No strategy nor policy of note has been impacted. Even the rise in oil prices is seen as speculation-based and not the result of regional problems.
On the other hand, Syria is a very interesting case in that it touches directly on the core US issue of the “Israeli” question. What happens in Syria could affect that process, impact Iranian influence in the region and Lebanon, and affect Hizballah’s ability to cause mayhem. This is the show to watch. Disturbances in Saudi Arabia would be a close second.
Q. US policy is a major balancing act. The United States has several interests at stake in the Middle East, like fighting terrorism and guaranteeing Israel's security. On the issue of Israel’s security, recently some concerns surfaced with regards to whether the new president-to-be in Egypt will honour the peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979 or whether the treaty will be revised at best, or scrapped at worst. How do you think the US should deal with such a new policy challenge?
A. The arguments for who benefits from the peace treaty tend to offset each other. Both Israel and Egypt have done well. Assuming logic prevails, Egyptians will realize that abandoning the Treaty will be costly, including a loss in tourist and investment revenues in the Sinai, a need to beef up forces in order to move them into the Sinai, and a loss of the annual one billion dollars plus from the US - and possible loss of US cooperation in military co-production.
The US should be active in promoting continuity on the one stable front Israel has (even Jordan is a bit shaky these days). An outbreak of friction between Egypt and Israel would be extremely costly to the US in many ways – to include deployment costs, logistical support to one or the other, etc.
Q. Calls for Arab governments to embrace democracy have been central to US policy that took into account the conflicting socio-political pressures that have long divided Arab societies. The recent uprisings in the wider Middle East which called for democratic reforms have given rise to discussions as to whether Turkey's relative success at wedding democratic freedoms with radical Islam can serve as a model. What is your opinion on that?
A. Turkey is of course a fairly good example; however, the Turks have been working at it for some time to fine tune and their experience in Europe is broader. It is too early to tell whether the revolutions in the Middle East will all lead to democratization. To date I would see we have seen a recognition of “people power.”
There’s always the possibility that this will not so much translate into democracy as much as a tool with which to beat governments into submission. The question then will be who gets to wield that tool.
* Colonel (ret) Normand L. St. Pierre recently completed six years as the MFO Director General’s Representative in Cairo, Egypt and is now a private consultant on Middle East issues. His interest in the Middle East began in 1980, while still in the US Army. As a regional specialist, he was assigned twice to the US Embassy in Tunisia, served as an advisor to the Lebanese Army in the ‘80s, and was later the US Defense Attaché to Syria.
Prior to his retirement from the military Colonel St. Pierre was the Middle East Division Chief in the Strategic Policy Division of the Joint Staff and then Assistant Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs for the Middle East and Asia at JCS. He was subsequently the political military advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State, Near East Affairs at the US State Department. Prior to his work with the MFO he was a Regional Manager for a major US firm in Algeria for four years.
Mr. St. Pierre is a graduate of Bentley University and received his Masters in International Relations from Boston University. He and his wife Pearl currently reside in Leeds, Maine.
** SOURCE: Middle East Observer, Issue #4, Vol. 2, March-June 2011
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